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1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Reversing organizational declines which are commonly defined as “conditions in 
which a substantial, absolute decrease in an organization’s resource base occurs over a 
specified period of time” is a specifically challenging task that has aroused interest of both 
academic scholars and business practitioners to the same extent (Cameron, Kim, & Whetten, 
1987, p. 224). The relevance of this task within today’s business landscape seems intuitive as 
the frequency and intensity of political and economic shocks significantly increased and 
major technological advancements (e.g., automation and digitalization) fundamentally disrupt 
existing business models with the effect of an increasing threat of experiencing organizational 
declines. But not only today, organizational decline has ever been a specifically threatening 
episode of a firm’s lifetime explaining why this phenomenon and, in particular, the question 
on what happens after organizational declines has early attracted organization theorists.  
Beginning with Whetten (1980) and his call for more research on this topic, there still 
is an ongoing debate among organization theorists whether organizational decline fuels 
innovation or rigidity (e.g., Audia & Greve, 2006; McKinley, Latham, & Braun, 2014; Mone, 
McKinley, & Barker, 1998). Innovation might open up new revenue streams helping improve 
performance while it can also drain very important resources and further destabilize 
performance (McKinley, 1993; McKinley et al., 2014). In the same vein, rigidity and its 
underlying risk avoidance might help reversing organizational declines while its clear focus 
on efficiency improvements can also hinder firms from introducing new profitable products 
and services (e.g., Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). Together, this debate is rather 
conceptual, still inconclusive and primarily focuses on the mentioned dichotomy. However, it 
is also the theoretical root of many recently discussed topics within the literature of 
turnaround management which primarily focuses on why and how some firms are more 
effective in reversing organizational declines than others.      
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Though there is a number of seminal studies in the field of research on organizational 
decline and turnaround management research (e.g., Arogyaswamy, Barker, & Yasai-
Ardekani, 1995; Barker & Mone, 1994; Pearce & Robbins, 1993), the most recent review of 
prior work on organizational decline and turnaround management research shows that 
conceptual and empirical findings are largely consistent in showing that response factors (e.g., 
the interpretation and perception of organizational declines) and turnaround actions (e.g., 
workforce downsizing as a means to shrink the scope of a firm or product diversification as a 
means to expand the scope of a firm) seem main building blocks of effectively reversing 
organizational declines (Trahms, Ndofor, & Sirmon, 2013).   
Extant research on response factors of organizational decline has largely focused on 
the role of managerial cognition and particularly underpins that managers’ ability to identify 
the true causes of decline as well as their ability to accurately assess its severity are important 
preconditions to effectively manage a firm’s turnaround (e.g., Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; 
Barker & Patterson, 1996; Ford, 1985; Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Trahms et al., 2013). 
However, there is no consensus about the exact role of managerial cognition in achieving 
turnarounds as, in particular, the perception and interpretation of the severity of declines is 
argued to determine either turnaround outcomes directly (e.g., Francis & Desai, 2005) or the 
choice of turnaround actions (e.g., Musteen, Liang, & Barker, 2011). Further, a detailed 
analysis of extant research on turnaround actions specifically underpins why Trahms, Ndofor, 
and Sirmon postulate that “much of the turnaround domain remains uninvestigated” (2013, p. 
1303). In essence, there is a remarkable ambiguity of findings regarding the effectiveness of 
turnaround actions and multiple important contingencies remain unexplored (e.g., Barker & 
Mone, 1994; Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Wan, 2003; Morrow, Johnson, & Busenitz, 2004; Ndofor, 
Vanevenhoven, & Barker, 2013; Pennings, Lee, & Van Witteloostuijn, 1998). Consequently, 
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a profound and reliable answer to the question on how to effectively reverse declining firm 
performance is still missing. 
To help resolve this shortcoming, Trahms et al. (2013) call for intensifying research on 
the effectiveness of different turnaround actions. However, this call is by far not enough to 
appropriately answer the question and this is exactly where this dissertation project starts. The 
dissertation provides three single studies which not only identify and rigorously investigate 
unexplored contingencies governing the effectiveness of turnaround actions but also break 
with the established research approaches both conceptually as well as methodologically in 
order to properly answer the research question. As an overview, Table 1 highlights the aim 
and scope as well as key methodological characteristics of each study. 
Table 1: Key characteristics of the single studies 
 
 
1st study: 
Organizational resilience 
2nd study: 
Workforce downsizing 
3rd study: 
Turnaround duration 
Aim and 
scope 
Apply the concept of resilience 
in an organizational context 
and empirically test its inherent 
relationship between the 
absorption of volatility in 
organizational declines and 
subsequent performance 
recovery. 
Understand the relevance of 
organizational networks of a 
firm in the context of 
performance outcomes of 
workforce downsizing as an 
important turnaround action 
and identify potential remedies 
(e.g., employee turnover) for 
negative individual outcomes 
of workforce downsizing.  
Extend the established research 
logic of investigating direct 
performance effects of 
managerial cognition as well 
as turnaround actions and thus 
empirically test the mediating 
role of turnaround duration 
regarding the relationships 
between managerial cognition 
as well as turnaround actions 
and turnaround performance in 
the aftermath of organizational 
declines. 
Methods Empirical investigation of all 
North American 
pharmaceutical firms 
experiencing organizational 
declines between 1988 and 
2015.  
Simulation approach adopting 
and extending the original 
organizational learning model 
by March (1991). 
Empirical investigation of all 
North American single 
business firms experiencing 
organizational declines 
between 1988 and 2015. 
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The following section briefly summarizes each study and points out the contribution to 
the overarching research question of this dissertation project. The first study introduces the 
concept of resilience originating from psychology and applies it to an organizational context. 
Organizational resilience describes a firm’s ability to absorb volatility caused by discrete 
shocks or continuous declines and its ability to achieve strong performance recovery 
following these shocks. Applying an organizational routine and dynamic capability 
perspective, this study develops a theoretical underpinning for the assumed linkage. Based on 
a large-scale empirical investigation, the findings support the notion of a positive relationship 
and highlight that asset retrenchment, financial slack, and CEO tenure determine its strength. 
Together, this study shows that also the manner in which firms undergo organizational 
declines (i.e., by absorbing performance volatility) explains subsequent firm performance 
increases while specific turnaround actions such as asset retrenchment merely strengthen this 
effect. Though extant research has primarily focused on better understanding turnaround 
actions, the organizational resilience perspective suggests that not only organizational 
behavior in the aftermath of declines but also during organizational declines (i.e., the 
buffering of performance volatility) seems, at least, equally important in order to reverse 
declining firm performance. 
The second study sheds light on performance outcomes of workforce downsizing as 
one of the most prominent turnaround actions. This study adopts a simulation approach to 
rigorously examine how workforce downsizing affects organizational learning via a firm’s 
formal (advice) and informal (friendship) network. We therefore compare performance 
outcomes of two structurally different downsizing strategies (i.e., different formal network 
positions of downsized employees) and investigate the influence of five different informal 
network configurations. The downsizing strategies are delayering (i.e., the layoff of middle 
managers) and thinning (i.e., the layoff of blue-collar workers). The informal network 
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configurations differ in terms of status homophily (i.e., the extent to which friendship ties are 
limited to employees at the same hierarchical level). Without considering informal network 
effects, we find that thinning consistently outperforms delayering. By incorporating the 
influence of a firm’s informal network, we find that high levels of status homophily render the 
organization immune to adverse consequences of the survivor syndrome while low and/or 
medium status homophily configurations might even amplify negative effects. Lastly, we 
identify a potential remedy to negative performance outcomes in the form of increased levels 
of post-downsizing employee turnover. Together, this study demonstrates that intra-
organizational networks (i.e., the configuration of formal and informal networks of 
employees) and the extent of employee turnaround in the aftermath of workforce downsizing 
significantly influence the effectiveness of workforce downsizing as one of the most 
prominent turnaround actions. While extant research has consistently underrepresented these 
two contingencies, their explicit consideration might help resolve parts of the ambiguity of 
findings on the effectiveness of turnaround actions. 
The third study applies a temporal perspective to research on turnaround management 
and specifically draws attention to turnaround duration as an important contingency. 
Empirical findings on the exact role of managerial cognition and direct effects of 
retrenchment and recovery actions on turnaround outcomes, however, have remained highly 
ambiguous. To help resolve this ambiguity, our study applies a temporal perspective and 
draws attention to turnaround duration as an important contingency in turnaround processes. 
In this study, we thus first analyze how managerial cognition (i.e., the severity of decline) and 
turnaround actions (i.e., retrenchment and recovery) relate to turnaround duration. In a 
subsequent step, we then examine how turnaround duration links with turnaround 
performance and whether turnaround duration mediates the relationship between managerial 
cognition as well as turnaround actions and turnaround performance. Our empirical findings 
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evidence that turnaround duration is an important process characteristic that directly affects 
turnaround performance as well as fully mediates the influence of recovery actions (i.e., 
expansions of diversification scope and CEO replacement) on turnaround performance. In 
contrast, the influence of asset retrenchment on performance is neither associated nor 
mediated by turnaround duration. Further, we find an inconsistent mediation regarding the 
severity of decline suggesting that, in some cases, specifically severe performance declines 
are associated with short turnaround duration and hence lower turnaround performance. On 
average and independent from turnaround duration, specifically severe declines are directly 
associated with greater turnaround performance though. Together, this study shows that the 
consideration of a temporal perspective contributes to an advanced understanding of what 
determines performance outcomes in the aftermath of organizational declines.   
The following three chapters each represent one of the above summarized studies 
starting with empirically testing the concept of organizational resilience and closing with 
explaining the importance of a temporal perspective in order to revere organizational declines. 
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2. UNPACKING ORGANIZATIONAL RESILIENCE: A THEORETICAL AND 
EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION OF THE LINKAGE BETWEEN VOLATILITY 
ABSORPTION AND PERFORMANCE RECOVERY 
 
(This chapter is based on a paper co-authored by Matthias Brauer) 
 
2.1. Introduction 
A cross-disciplinary review of psychology, ecology and management science 
literatures suggests that resilient organizations are characterized by their ability to absorb 
volatility caused by discrete or continuous internal or external shocks and their ability to 
achieve strong performance recovery following these shocks (e.g., APA, 2015; Holling, 1973; 
Lengnick-Hall, Beck, & Lengnick-Hall, 2011; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007; Williams, Gruber, 
Sutcliffe, Shepherd, & Zhao, 2017). The notion of organizational resilience has regained 
considerable prominence in public and scholarly debates in the wake of more frequently 
occurring economic, political and societal crises that have majorly affected organizations’ 
performance and survival (Annarelli & Nonino, 2016; Ortiz-De-Mandojana & Bansal, 2016; 
van der Vegt, Essens, Wahlström, & George, 2015; Williams et al., 2017; Williams & 
Shepherd, 2016). For instance, in the opening paragraph of his letter to shareholders Bob 
Dudley, CEO of BP, stated: “The work we have done to reshape and strengthen BP after 2010 
stood us in good stead to withstand these conditions and last year we took further action to 
make the business more resilient in the short term” (BP, 2015, p. 8). Similarly, General 
Electric’s (GE) top level management has highlighted to its shareholders and employees that 
“[…] as the world is increasingly volatile, our ability to anticipate, respond to and recover 
from events is critical” (GE, 2016).  
But despite the concept’s imminent importance in today’s economic environment, a 
critical review of extant organizational resilience literature shows that our conceptual 
understanding of organizational resilience and empirical work in this domain are 
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underdeveloped (Anand & Singh, 1997; Cameron et al., 1987; Marcus & Nichols, 1999; 
Ortiz-De-Mandojana & Bansal, 2016; van der Vegt et al., 2015; Williams et al., 2017). 
Essentially, troubles start with the fundamental assumption that a firm’s general ability to 
absorb (performance) volatility is positively associated with strong performance recovery in 
the aftermath of a major industry downturn or exogenous shock. Though this link might be 
intuitively appealing, it is neither theoretically nor practically self-evident. For instance, prior 
work in organization theory on so-called high-reliability organizations (HROs; e.g., nuclear 
power plants, traffic control centers, hospitals) has shown that a firm’s ability to absorb 
volatility caused by discrete or continuous shocks may actually come at the expense of lower 
efficiency levels (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). This is because the ability to absorb 
volatility often requires the build-up of organizational slack and redundancies so that, for 
example, process efficiencies and capacity utilizations are not optimized. While high 
reliability organizations usually operate in industry settings in which efficiency objectives are 
secondary, in highly competitive, profit-seeking industry settings the potential inefficiencies 
associated with building up and preserving the capability of volatility absorption could in fact 
lead to competitive disadvantages. Further, a critical review of extant contributions on 
organizational resilience shows that a theoretically sound explanation of why volatility 
absorption should be positively associated with performance recovery is largely amiss. 
Similarly, systematic empirical evidence on the true nature and strength of this relationship is 
found to be sparse, if not non-existent. As a result, we hold very little knowledge on the 
factors that condition the relationship between volatility absorption and performance 
recovery. 
To address these salient issues, our study’s first research objective is to develop a 
theoretical rationale for the assumed positive relationship between volatility absorption and 
performance recovery, as suggested by the concept of organizational resilience. In order to do 
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so, we draw on the organizational routine and dynamic capability perspectives. Our second 
major research objective that directly builds on the above is to empirically investigate the 
actual nature and strength of the relationship between a firm’s ability to absorb volatility and 
subsequent performance recovery. Additionally, we aim to further our understanding about 
organizational contingencies that strengthen or weaken the proposed positive relationship 
between volatility absorption and performance recovery. Specifically, we study the 
moderating influences of asset retrenchment, financial slack and CEO tenure on the main 
relationship. Building on the organizational routine and dynamic capability perspectives, we 
propose that these factors influence the set of key routines and major organizational 
capabilities (i.e., mindfulness, effective resource configuration) through which volatility 
absorption is positively linked with performance recovery.  
Based on our sample of all US pharmaceutical companies over a time period of 28 
years (1988-2015), we find evidence for a positive relationship between volatility absorption 
and performance recovery, supporting the fundamental proposition of organizational 
resilience literature. Our empirical results further show that asset retrenchment and financial 
slack amplify the positive relationship between volatility absorption and performance 
recovery. In contrast, we further find that CEO tenure dampens the positive relationship 
between volatility absorption and firm performance recovery.  
Collectively, our study thus contributes to organization theory in several ways. First, 
by reviewing prior work on organizational resilience across different literature streams and 
disciplines, we generate an improved understanding of the conceptual building blocks of 
organizational resilience. Aside from identifying the major conceptual building blocks of 
organizational resilience (i.e., volatility absorption and performance recovery), we further 
extend organizational resilience literature by developing a theoretical rationale for a positive 
linkage between volatility absorption and performance recovery. To do so, we are first to 
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incorporate the organizational routine and dynamic capability perspectives into the study of 
organizational resilience. Second, we make an empirical contribution to organizational 
resilience literature by examining the relationship between a firm’s ability to absorb volatility 
and firm performance recovery across time, and by showing that the strength of this key 
relationship is contingent on managerial and organizational practices and characteristics. 
Third, we demonstrate the relevance of organizational resilience in industry downturns and 
thereby apply the concept to a “[…] more prosaic organizational setting” (Williams et al., 
2017), whereas extant research on organizational resilience has predominantly focused on 
very rare and discrete shocks (e.g., Alexander, 2013). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. As a background for our 
theorizing and empirical analysis, we first present and discuss extant conceptualizations of 
organizational resilience. Drawing on an organizational routine and dynamic capability 
perspective, we then develop a theoretical underpinning for the positive relationship between 
volatility absorption and performance recovery. Subsequently, we theorize on selected 
managerial and organizational factors conditioning our main relationship. Next, we present 
our empirical design and the results of our empirical analysis. We conclude with a discussion 
of our findings and their implications. 
 
2.2. Background: Prior conceptualizations of resilience 
The concept of organizational resilience has developed from work on resilience in a 
wide variety of research fields such as psychology (Werner, Bierman, & French, 1971) and 
ecology (Holling, 1973). The following discussion of established definitions and 
conceptualizations of resilience across disciplines serves to identify the construct’s main 
building blocks. Based on these insights, we then highlight major unresolved issues and 
shortcomings in the extant body of knowledge on organizational resilience. 
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In individual psychology, the notion of resilience goes back to a set of studies by 
Werner et al. (1971) who investigated the coping behavior of children growing up under 
detrimental conditions such as abusive or drug-addicted parents (Masten, Best, & Garmezy, 
1990; Werner, 1997; Werner et al., 1971; Werner & Smith, 2001). The main finding was that 
some of these children mimicked the behavior of their parents in their further course of life 
whereas others did not adopt such a way of life. Hence, Werner et al. (1971) called the 
children of the latter group resilient children and thereby started off an ongoing discussion 
about resilience and specifically its predictors within individual psychology literature. The 
American Psychological Association (APA) nowadays defines resilience as a specific 
capability allowing individuals to withstand adversity and properly recover from traumatic 
incidents. Recent research on resilience in the field of (individual) psychology which has 
largely focused on predictors of resilience indicates that individuals demonstrating resilience 
embody optimism as well as positivity and are particularly able to find a balance between 
negative and positive emotions (Bonanno, 2004; Bonanno, Romero, & Klein, 2015). From a 
conceptual point of view, there is an ongoing debate whether individual resilience is a 
personal trait, a process or a capacity (Luthar, Cicchetti, & Becker, 2000). To further this 
discussion, the recent review by Kossek and Perrigino (2016) discusses literature on 
individual resilience in organizational behavior and management literature, specifically 
drawing on individual careers (London, 1983) and positive psychology (Fredrickson, 2001). 
Kossek and Perrigino (2016) conclude that resilience can be understood as the synthesis of 
individual traits (e.g., hardiness), processes (e.g., coping and appraisal) and capacities (e.g., 
sufficient resources) for positively adapting to adversity. 
In ecology, resilience was first discussed by Holling (1973) who introduced the 
concept of resilience to describe and measure the ability of ecological systems (e.g., fish 
populations) to absorb change and still persist. Holling’s work (1973) has been constitutive of 
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the emergence of the concepts of ecological resilience and engineering resilience. The main 
distinction between these two types of resilience lies in the specificity of their respective 
measurements. Ecological resilience describes the magnitude of disturbance caused by 
internal and external shocks which an ecological system can absorb before the system changes 
its structure (Cumming et al., 2005; Holling, 1996). Engineering resilience is measured by the 
magnitude of resistance (e.g., the resistance of specific materials) to disturbance and 
subsequent speed of recovery (O'Neill, 1986; Pimm, 1984; Tilman & Downing, 1994). 
Specifically, material sciences nowadays use the concept of engineering resilience to indicate 
the extent to which a certain material bends (i.e., absorbs energy) and bounces back or breaks 
when stressed (Askeland & Wright, 2013). Thus, both conceptualizations, ecological and 
engineering resilience, have in common that they emphasize the ability to recover from 
internal or external disturbances (Dinh, Pasman, Gao, & Mannan, 2012).  
Consistent with the original works in psychology, ecology and engineering, extant 
conceptualizations of organizational resilience in organization and management science 
emphasize the ability of resilient organizations to absorb or deal with adversary developments 
and to recover from these (see Annarelli & Nonino, 2016; Linnenluecke, 2017; Williams et 
al., 2017 for a review and discussion). However, the understanding of organizational 
resilience in organization and management science has evolved over time. Initially, 
organizational resilience was merely seen as the capability to rebound from adverse situations 
and to sustain performance levels rather than to improve them (Gittell, Cameron, Lim, & 
Rivas, 2006; Mallak, 1998). Over time, management scholars, however, have increasingly 
described organizational resilience as the ability to buffer disruptive events coupled with the 
explicit notion of performance recovery (Lengnick-Hall et al., 2011; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 
2007). Based on this understanding, both components (i.e., absorption and recovery) have 
been refined even further (e.g., Annarelli & Nonino, 2016; Carvalho, Barroso, Machado, 
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Azevedo, & Cruz-Machado, 2012; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007). For instance, more recent work 
has stressed that not simply performance persistence but performance improvement 
characterizes organizational resilience (Carvalho et al., 2012; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007). 
Consequently, Vogus and Sutcliffe (2007) define organizational resilience as “[…] the 
maintenance of positive adjustment under challenging conditions such that the organization 
emerges from those conditions strengthened […]” (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 3418). 
In summary, the review of resilience literature across disciplines shows that there is 
consensus on organizational resilience constituting of two main components: a.) the ability to 
absorb volatility caused by either discrete shocks or continuous strains and b.) subsequent 
performance recovery. Table 2 summarizes main definitions and highlights the most 
prominent building blocks of the organizational resilience construct in organization and 
management science research. 
While organization science research has converged to a fairly unanimous 
understanding of organizational resilience, a critical review of organizational resilience 
literature reveals a set of unresolved issues and shortcomings. First, the theoretical 
explanation for why a positive relationship between volatility absorption and firm 
performance recovery should be expected has remained largely underdeveloped. Second, the 
positive relationship between volatility absorption and firm performance recovery has not 
been subject to systematic, rigorous empirical examination. Third, we lack a general 
understanding of the managerial and organizational contingencies that condition the 
relationship between volatility absorption and performance recovery. 
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Table 2: Conceptualizations of resilience across disciplines 
Definitions of resilience Author(s) (Year) Discipline 
The measurement of (ecological) resilience is the 
magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before 
the system changes its structure by changing the 
variables and processes that control behavior. 
Engineering resilience: 
[…] where resistance to disturbance and speed of 
return to equilibrium are used to measure the property. 
Holling (1996), 
O´Neil et al. 
(1986), Pimm 
(1984), Tilman & 
Downing (1994) 
Ecology/ 
Engineering 
Resilience is the process of adapting well in the face of 
adversity, trauma, tragedy, threats or significant sources 
of stress — such as family and relationship problems, 
serious health problems or workplace and financial 
stressors. It means “bouncing back” from difficult 
experiences. 
American 
Psychological 
Association 
(APA) 
Psychology 
Organizational resilience is defined here as a firm’s 
ability to effectively absorb, develop situation-specific 
responses to, and ultimately engage in transformative 
activities to capitalize on disruptive surprises that 
potentially threaten organization survival. 
Lengnick et al. 
(2012) 
HR 
Management 
Supply chain resilience is concerned with the system’s 
ability to return to its original state or to a new, more 
desirable, one after experiencing a disturbance, and 
avoiding the occurrence of failure modes. 
Carvalho et al. 
(2012) 
Operations 
Management 
[…] the maintenance of positive adjustment under 
challenging conditions such that the organization 
emerges from those conditions strengthened […]. 
Vogus & Sutcliffe 
(2007) Management 
Organizational resilience is the organization’s 
capability to face disruptions and unexpected events in 
advance thanks to the strategic awareness and a linked 
operational management of internal and external shocks. 
The resilience is static, when founded on preparedness 
and preventive measures to minimize threats probability 
and to reduce any impact that may occur, and dynamic, 
when founded on the ability of managing disruptions 
and unexpected events to shorten unfavorable 
aftermaths and maximize the organization’s speed of 
recovery to the original or to a new more desirable 
state. 
Annarelli & 
Nonino (2015) Management 
 
Though the assumption about a positive relationship between volatility absorption and 
performance recovery is prevalent in organizational resilience literature (Gittell et al., 2006; 
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Ortiz-De-Mandojana & Bansal, 2016), an explicit theoretical underpinning and empirical 
evidence are widely amiss. Although the assumption about a positive relationship might seem 
intuitively appealing, research findings on high reliability organizations (HROs; e.g., nuclear 
power plants, traffic control centers, hospitals) challenge its general validity. 
HROs have usually perfected the ability to absorb volatility as the failure to do so in 
most cases has disastrous consequences (Weick et al., 1999). In order to succeed in absorbing 
volatility, HROs however build up and deliberately maintain slack as well as redundancies. 
These precautions come at the expense of lower efficiency. Similarly, research on global 
institutions (i.e., intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations) considers resilience 
and performance as two contradicting concepts implying that these organizations might focus 
on either the absorption of volatility or the maximization of performance because the 
perfection of both abilities seems simply not possible (Schemeil, 2013). Collectively, the 
findings on HROs and global institutions thus illustrate that volatility absorption and strong 
financial performance (recovery) are often difficult to align. 
In absence of an existing theoretical underpinning for the assumed positive linkage 
between volatility absorption and performance recovery in organizational resilience literature 
and in light of seemingly contradictory empirical evidence, we next turn our attention towards 
developing such a theoretical rationale. To do so, we draw on the organizational routine and 
dynamic capability perspectives. We further derive predictions about critical contingencies 
conditioning the assumed positive relationship between a firm’s ability to absorb volatility 
and to generate above-average financial returns.  
 
2.3. Theory and hypotheses 
As pointed out above, the inherently assumed positive relationship between volatility 
absorption and performance recovery that is foundational to the conceptualization of 
organizational resilience is both theoretically as well as empirically non-obvious. In order to 
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establish a theoretical rationale for why previous organizational resilience literature has 
inherently assumed a positive relationship between volatility absorption and performance 
recovery, we draw on an organizational routine and dynamic capability perspective. 
Specifically, we propose in the following that a firm’s ability to absorb volatility constitutes a 
dynamic capability. Dynamic capabilities have been argued to be the sources of enterprise-
level competitive advantage (Schreyögg & Kliesch-Eberl, 2007; Teece, 2007, 2014; Teece, 
Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Zollo & Winter, 2002). In keeping with prior theorizing on dynamic 
capabilities and their microfoundations (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Kleinbaum & Stuart, 2014; 
Teece, 2007, 2014), we propose that volatility absorption, as a type of dynamic firm 
capability, rests on two major organizational capabilities (i.e., organizational mindfulness, 
effective resource configuration) that are themselves originating from the applications and 
ongoing refinement of a set of organizational routines (e.g., reluctance to simplify 
interpretations, sensitivity to operations, preoccupation with failure) (see Figure 1).1 
As proposed by Teece (2007), dynamic capabilities can be disaggregated into three 
capacities 1) sensing of opportunities and threats, 2) seizing of opportunities and threats and 
3) reconfiguring. “Sensing” refers to continuous scanning activities in order to detect and 
better understand ongoing and looming environmental changes. ”Seizing” refers to the 
evaluation and selection of organizational responses to these changes, while “reconfiguring” 
describes the actual “implementation” of these responses in form of resource deployment, 
recombination or renewal.  
  
1 The foundational build-up which we describe in Figure 1 is not only in keeping with Teece’s (2007) 
conceptualization but also in accordance with prior research that has reasoned that dynamic capabilities require 
specific and difficult-to-replicate organizational capabilities through which they are eventually transmitted 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, 2007). 
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Figure 1: Conceptual model of organizational resilience 
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For an organization to be effective in volatility absorption, all these three capacities 
are essentially required (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007). Sensing is in essence a function of 
organizational mindfulness. Organizational mindfulness describes an organization’s state of 
active awareness characterized by the continual creation and refinement of categories, 
openness to new information and willingness to incorporate various perspectives (Fiol & 
O'Connor, 2003; Langer, 1989; Levinthal & Rerup, 2006; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006; Weick et 
al., 1999). The major organizational routines that have been argued to create organizational 
mindfulness are the following: an organization’s general reluctance to simplify 
interpretations, sensitivity to operations, deference to expertise and preoccupation with failure 
(Fiol & O'Connor, 2003; Weick et al., 1999). 
Similarly, seizing and reconfiguring are essential for volatility absorption. These 
microfoundations ensure, for instance, that resources are allocated to business areas and 
operations that face immediate threats, and that valuable resources are protected from threats 
and leveraged to avert threats (Ortiz-De-Mandojana & Bansal, 2016). In accordance with the 
fundamental conceptualization by Teece (2007), the dynamic capability of volatility 
absorption can thus be understood to rest on two major organizational capabilities: 
organizational mindfulness and resource configuration.  
Important for our purposes, conceptualizing volatility absorption as a dynamic 
capability that builds on organizational mindfulness and a firm’s resource configuration 
ability allows to rationalize and to explain why volatility absorption is assumed to be 
positively linked with performance recovery in organizational resilience literature. 
Mindfulness has been argued and found to be positively associated with increased chances for 
organizational survival (Weick et al., 1999) and superior individual task performance (Dane, 
2011; Dane & Brummel, 2014; Reb, Narayanan, & Ho, 2015; Shonin, Van Gordon, Dunn, 
Singh, & Griffiths, 2014). Further, the recurrent, collective processes that help build 
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organizational mindfulness (i.e., reluctance to simplify interpretations, sensitivity to 
operations, deference to expertise and preoccupation with failure) help an organization to 
respond more rapidly and more accurately to change, considerably raising chances for above-
average performance improvements (Ciravegna & Brenes, 2016; Vogus & Welbourne, 2003; 
Weick et al., 1999). Further, a firm’s ability to flexibly reconfigure its resource base has also 
been widely found to be positively associated with firm performance (Amit & Schoemaker, 
1993; Barney, 1991; Bloodgood & Morrow, 2003; Capron & Mitchell, 2009; Karim, 2006; 
Newbert, 2008; Powell, 2001; Priem & Butler, 2001).  
Viewing volatility absorption as a dynamic capability that rests on the two 
organizational capabilities of organizational mindfulness and effective resource 
(re)configuration, and the empirical evidence on the positive influence of these two 
organizational capabilities on firm performance leads to the following baseline hypothesis that 
is fundamental to organizational resilience literature: 
Baseline hypothesis: A firm’s ability to absorb volatility in industry downturns is 
positively associated with subsequent firm performance recovery. 
 
2.3.1. Moderating influences on the volatility absorption-performance recovery 
relationship 
Building on the outlined theoretical rationale for a positive relationship between 
volatility absorption and performance recovery, we next turn to explore three factors that are 
likely to condition this relationship: the extent of asset retrenchment, the extent of financial 
slack and CEO tenure. Our choice of moderating factors is guided by two major aspects: First, 
all of these three contingencies are managerial practices that have been found to be widely 
applied to facilitate corporate turnarounds (e.g., Barker, Patterson, & Mueller, 2001; Chen & 
Hambrick, 2012; Morrow et al., 2004; Pearce & Robbins, 1994; Robbins & Pearce, 1992; 
Tangpong, Abebe, & Li, 2015; Trahms et al., 2013). Second, we focus on these factors 
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because they are likely to influence the microfoundations of organizational mindfulness as 
well as a firm’s organizational capability of effective and efficient (re)configuration. 
Moderating influence of asset retrenchment. Within the organizational decline and 
turnaround literature, there is strong consensus and empirical evidence that asset retrenchment 
which is defined as a reduction in assets (long-term and short-term) is a frequently used 
response to deteriorating firm and industry performance (e.g., Dewitt, 1998; Hoskisson, 
Johnson, & Moesel, 1994; Morrow et al., 2004; Pearce & Robbins, 1994). Importantly for our 
theorizing, asset retrenchment is likely to positively affect the effectiveness of organizational 
routines (i.e., sensitivity to operations and reluctance to simplification etc.) which have been 
argued to establish a positive link between industry volatility absorption and performance 
recovery. 
Asset retrenchment that typically results from different forms of restructuring (e.g., 
plant closures, divestitures) specifically demonstrates a heightened sensitivity to operations 
and a particularly strong deference to expertise. This is because managers need to carefully 
consider which organizational processes and relations might be disrupted by the retrenchment 
and how related processes can be stabilized or mended (e.g., Feldman, 2014). Such analyses 
and processes particularly require a profound understanding of operational processes as well 
as high levels of managerial attention. Further, asset retrenchment also requires and fosters a 
greater reluctance to simplification as managers thereby accept and bring about a shift in the 
dominant logic of the company (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). This is because revising a 
company’s dominant logic is particularly challenging and complicated when environmental 
complexity is high such as in industry downturns (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995). More generally, 
asset retrenchment inherently requires a rethinking of multiple organizational routines and 
fuels the inclination to break with conventional wisdom (Bowman & Singh, 1993; Hoskisson 
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et al., 1994). Following our micro-foundational built-up, all this is required not only to sense 
but also to seize opportunities as well as avert threats. 
Further, the decision to retrench assets indicates that managers make resource (value) 
assessments and are motivated to improve resource allocation efficiency (Karim & Mitchell, 
2000; Vidal & Mitchell, 2015). Consequently, organizational routines that underlie the ability 
of effective resource configuration, and thus help absorb volatility, are likely to receive even 
greater levels of managerial attention in the process of asset retrenchment. This is also 
because asset retrenchment might lower strategic flexibility (e.g., lower level of 
diversification) which specifically underpins that, for example, assessing the remaining 
resources is of utmost importance. In total, it can thus be concluded that the managerial 
mindset, motivation and mechanisms that are required for asset retrenchment are well aligned 
with and supportive of the organizational capabilities (i.e., mindfulness, resource 
configuration) that are constitutive of a firm’s ability to absorb volatility. The positive 
relationship between volatility absorption and firm performance recovery is thus likely to be 
strengthened by asset retrenchment. 
Hypothesis 1: Asset retrenchment amplifies the positive relationship between a firm’s 
ability to absorb volatility in industry downturns and subsequent firm performance 
recovery. 
 
Moderating influence of financial slack. Financial slack provides a buffer in the face of 
environmental changes (e.g., Hambrick & Snow, 1977) and allows firms to more swiftly 
respond to performance downturns. This is because financial slack provides the capacity to 
redirect existing resources or to deploy new resources to stabilize core activities (Cyert & 
March, 1963; Thompson, 1967). 
Though high levels of financial slack might also breed managerial inertia (Davis & 
Stout, 1992; Leonard-Barton, 1992), this negative side effect is not likely to materialize as 
strongly in the face of high performance volatility, and more likely to be overpowered by the 
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urge to take action. In fact, it can be expected that abundant financial slack has numerous 
positive effects on the organizational routines that underlie organizational mindfulness. For 
instance, slack allows managers to dedicate more time and resources to decisions that impact 
firm survival (e.g., Bradley, Shepherd, & Wiklund, 2011). Specifically, the higher level of 
detail that managers can incorporate in their decision-making, even during performance 
downturns (Sharfman, Wolf, Chase, & Tansik, 1988), supports a rigorous deference to 
expertise. Further, the buffering effects of abundant slack allow managers to engage in more 
comprehensive analysis of the reasons for and sources of the downturn which might reside at 
an operational level. In general, slack thus allows for much greater sensitivity to operations 
that has been found to foster organizational mindfulness.  
On top of these effects that abundant financial slack might have on the effectiveness of 
routines fostering greater organizational mindfulness, high levels of slack also positively 
affect routines that enable effective and efficient resource reconfiguration. Abundant slack not 
only facilitates resource reconfiguration but is a necessary pre-condition that allows for and 
supports the rigorous assessment of resources according to their value, imitability, and 
substitutability. The quality of such resource assessments has been found to substantially 
determine the likelihood of effective performance recovery (Morrow et al., 2004; Trahms et 
al., 2013).  
Together, we thus propose that financial slack positively moderates the relationship 
between a firm’s ability to absorb volatility and subsequent firm performance recovery as 
abundant financial slack increases the effectiveness of routines underlying mindfulness and 
effective resource reconfiguration. 
Hypothesis 2: Financial slack amplifies the positive relationship between a firm’s 
ability to absorb volatility in industry downturns and subsequent firm performance 
recovery. 
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Moderating influence of CEO position tenure. Both corporate governance and corporate 
turnaround research show that CEO changes frequently occur during downturns (Chen & 
Hambrick, 2012; Fredrickson, Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988; Jenter & Kanaan, 2015; Kesner 
& Dalton, 1994; Puffer & Weintrop, 1991). A key explanation for frequent CEO changes 
during industry downturns, and crisis situations more generally, is that these specific 
circumstances require different skill sets which current CEOs often do not hold in the eyes of 
investors. Further, investors believe in a positive new CEO effect because CEOs with shorter 
position tenure are more willing to challenge taken for granted knowledge on products, 
internal processes and industry characteristics than long-tenured CEOs (Henderson, Miller, & 
Hambrick, 2006). In doing so, new CEOs are not only likely to ask employees to question 
accepted truths and standards (Chen, 2015; Miller, 1993) but also to accept and appreciate 
complexity in decision-making processes even if this might contradict with practices or 
structures which have been in place for a long time. As a result, short-tenured CEOs tend to 
break existing mental frames and to overcome a general reluctance to change (Miller, 1993; 
Simon, 1987; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001). In the same vein, newly appointed CEOs have 
been found to be highly likely to transform strategies, key organizational structures and 
processes shortly after taking office (Chen, 2015; Gordon, Stewart, Sweo, & Luker, 2000; 
Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). These changes reflect and fuel the willingness to dissociate 
from structures and processes that may no longer fit practical reality. Initiation of these 
fundamental changes, however, also requires detailed and profound knowledge about 
structures and operational processes. Thus, the sensitivity to operations and the deference to 
expertise thus appear as key requirements for successfully initiating these changes. 
Collectively, these findings in prior upper echelons research clearly indicate that CEOs with 
shorter position tenure are likely to be more attentive to and appreciative of the major 
practices and processes that help maintain and raise organizational mindfulness.  
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In addition, CEO position tenure is also likely to impact the effectiveness of routines 
underlying resource reconfiguration. As outlined above, new CEOs direct a lot of attention 
and substantial effort to assess the firm’s resource base (Chen, 2015; Miller, 1993). Among 
others, this is reflected in greater changes to a firm’s business portfolio (Chiu, Johnson, 
Hoskisson, & Pathak, 2016; Feldman, 2014) and more frequent adjustments to organizational 
structures and processes following CEO replacements (Chen, 2015; Kang, 2016; Westphal & 
Fredrickson, 2001). Thus, the establishment and refinement of processes for resource 
assessment is also a necessity for CEOs with relatively short position tenure in order to build 
their legacy (Hayward, Rindova, & Pollock, 2004; Matta & Beamish, 2008). 
For all these reasons, we hypothesize that the positive relationship between a firm’s 
ability to absorb volatility and performance recovery is more pronounced for CEOs with short 
tenures and less pronounced for longer tenured CEOs. 
Hypothesis 3: CEO position tenure dampens the positive relationship between a firm’s 
ability to absorb volatility in industry downturns and subsequent firm performance 
recovery.  
 
2.4. Methods 
As an empirical setting for our study, we selected the US pharmaceutical industry (SIC 
283) from 1988 and 2015. The US pharmaceutical industry provides for a suitable and 
interesting empirical setting to study the relationship between volatility absorption and 
performance recovery because the industry is historically characterized by considerable 
volatility. Moreover, studying the resilience of pharmaceutical firms seems relevant as the 
industry is one of the most important contributors to the US economy. 
2.4.1. Dependent variable: Firm performance recovery 
To assess a firm’s extent of performance recovery subsequent to crisis, we first needed 
to identify periods of industry downturns. Following prior work on industry munificence 
(Dess & Beard, 1984), we marked periods as industry downturns when average industry 
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performance (i.e., mean industry ROA weighted by asset size) declined over three consecutive 
years. We then assessed the extent of firm performance recovery as a firm’s increase in 
industry-adjusted return on assets in the three years following an industry downturn (t+1 to 
t+3) relative to the year prior to the industry downturn (t-1):2 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 [𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚�𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖.  𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎.  𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡+1;𝑡𝑡+3)� −  𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖.  𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎.  𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡−1)] 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 [𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎�𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖.  𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎.  𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡−1)�]  
2.4.2. Key predictor variable: Volatility absorption 
To assess a firm’s ability to absorb volatility, we calculate the extent to which focal 
firm performance volatility is lower/higher than industry performance volatility during the 
downturns. To do so, we first calculate industry performance volatility as the median 
volatility using the performance volatilities (i.e., standard deviation) of all firms that 
experience a performance decline during an industry downturn. To assess the actual volatility 
absorption by firms that experience performance declines during industry downturns, we then 
finally created a ratio of the industry performance volatility divided by firm performance 
volatility. Thus, the greater the score the stronger is a firm’s ability for volatility absorption. 
For instance, a score of 3 implies that a focal firm absorbs three times as much performance 
volatility compared to the industry.  
2.4.3. Moderator variables 
Asset retrenchment. In line with prior research on organizational decline, we operationalize 
asset retrenchment as the change of firm size over the course of the industry downturn 
(Morrow et al., 2004). We then reverse-coded the variable with the effect that larger values 
indicate greater asset retrenchment.  
log (𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡+3)) − log (𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡+1)) 
2 Return on assets was measured as operating income before depreciation divided by the book value of total 
assets. As for other firm-levels variables, the data was obtained from Compustat and Datastream. 
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Financial slack. Financial slack was measured as the ratio of current assets to current 
liabilities (i.e., the current ratio) (Bromiley, 1991). For our specific context, the current ratio 
seems most suitable since it represents both available slack and unabsorbed slack which are 
most likely to influence a firm’s ability to react to volatile conditions. 
CEO tenure. CEO tenure was measured by counting his/her years in office (Henderson et al., 
2006). 
2.4.4. Control variables 
We further included a number of control variables that are likely to influence firms’ 
performance development. We assessed product diversification using the entropy measure by 
Jacquemin and Berry (1979). We also controlled for firm geographic diversification as the 
ratio of foreign sales to total sales (Kang, 2013; Tallman & Li, 1996). Firm size was measured 
as the natural logarithm of total assets (Laamanen & Keil, 2008). Firm leverage was 
measured as the ratio of total liabilities to shareholder equity (Bromiley, 1991). Further, we 
controlled for firm portfolio restructuring activity which was measured as the number of 
divestitures and acquisitions during the three-year industry downturn period (Haunschild, 
1993; Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; Hoskisson et al., 1994; Vidal & Mitchell, 2015). 
Acquisition and divestiture data was retrieved from SDC Platinum. Further, we controlled for 
the severity of downturn by assessing the difference between the extent of the firm 
performance downturn and the industry downturn divided by the extent of the industry 
downturn. Lastly, we included year dummies in our analysis to account for temporal effects. 
2.4.5. Data Analysis 
For our empirical analyses, we applied random effects modeling since the results of 
the Hausman test (Greene, 2003; Hausman, 1978) did not reject the randomness of residuals 
hypothesis. Subsequent collinearity diagnostics using the variance inflation factors (VIFs) 
indicated no multicollinearity problems, as none of the VIFs approached the threshold of 10 
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(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2013; Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Wasserman, 1996). The 
mean variance inflation for the variables in our regression models ranged from 1.09 to 5.47.  
 
2.5. Results 
Table 3 depicts means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations for all variables 
included in our study. 
Table 4 presents the results of estimating the effects of our explanatory and control 
variables on performance recovery using random-effects estimation. As indicated by the F-
test statistics, all models are highly significant. Further, we conducted Wald tests on the 
significance of the inclusion of both the independent variable (i.e., volatility absorption) and 
each moderating term. As shown in the Wald chi-square statistics, the inclusion of volatility 
absorption and all three moderations terms significantly improves model fit.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics and correlationsa 
 Variables Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Firm performance recovery  -0.49 0.88 1.00          
2 Volatility absorption 3.00 5.08 0.17 1.00         
3 Asset retrenchment 0.06 0.66  -0.01  -0.21 1.00        
4 Financial slack 8.57 8.98  -0.08  -0.15 0.09 1.00       
5 CEO tenure 6.93 5.38  -0.02 0.14 0.13  -0.17 1.00      
6 Firm size 4.39 2.40 0.06 0.48  -0.19  -0.14 0.15 1.00     
7 Firm leverage 0.15 0.35 0.09 0.03 0.05  -0.18 0.15 0.04 1.00    
8 Product diversification 0.12 0.33 0.06 0.33  -0.12  -0.22 0.08 0.47 0.04 1.00   
9 Geographic diversification 0.14 0.27 0.11 0.34  -0.17  -0.25 0.17 0.38 0.09 0.30 1.00  
10 Restructuring activity 1.09 3.47 0.08 0.35  -0.16  -0.19 0.07 0.60 0.04 0.49 0.34 1.00 
11 Severity of downturn  -0.16 0.34 0.10 0.22  -0.46 0.02  -0.09 0.25  -0.18 0.10 0.15 0.10 
a N = 1498. Correlations greater than 0.05 are significant at p < .05.
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Table 4: Results of random-effects regression analysis predicting firm performance recoveryb 
Explanatory Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Volatility absorption  0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 
  (0.006)   (0.007)   (0.007) (0.01) (0.01) 
Volatility absorption × Asset retrenchment   0.03**   0.03* 
   (0.01)   (0.01) 
Volatility absorption × Financial slack       0.002***      0.002*** 
      (0.001)     (0.001) 
Volatility absorption × CEO tenure        -0.002**    -0.002*** 
        (0.001)    (0.001) 
Asset retrenchment 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.12** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.13** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Financial slack  -0.008***  -0.008***  -0.008*** -0.01***    -0.007** -0.01*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)   (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003) 
CEO tenure  -0.003  -0.004  -0.005   -0.005     0.002     0.001 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)   (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.006) 
Firm size -0.02 -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** -0.05** -0.05** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Firm leverage 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
Product diversification  -0.002 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Geographic diversification 0.25** 0.19* 0.19* 0.20* 0.20* 0.21* 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Restructuring activity 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Severity of downturn 0.34** 0.32* 0.28* 0.31* 0.32* 0.28* 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Constant -0.39*** -0.36*** -0.36*** -0.34*** -0.40*** -0.38*** 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
F-value 4.28*** 5.59*** 5.45*** 5.57*** 5.59*** 5.48*** 
Adjusted R²   0.052   0.069    0.071     0.072     0.072     0.078 
Wald test χ² (1)  19.43*** 22.73*** 27.91*** 25.05*** 48.69*** 
Wald test χ² (2)   4.06** 8.74*** 4.48** 19.15*** 
b N = 1498; Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown with Huber-White standard errors in parentheses; year dummies included.  
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. *p<0.1 
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Our baseline hypothesis tests the inherent assumption in organizational resilience 
literature that a firm’s ability to absorb volatility is positively associated with firm 
performance recovery. As shown in Model 2 of Table 4, volatility absorption is found to be 
significantly positive (b = 0.03, p < 0.01) related to firm performance recovery. The empirical 
results thus support our baseline hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that asset retrenchment amplifies the positive relationship 
between volatility absorption and performance recovery. Model 3 of Table 4 shows that the 
interaction between asset retrenchment and volatility absorption is positive and statistically 
significant (b = 0.03, p < 0.05). Hypothesis 1 thus finds support. Figure 2 demonstrates the 
moderating effect of asset retrenchment on the relationship between volatility absorption and 
firm performance recovery.  
Figure 2: Moderating effect of asset retrenchment on the relationship between volatility 
absorption and performance recovery 
 
 
Hypothesis 2 proposed that financial slack positively moderates the relationship 
between volatility absorption and firm performance recovery. As shown in Model 4 of Table 
4, the interaction term between financial slack and volatility absorption is positive and 
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statistically significant (b = 0.002, p < 0.01). Hypothesis 2 is thus also supported by our 
empirical results. Figure 3 visualizes the moderating effect. 
Figure 3: Moderating effect of financial slack on the relationship between volatility 
absorption and performance recovery 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Moderating effect of CEO tenure on the relationship between volatility absorption 
and performance recovery 
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Hypothesis 3 predicted that CEO tenure negatively moderates the relationship between 
volatility absorption and firm performance recovery. Model 5 of Table 4 indicates that the 
interaction term is negative and significant (b = -0.002, p < 0.05). Hypothesis 3 thus also finds 
support. Figure 4 illustrates the moderating effect of CEO tenure on the relationship between 
volatility absorption and firm performance recovery. 
Finally, Model 6 displays results for the full model. When including all moderating 
effects in one model, we see that the direction and significance of effects remain highly 
consistent. This underscores the robustness of our individual findings. 
 
2.6. Discussion and implications  
Against the backdrop of more frequently occurring economic downturns, 
organizational resilience has become a major strategic agenda item. Despite the concept’s 
great practical relevance, a critical review of organizational resilience literature reveals, 
however, that a theoretically sound explanation of why volatility absorption should be 
positively associated with performance recovery is largely amiss. Similarly, systematic 
empirical research on the nature and strength of this relationship is found to be sparse, if not 
non-existent. As a result, we also hold very little knowledge on the factors that condition the 
relationship between volatility absorption and performance recovery.  
To address these issues, this study set out to develop a theoretical argument for the 
proposed relationship between volatility absorption and performance recovery and to test the 
strength of this relationship, as well as the factors conditioning it. Drawing on the 
organizational routine and dynamic capability perspectives, we conceptualize volatility 
absorption as a dynamic capability that builds on two major organizational capabilities: 
organizational mindfulness and a firm’s ability of resource configuration. The proposed 
conceptualization ties in with foundational work on the microfoundations of dynamic 
capabilities and explicates that volatility absorption is a product of organizational capabilities 
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and their underlying routines (Teece, 2007). In essence, we argue that these underlying 
routines, which we identify and elaborate on, constitute the quality of two major 
organizational capabilities which essentially allow for performance volatility absorption in 
industry downturns. We therefore provide a theoretical underpinning for how and why 
volatility absorption should be expected to be positively associated with performance 
recovery.  
Building on our theoretical model of organizational resilience (illustrated in Figure 1), 
our empirical analysis then provides evidence for a positive relationship between a firm’s 
ability to absorb volatility and subsequent performance recovery. In terms of specific effect 
sizes, our results suggest that a one unit increase in volatility absorption leads to an additional 
absolute increase in industry-adjusted firm performance by 3 %. Aside from statistical 
significance, this finding is materially significant, suggesting that a firm’s ability to absorb 
volatility is indeed a major success factor for effectively navigating through and emerging 
from downturns. Consequently, our results suggest that building up and preserving 
organizational capabilities that support organizational resilience is economically valid.  
Moreover, we examined the moderating influences of three organizational 
contingencies (i.e., asset retrenchment, financial slack and CEO tenure) that are likely to 
influence the organizational routines that help nurture the ability of volatility absorption. In 
particular, our empirical results suggest that asset retrenchment and financial slack strengthen 
the positive relationship between volatility absorption and performance recovery. Regarding 
the moderation of financial slack, the graphical illustration of the effect (see Figure 3) further 
reveals an interesting cross-over effect. For a firm with low capabilities for volatility 
absorption, performance recovery is more significant under conditions of low financial slack 
than under conditions of high financial slack. A potential explanation for this finding is that 
managers might demonstrate even greater mindfulness and prepare decisions even more 
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carefully under conditions of low financial slack as the consequences of erroneous decisions 
are more survival-threatening. In contrast, firms with high capabilities for volatility absorption 
seem to benefit above average from high levels of slack. Essentially, this finding can be 
explained by insights from turnaround research that has found that once a firm has stabilized 
its position, the capacity to engage in new expansionary activities is particularly crucial for 
subsequent firm success (Ndofor et al., 2013; Robbins & Pearce, 1992). 
Further, we find that CEO position tenure dampens the positive relationship between 
volatility absorption and firm performance recovery. This finding essentially underpins the 
proposition that longer-tenured CEOs grow “stale in the saddle” and thereby are less suited to 
manage industry downturns (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). In other words, it might not be 
the longstanding experience of CEOs that helps being resilient. On the contrary, shorter-
tenured CEOs seem to more effectively contribute by addressing managerial issues with new 
ideas and unconventional approaches as they typically demonstrate a greater inclination to 
break with existing structures and processes (Henderson et al., 2006). 
2.6.1. Theoretical and practical implications 
Collectively, our findings contribute to extant research on organizational resilience in 
several ways. First, by synthesizing prior work on organizational resilience across different 
literature streams and disciplines, we generate an improved conceptual understanding of the 
“DNA” of organizational resilience. Aside from identifying the major building blocks of 
organizational resilience (i.e., volatility absorption and performance recovery) based on prior 
literature, we extend organizational resilience literature by developing a theoretical rationale 
and model that justifies the assumed positive linkage between volatility absorption and 
performance recovery in organization resilience literature. To do so, we are first to 
incorporate the organizational routine and dynamic capability perspective into the study of 
organizational resilience. Second, we make an empirical contribution to organizational 
resilience literature by examining the relationship between a firm’s ability to absorb volatility 
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and firm performance recovery. We further show that a firm’s ability to absorb volatility 
seems to be susceptible to organizational and CEO characteristics that affect both 
organizational mindfulness and the effectiveness in resource configuration. Our nuanced 
findings highlight that the positive linkage between volatility absorption and performance 
recovery is sensitive to several organizational contingencies. This is best reflected in our 
findings on the conditioning effect of organizational slack. 
Our findings also have practical implications for managers. Our empirical results show 
that the capability of volatility absorption greatly facilitates performance recovery following 
crisis. Against the backdrop of increasing volatility and more frequently occurring economic 
downturns, top management teams should thus invest into building up and honing their 
organization’s capability to absorb volatility. Our conceptual model provides detailed insights 
into which processes and routines should be at the heart of this capability building process. 
For instance, fostering sensitivity to operations and/or increasing the reluctance to 
simplification seem critical for both organizational mindfulness and effective and efficient 
resource reconfiguration, which essentially enable improved volatility absorption. While we 
acknowledge that building this capability is challenging, we strongly believe that this is the 
only effective response strategy in times of increasing volatility. 
2.6.2. Limitations and conclusion 
Lastly, we would like to acknowledge that, like any study, our work leaves some 
important questions unanswered. A follow-up question that arises from our research findings 
is, for instance, whether firms that are characterized by specific ownership structures 
specifically focus on absorbing performance volatility. For instance, family firms that have 
been argued to put greater focus on long-term planning and sustainable value creation might 
be more likely to appreciate volatility absorption. Future research might thus examine the 
question on whether family firms demonstrate superior organizational resilience. Further, 
research on individual resilience suggests that teams might only be resilient if all or at least 
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key team members demonstrate individual resilience. Thus, another interesting question is 
whether CEO resilience facilitates the process of building up organizational resilience. In 
doing so, future work could connect individual and organizational dimensions of resilience, 
and investigate the importance of resilience as a CEO characteristic. Finally, it should be 
noted that we use a capital intensive, manufacturing industry as our empirical setting. Thus, 
there seems a need to assess the applicability of our findings in other industry contexts. 
Specifically, industries that are characterized by rather low levels of average performance 
volatility seem interesting in order to compare these findings with our study. This would 
enrich the discussion on the question whether it is still worth investing in organizational 
resilience even though lower levels of industry performance volatility implicitly restrict the 
absorption of volatility. Still, we hope that our study lends helpful conceptual and empirical 
guidance to future research on this theoretically and practically highly relevant issue. 
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3. HOW ORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS AND EMPLOYEE TURNOVER 
AFFECT ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING IN THE AFTERMATH OF 
WORKFORCE DOWNSIZING 
 
(This chapter is based on a paper co-authored by Nicolas Jonard and Matthias Brauer) 
 
3.1. Introduction 
From an organizational learning perspective, there are three major implications of 
workforce downsizing that explain negative performance outcomes. First, employees leaving 
the firm inevitably cause knowledge losses (e.g., Fisher & White, 2000; Massingham, 2008; 
Schmitt, Borzillo, & Probst, 2012; Starke, Dyck, & Mauws, 2003). Second, workforce 
downsizing disrupts organizational networks which might lead to fundamental disruptions of 
intra-organizational knowledge flows (e.g., Shah, 2000). Third, layoff survivors tend to show 
lower levels of loyalty, motivation, and commitment towards the organization (Brockner et 
al., 1994; Brockner et al., 2004; Cascio, 1993; Luthans & Sommer, 1999; Mellor, 1992), 
while this so-called survivor syndrome might negatively affect their individual knowledge 
processing capacity (i.e., the quality of acquiring and disseminating accurate knowledge). 
Though there is consensus that the extent of direct knowledge losses depends on the quality of 
the knowledge held by the employees leaving the firm (e.g., Massingham, 2008; Starke et al., 
2003), identifying and investigating other factors that determine the strength of negative 
effects resulting from disrupted knowledge flows and/or reduced knowledge processing 
capacities is more much complex and specifically underexplored.  
In order to address this shortcoming, we theoretically derive these factors and 
subsequently investigate their strength using a simulation approach. We argue that the 
question on who is downsized essentially explains the nature and severity of disruptions of 
organizational networks (i.e., of both a firm’s formal (advice) and informal (friendship) 
network). The intuitive rationale for different formal network disruption is that job cuts can be 
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done at different hierarchical levels and therefore different knowledge flows might be 
disrupted depending on who is downsized. Informal network disruptions also vary as the 
distribution of friendship relationships among employees is firm specific. Moreover, the 
informal network position of downsized employees (i.e., who is friends with whom) is of 
utmost importance as the survivor syndrome (i.e., reduced knowledge processing capacities) 
is found to be particularly strong when survivors were friends of downsized employees (Shah, 
2000). Lastly, we argue that the extent to which firms manage to acquire and internalize novel 
knowledge by bringing new employees into the organization allows compensating for 
potential knowledge losses, disrupted knowledge flows and reduced knowledge processing 
capacities of survivors. We therefore draw on the seminal finding by Trevor and Nyberg 
(2008) on increased levels of employee turnover subsequent to workforce downsizing and 
view this finding as a potential means not only to mitigate negative performance outcomes but 
also to improve organizational performance in the aftermath of downsizing. 
   In this paper, we therefore investigate how organizational learning evolves subsequent 
to workforce downsizing by distinguishing between different network disruptions, the 
strength of the survivor syndrome and varying levels of post-downsizing employee turnover. 
In order to do this, we use a simulation approach as it allows for precisely isolating effects 
from both a firm’s formal (advice) and informal (friendship) network. Further, the simulation 
approach allows modelling the strength of reduced individual knowledge processing 
capacities for survivors (i.e., the strength of the survivor syndrome) and gives the opportunity 
to rigorously examine performance outcomes of the interplay of workforce downsizing and 
employee turnover which both seems impossible in an empirical setting.  
In our computational model, we distinguish between different network disruptions by 
considering two downsizing strategies that differently restructure the formal network of a firm 
(i.e., a firm’s hierarchical structure in which organizational learning takes place). The two 
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downsizing strategies are delayering (i.e., the layoff of an entire layer of middle managers) 
and thinning (i.e., the layoff of workers located on the lowest hierarchical level). Following 
Cameron, Freeman, and Mishra (1991) and DeRue, Hollenbeck, Johnson, Ilgen, and Jundt 
(2008), we thereby contrast a redesign strategy that eliminates hierarchy and thus requires 
substantial structural restructuring (i.e., delayering) with a traditional workforce reduction 
strategy (i.e., thinning) maintaining hierarchy and implying fewer structural adaptation to a 
firm’s formal network. Further, we model five informal network configurations that are 
characterized by different levels of status homophily describing the extent to which friendship 
ties are limited to groups of employees at the same hierarchical level. We thereby draw on 
seminal findings from sociology research suggesting that employees tend to engage in 
friendship relationships with employees at the same hierarchical level (e.g., Carley, 1991; 
Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954; McPherson & Smith-Lovin, 1987; Verbrugge, 1977) while the 
mobility of employees through internal promotion and targeted human resource policies (i.e., 
job rotation, training and coaching) also generate friendship relationships that potentially go 
beyond the same hierarchical level. Lastly, we model different levels of post-downsizing 
employee turnover and investigate how performance outcomes evolve depending on the 
choice of the downsizing strategy, the strength of the survivor syndrome and the informal 
network configuration.  
Our results indicate that the two downsizing strategies lead to significantly different 
performance outcomes. As could be expected, workforce downsizing negatively affects 
organizational performance while thinning is consistently preferable to delayering. In other 
words, downsizing middle managers has significantly more harmful effects than downsizing 
blue-collar workers. This finding specifically emphasizes the capability of middle managers 
to effectively process knowledge between the lower and upper parts of the organization (e.g., 
Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990) while it might also contradict with the 
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prominence of this downsizing strategy (Friedman, Scullion, & Hill, 2006; Littler & Innes, 
2004; Littler, Wiesner, & Dunford, 2003; Shaw & Schneier, 1993; Wulf, 2012). Further, we 
demonstrate that specific informal network configurations (such as high status homophily) 
can protect firms from negative performance effects induced by the survivor syndrome. 
However, we also find that low and/or medium levels of status homophily can significantly 
lower organizational performance in the aftermath of workforce downsizing. Finally, we 
demonstrate that increased levels of employee turnover which extant literature almost always 
perceives as an additional cost of downsizing (e.g., Cascio, 2000; Sturman, Trevor, Boudreau, 
& Gerhart, 2003) can help mitigate and sometimes overcome negative performance effects.  
Our study contributes to organizational learning theory and research on the interplay 
as well as the outcomes of workforce downsizing and employee turnover. First, we 
specifically enrich the organizational learning perspective in explaining performance 
outcomes of workforce downsizing. We can demonstrate that, in particular, disrupted 
knowledge flows resulting from network disruptions and reduced individual knowledge 
processing capacities of survivors can significantly lower organizational performance in the 
aftermath of workforce downsizing. Applying learning-based explanations, our simulation 
results thereby provide a sound underpinning for the existence of negative performance 
outcomes of workforce downsizing. However, our study goes beyond this as we also 
demonstrate how and why workforce downsizing might be also be associated with subsequent 
performance improvements. We identify increased employee turnover in the aftermath of 
workforce downsizing as a means to acquire and internalize novel knowledge in order to 
(over)compensate for negative effects. Thus, our study attests that organizational learning 
theory specifically contributes to a better understanding on the ambiguity of findings on the 
performance outcomes of workforce downsizing. Moreover, we enrich research on the 
interplay of workforce downsizing and employee turnover as well as the performance 
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outcomes of employee turnover. By finding that the increasing tendency of employees to 
leave the organization might help improving organizational performance, we relate individual 
with organizational outcomes of workforce downsizing by demonstrating a specifically strong 
mediating influence of increased levels of employee turnover in the aftermath of downsizing. 
Thereby, we contribute to existing research on both the outcomes of workforce downsizing 
(Datta & Basuil, 2015; Datta, Guthrie, Basuil, & Pandey, 2010) and employee turnover 
(Hancock, Allen, Bosco, McDaniel, & Pierce, 2013).  
In the next section, we briefly review prior literature on performance outcomes of 
workforce downsizing and specifically discuss learning-based explanations. We then develop 
our model in greater detail, present our experimental design and computational analysis, and 
elaborate on our results. We conclude with a discussion of our major findings, and their 
implications for management research and practice. 
 
3.2. Background: Workforce downsizing and organizational learning 
Workforce downsizing describes the intentional reduction of the number of employees 
aiming at subsequent performance improvements (see Datta et al. (2010); Datta and Basuil 
(2015) for recent reviews). Findings on the relationship between workforce downsizing and 
organizational performance are highly ambiguous though. While there are studies suggesting 
performance improvements subsequent to workforce downsizing (e.g., Kang & Shivdasani, 
1997; Palmon & Sun, 1997; Perry & Shivdasani, 2005), many other studies show that there 
might be a negative relationship between workforce downsizing and organizational 
performance (e.g., Cascio, Young, & Morris, 1997; Espahbodi, John, & Vasudevan, 2000; 
Guthrie & Datta, 2008). In line with the general equivocality of findings, Brauer and 
Laamanen (2014) find an U-shaped relationship between the magnitude of workforce 
downsizing and organizational performance emphasizing that laying off employees might 
lead to positive or negative performance outcomes.  
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The organizational learning perspective provides theoretical explanations for both 
positive and negative performance effects. Following Shah (2000), performance improving 
can be that some of those employees who remain within the organization subsequent to 
workforce downsizing, so-called survivors, potentially see upside potentials for their 
individual careers. This phenomenon specifically occurs if structurally equivalent employees 
(i.e., employees that perform the same task) are downsized. In this case, remaining employees 
gain power and visibility within a firm (Brass, 1984) which they then might use to engage in 
more accurate processing of knowledge that helps patching knowledge losses due to 
workforce downsizing. More generally, learning-based explanations for positive performance 
effects of workforce downsizing refer to individual outcomes for survivors that positively 
affect their willingness and commitment to contribute to the knowledge acquisition and 
processing of an organization and thereby enhance the accuracy and effectiveness of their 
individual knowledge processing capacity (i.e., the quality of acquiring and disseminating 
accurate knowledge).  
The more intuitive learning-based explanations for performance outcomes of 
workforce downsizing underpin negative effects though. Workforce downsizing inevitably 
leads to significant losses of knowledge as employees who essentially hold large parts of a 
firm’s knowledge might be downsized (e.g., Fisher & White, 2000; Schmitt et al., 2012). 
Thus, the extent of knowledge quality held by downsized employees determines how severe 
the loss of knowledge is. Specifically severe knowledge losses might occur when employees 
possess rare and difficult-to-imitate knowledge that makes important for the organization 
(Starke et al., 2003).  
Further, workforce downsizing disrupts both a firm’s formal (advice) and informal 
(friendship) network and both network disruptions affect how organizational learning evolves 
in the aftermath of workforce downsizing (Shah, 2000). The disruption of a firm’s formal 
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(advice) network implies that formerly existing knowledge flows are also disrupted as, for 
example, employees allowing knowledge flows from lower to upper parts of a firm’s and the 
other way around might also be part of the downsizing strategy. So-called knowledge brokers 
are typically located between lower and upper parts of a firm’s hierarchy and constitute a 
firm’s middle management (Delmestri & Walgenbach, 2005; Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Likert, 
1961; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990). 
The disruption of a firm’s informal (friendship) network implies that survivors need to 
accept that some of their former friends were downsized which cognitively impacts 
themselves (Shah, 2000). Downsizing scholars describe this phenomenon as the survivor 
syndrome referring to lower levels of trust, commitment and loyalty for remaining employees 
(Brockner et al., 1994; Brockner et al., 2004; Luthans & Sommer, 1999; Mellor, 1992), with a 
particularly strong response when these survivors have lost friends through workforce 
downsizing (Shah, 2000). The survivor syndrome originates from psychological contracts 
between employees and employers. These psychological contracts are essentially the sum of 
perceptions by both employees and employers of a number of reciprocal obligations that they 
expect to be fulfilled (Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 1998). When surviving employees interpret 
workforce downsizing as a violation of such psychological contracts, the responses of those 
employees who lose friends often include negative feelings towards the organization, lower 
levels of trust, commitment and loyalty, and eventually increasing tendencies to voluntary 
leave the firm (Brockner et al., 1994; Brockner et al., 2004; Luthans & Sommer, 1999; 
Mellor, 1992; Shah, 2000; Trevor & Nyberg, 2008). From an organizational learning 
perspective, the lower levels of trust, commitment and loyalty towards the organization 
translate into reduced individual knowledge processing capacity of those employees who lose 
friends through workforce downsizing.  
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Together, we can conclude that there are different mechanisms that explain negative 
performance outcomes of workforce downsizing applying an organizational learning 
perspective. While the extent of knowledge losses seem to directly depend on the quality of 
the knowledge held by downsized employees, we next elaborate on what exactly influences 
the implications of workforce downsizing via a firm’s organizational networks and individual 
outcomes of survivors in greater detail.  
First, disrupted knowledge flows inhibit effective organizational learning in the 
aftermath of workforce downsizing. In order to find out what kind of knowledge flows are 
disrupted and hence how detrimental this is can be for the effectiveness of learning, the 
question on who is downsized becomes of foremost importance. However, no prior study has 
yet investigated how the position of downsized employees in a firm’s formal network affects 
organizational performance subsequent to workforce downsizing. We therefore investigate 
this relationship by comparing the performance outcomes of two downsizing strategies that 
include employees at different formal network positions. Specifically, we investigate 
delayering (i.e., the layoff of an entire layer of middle managers) and thinning (i.e., the layoff 
of workers located on the lowest hierarchical level). Following Cameron et al. (1991) and 
DeRue et al. (2008), we thereby contrast a redesign strategy that eliminates hierarchy and thus 
requires substantial structural restructuring (i.e., delayering) with a traditional workforce 
reduction strategy (i.e., thinning) that maintains the former hierarchy and implies fewer 
structural adaptation to a firm’s formal network.  
Second, reduced individual knowledge processing capacities of survivors also inhibit 
effective organizational learning in the aftermath of workforce downsizing. Drawing on Shah 
(2000), this phenomenon is particularly strong for survivors who lose friends. Consequently, 
knowing about who is downsized using the information on a firm’s formal network is not 
enough, the information on who is friends with whom (i.e., a firm’s informal network) is 
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another important and specifically underexplored precondition to better understand 
performance outcomes of workforce downsizing. The distribution of friendship relationships 
among employees differs though. In order to structurally advance the inconclusive discussion 
on performance outcomes induced by the survivor syndrome, we model five informal network 
configurations that are characterized by different levels of status homophily describing the 
extent to which friendship ties are limited to groups of employees of the same hierarchical 
level. We thereby draw on seminal findings from sociology research suggesting that there 
employees tend to engage in friendship relationships with colleagues at the same hierarchical 
level (e.g., Carley, 1991; Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954; McPherson & Smith-Lovin, 1987; 
Verbrugge, 1977) while the mobility of employees through internal promotion and targeted 
human resource policies (i.e., job rotation, training and coaching) might also lead to 
friendship relationships across hierarchical levels.  
Third, the survivor syndrome can also imply that employees voluntarily leave the 
organization as a result of their lower levels of trust, commitment and loyalty towards the 
organization as evidenced by Trevor and Nyberg (2008) finding a positive relationship 
between workforce downsizing and subsequent employee turnover. Downsizing scholars 
consider increased levels of employee turnover as an additional indirect cost of workforce 
downsizing that specifically include employee replacement, training, and outplacement 
(Cascio, 2000; Sturman et al., 2003) and sometimes even exceed an employee’s annual salary 
(Johnson, 1995). From an organizational learning perspective, high turnover corresponds to 
extensive inflows of novel knowledge into a system in which novel knowledge can only be 
internalized up to an amount that corresponds with the individual knowledge processing 
capacity of employees (March, 1991). Thus, excessive levels of employee turnover might be 
detrimental while certain levels of novel knowledge can significantly improve performance 
outcomes though (March, 1991). Whether or not additional levels of employee turnover that 
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result from workforce downsizing might improve performance outcomes seem to essentially 
boil down to the question on the extent to which firms manage to acquire and internalize 
novel knowledge. To date, prior work has not yet rigorously tested performance outcomes of 
the seminal findings by Trevor and Nyberg (2008) though.  
Together, organizational learning theory allows concluding that (negative) 
performance outcomes of workforce downsizing seem to specifically depend on three factors: 
the position of downsized employee in the formal network, the distribution of friendship 
relationships among employees and the level of employee turnover in the aftermath of 
downsizing. In the following, we explain how these factors and all other relevant components 
are incorporated in our simulation model.  
 
3.3. The model 
We now develop a learning model of the firm which incorporates both formal and 
informal networks to examine how organizational learning evolves in the aftermath of 
workforce downsizing. The model explicitly embeds employees in two organizational 
networks: a formal (advice) relationship network in which organizational learning takes place 
and an informal (friendship) network which transmits affect. Together, these two networks 
form the organizational architecture (Nadler, Tushman, & Nadler, 1997). Downsizing impacts 
both networks and therefore affects organizational performance through two different 
channels. First, downsizing changes the formal network, essentially creating a novel 
organization that is both smaller in size and differently organized in terms of existing 
knowledge flows. Second, downsizing also changes the informal network, which affects 
surviving employees’ cognitive state and thus their capacity to process knowledge effectively. 
The model we develop aims at properly disentangling these two effects and at understanding 
how they jointly determine organizational performance in the aftermath of workforce 
downsizing. Formally, the model draws on March’s (1991) model, with the addition of a 
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sequential learning rule inspired by Padgett’s (1980) hierarchical variant of the Garbage Can 
model and recent contributions on organizational learning (Fang, Lee, & Schilling, 2010; 
Miller, Meng, & Calantone, 2006; Schilling & Fang, 2014). In the following, we describe the 
model’s components in greater detail. 
3.3.1. Organizational architecture: Formal (advice) & informal (friendship) network 
The organizational architecture consists of both a formal and an informal network of 
the firm. We conceive the formal network as the outcome of an intentional design logic aimed 
at coordinating individual actions towards organizational objectives (i.e., hierarchical 
relationships), whereas the informal structure is interpreted as an emerging arrangement that 
is formed spontaneously from the interactions among employees (i.e., friendship 
relationships). 
Formal (advice) network. The formal network resembles a firm’s organigram that represents 
hierarchical work relationships. Each node in this network represents an employee who 
belongs to a unique hierarchical level and each edge represents a supervisor-subordinate 
relationship. We focus on the simplest hierarchical structure, a tree with an identical number 
of children for each parent node, which represents a pyramidal organization in which each 
supervisor is responsible for the same number of subordinates (the span of control is 
uniform). Figure 5 depicts an illustrative formal network.  
The president or CEO oversees 5 vice-presidents, each of them supervises 5 middle 
managers who themselves supervise 5 blue-collar workers each. For the sake of simplicity, 
the top management team includes the CEO and all vice-presidents. Blue-collar workers are 
located at the bottom of the organizational pyramid while middle managers are located 
between the lower and upper levels of the hierarchy (Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Wooldridge & 
Floyd, 1990). 
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Figure 5: The formal network of a firm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Informal (friendship) network. The informal network represents friendship relationships. We 
entirely abstract from the advice and information-seeking functions that informal networks 
might also perform and deliberately focus on affect. In order to better understand how the 
configuration of the informal network impacts post-downsizing organizational performance, 
we assume that the hierarchical level allocates organizational status to employees, and that 
employees might form friendship relationships based on the hierarchical level. We therefore 
consider different configurations corresponding to different levels of status homophily (i.e., 
the extent to which friendship ties are limited to groups of employees of the same hierarchical 
level). 
When status homophily is high, friendship relationships are restricted to the same 
hierarchical level and the friendship network consists of isolated clusters. Specifically, 
maximum status homophily means that middle managers only hold friendship relationships 
among each other. At the other extreme, when status homophily is minimal, friendship 
relationships are homogenously distributed across all hierarchical levels and the friendship 
network is a uniform random graph spanning the entire organization. Between these two 
extremes, any intermediate situation can exist in which friendship ties cut across different 
CEO 
Vice presidents 
Middle managers 
Blue-collar workers 
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hierarchical levels. Although a tendency towards status homophily exists in most 
organizations (e.g., Carley, 1991; Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954; McPherson & Smith-Lovin, 
1987; Verbrugge, 1977), workers’ mobility through internal promotion and targeted human 
resource policies (i.e., job rotation, training and coaching) allow for friendship relationships 
that go beyond hierarchical levels. 
Together, we distinguish between five different informal network configurations 
characterized by different degrees of status homophily (see Figure 6). As a measure of status 
homophily, we use the assortativity coefficient of Newman (2002)3 which takes on positive 
values when connected nodes in a network tend to have the same status and negative values 
otherwise. In our context, the assortativity coefficient is 1 if employees only have friends at 
the same hierarchical level (high status homophily) and gets close to 0 if employees have 
friendship relationships across all hierarchical levels (low status homophily). 
3 The assortativity coefficient is the Pearson correlation coefficient of the status value (employee class index) for 
all pairs of linked nodes. 
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Figure 6: Five informal network configurations with varying degrees of status homophily 
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Configuration 1 
High level of status homophily 
Assortativity coefficient = 1.00 
Configuration 2 
High to medium level of status homophily      
Assortativity coefficient = 0.79 
 
Configuration 3 
Medium level of status homophily 
Assortativity coefficient = 0.28 
 
Configuration 4 
Medium to low level of status homophily 
Assortativity coefficient = 0.27 
 
Configuration 5 
Low level of status homophily 
Assortativity coefficient = 0.02 
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3.3.2. Organizational processes 
The core organizational process of our model is organizational learning. Following 
March (1991), the organization’s objective is to discover a multi-dimensional reality. At any 
point in time, each employee holds a belief about each dimension of reality and a given 
processing capacity. We implement bi-directional learning in order to represent both top-
down and bottom-up information flows. Each employee in a given level assesses the 
correctness of her belief (i.e., the distance between her belief and reality) as well as the 
correctness of the beliefs held by the individual employees in her reference group, and then 
adopts the belief closest to reality. Employees have a fixed processing capacity that in effect 
constrains the size of their reference group: an employee with more subordinates than she can 
process will only consider a (random) subset of subordinates whose size matches her capacity. 
While this plays no role before downsizing because span of control and capacity coincide, 
employees might have more subordinates than what their capacity permits in the post-
downsizing organization. This implementation of bottom-up learning follows the hierarchical 
garbage can models of Padgett (1980) and Morgan and Carley (2012).4 Once bottom-up 
learning has taken place, we follow March (1991) and allow for a phase of socialization 
which is a specific learning process building on shared experiences. Our implementation is 
sequential, one level at a time starting from the top of the hierarchy and proceeding 
downwards, with employees partly adopting the belief of their supervisor regardless of the 
correctness of this belief.5 Moreover, the model also includes employee turnover and 
workforce downsizing as organizational processes. In the following, we further describe these 
organizational processes. 
4 Several recent contributions based on March (1991) also have a form of interpersonal learning that differs from 
March’s original centralized learning procedure (Fang et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2006; Schilling and Fang, 2014). 
5 Whereas bottom-up learning works clearly towards improving the quality of the beliefs held in the 
organization, socialization forces adhesion to the values of the organization, regardless of their intrinsic 
correctness. Another interpretation is that subordinates do not question supervisor authority. 
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Learning and socialization. In the process of bottom-up learning, individual beliefs are 
filtered upwards with their accuracy gradually improving as learning proceeds from the 
bottom level of the hierarchy to its top. While all employees in the organization store 
knowledge, members of the top management team and middle managers also process 
knowledge (i.e., in terms of updating their beliefs through comparisons and active adaptations 
towards increased correctness). 
When an employee that processes knowledge learns, she selects a subset of her 
subordinates whose size matches with her capacity c and adopts with fixed probability 
pbottomup the belief held on every dimension of reality by the most accurate subordinate within 
that subset.6 This procedure starts with middle-managers, and is repeated for the vice 
presidents, and finally for the CEO of the organization. The value of bottom-up learning is 
obvious: beliefs are sequentially updated and transmitted upwards until the most accurate (at 
least in expected terms) belief reaches the CEO. Socialization operates the other way round. 
Starting with top management, each individual adopts with fixed probability ptopdown the belief 
held on every dimension of reality by her supervisor. The value of socialization is to 
disseminate correct beliefs across organization so that the next round of bottom-up learning 
includes more accurate individual beliefs. 
Employee turnover. Employee turnover refers to the process by which current employees 
leave the organization and are replaced by new individuals in the same organizational roles 
(March, 1991). The position left vacant by an outgoing employee is assumed to be filled with 
an incoming individual whose beliefs are randomly initialized, and whose processing capacity 
is identical to the initial value. The friendship ties of incoming employees are assumed to 
follow the status homophily patterns that have been described earlier, maintaining a constant 
density of the friendship network. 
6 The most accurate subordinate is the subordinate who deviates least from reality. Deviation from reality is 
computed as the taxicab distance between the belief and reality vectors. 
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Workforce downsizing. Workforce downsizing refers to the reduction of the total number of 
employees (Cameron, 1994; Cascio, 1993). We model two downsizing strategies: delayering 
(i.e., the layoff of an entire layer of middle managers) and thinning (i.e., the layoff of workers 
located on the lowest hierarchical level). Following Cameron et al. (1991) and DeRue et al. 
(2008), we thereby contrast a redesign strategy that eliminates hierarchy and thus requires 
substantial structural restructuring (i.e., delayering) with a traditional workforce reduction 
strategy (i.e., thinning) that maintains hierarchy and implies fewer structural adaptation to a 
firm’s formal network. Figure 7 displays the pre- and post-downsizing formal networks for 
both downsizing strategies. 
Figure 7: The formal networks in the aftermath of both downsizing strategies 
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The upper half of Figure 7 represents the case of delayering which results in a flatter 
formal network. The subordinates of the dismissed middle-managers directly report to the 
vice-presidents. The lower half of Figure 7 panel represents thinning. A four-level hierarchy 
remains still in place, but fewer blue-collar workers at the bottom level. In terms of their 
impact on the formal network, it is important to emphasize that both approaches lead to the 
same number of employees but a different overall processing capacity of the post-downsizing 
organization. 
Workforce downsizing also impacts the informal network of surviving employees. As 
all friendship relationships of dismissed employees vanish, some survivors (if not all) are left 
with reduced options when seeking support and friendship. The loss of friends affects 
survivors’ knowledge processing capacities (Shah, 2000) and therefore complicates 
organizational learning. We contrast two forms of the survivor syndrome: a moderate and a 
strong representation. In both cases, the affected survivors (i.e., the former friends of the laid-
off employees) deviate from the strict principles of bottom-up learning.7 The moderate 
survivor syndrome entails confusion and we assume that confusion incentivizes individuals to 
select and learn from a random subordinate rather than the most accurate one. The strong 
survivor syndrome is a particularly negative reaction that makes survivors to undermine 
loyalty and commitment to the firm (Brockner et al., 2004), and intentionally select their less 
accurate subordinate for imitation (Schilling & Fang, 2014). 
 
3.4. Experimental design 
In order to remove as many spurious effects as possible, we adopt the following 
experimental design. Reality remains fixed for the entire experiment. Thus, we leave out the 
7 In designing how bottom-up learning exactly deviates from affected survivors, we draw on Schilling’s and 
Fang’s (2014) conceptualization of information distortion. 
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possibility of turbulence considered by March (1991). If reality was permitted to change 
additionally to downsizing, we would not be able to properly disentangle these two effects. 
Regarding the size of the organization, the pre-downsizing formal network is a tree 
with 4 levels and 5 subordinates per parent node.8 All 156 employees in the formal network 
are initially endowed with random beliefs in the set of {1, 2, … , 20} in each of the 75 
dimensions of reality and given an identical knowledge processing capacity (c=5). The pre-
downsizing informal network is a random graph from one of the five status homophily 
configurations discussed in the previous section. 
Several parameter values and specificities of the model need to be briefly commented 
upon. We allow for a much greater diversity of beliefs than March’s original model (1990) by 
considering a 75-dimensional reality with 20 possible values for each dimension. Given these 
values, the performance of the learning model itself is remarkable when realizing that search 
takes place over a universe of 2075 candidate vectors (roughly 1097 elements) and the 95% 
congruence threshold is very seldom reached in more than 1,000 periods. 
All five informal network configurations are generated according to the principles 
presented earlier, with an average number of 12 friends per employee that corresponds to a 
sparse friendship network (density of 12/155=7.7%). The span of control equals the individual 
processing capacity (c=5). The rate of bottom-up learning (pbottomup) is set to 0.9, and the 
socialization rate (ptopdown) is set to 0.3. Three rates of employee turnover are considered: 
low=0.005, moderate=0.025 and high=0.15.  
At any point in time, organizational performance is the relative congruence of the 
CEO belief (i.e., one minus the distance of the CEO to reality over the maximum distance 
from reality). The expected relative congruence of a random set of beliefs is computed to be 
equal to 67%, and when reality is discovered relative congruence is 100%.  
8 Regarding the size of the organization, the span of control and the number of hierarchical levels, we have 
extensively explored alternative values and found no significant differences with the results presented below, 
absolute numbers vary but the properties we identify are qualitatively preserved. 
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The most relevant metric we use to evaluate how organizational learning evolves in 
the aftermath of downsizing is the hitting time of a rate of relative congruence of 95% (i.e., 
the period in which organizational performance first exceeds 95% in the aftermath of 
downsizing). In simple terms, the lower the hitting time, the higher the post-downsizing 
performance.   
Further, we place an upper bound of 3,000 periods to keep the computational 
experiment within reasonable time limits. Downsizing takes place in period 50, a number for 
which the likelihood of reaching the 95% relative congruence threshold is negligible. For each 
parameter configuration, we generate 50 replications to ensure that our findings are 
representative of the average behavior of the system. We ran all of our simulation analysis in 
parallel on 50 cores of a computing cluster. This extensive computational capacity specifically 
allowed for ample testing and experimentation. 
 
3.5. Results and analysis 
As pointed out earlier, there are three main factors that explain performance outcomes 
of workforce downsizing applying an organizational learning perspective: (i) the position of 
downsized employees in the formal network, (ii) the distribution of friendship relationships 
among employees and (iii) the level of employee turnover in the aftermath of downsizing. In 
the following, we not only investigate the strength of each factor but also demonstrate how 
they interact and jointly determine organizational performance in the aftermath of workforce 
downsizing. We therefore begin investigating the influence of the formal network position of 
downsized employee by comparing the performance outcomes of two downsizing strategies. 
3.5.1. Downsizing strategies 
In the following, we investigate the performance outcomes of delayering (i.e., 
dismissal of all 25 middle managers) and thinning (i.e., dismissal of 25 blue-collar workers). 
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We also display the performance outcomes for an organization undergoing no downsizing 
(reference case).  
To provide a first visual indication of the obtained results, Figure 8 displays time 
series plots of organizational performance for thinning, delayering and no downsizing given 
three levels of employee turnover. The hitting times for all three cases and the period of the 
downsizing event are indicated by vertical lines (see legend of Figure 8). The upper half of 
Figure 8 displays time series from the 1st period to the period in which the 95% threshold is 
hit (i.e., hitting time), whereas the lower half focuses on the post-downsizing periods only 
(i.e., starting from period 50). For low and moderate turnover, both downsizing strategies are 
significantly worse off than the non-downsizing organization. Given high employee turnover, 
the hitting times for thinning and the non-downsizing organization are virtually identical. For 
all three levels of turnover, thinning is preferable to delayering and the difference is 
particularly large when turnover is high. 
While these time series only represent single runs, Figure 9 provides robust support of 
these findings by displaying boxplots of the hitting times pooled over 50 independent 
replications.9 As shown in Figure 9, the median hitting time in the case of delayering is 
consistently larger than for either thinning or the non-downsizing organization. The difference 
in median hitting times for delayering and thinning is particularly large given low and high 
turnover, and smallest for moderate turnover. Further, the median hitting time for thinning is 
always slightly larger than the median hitting time for the non-downsizing organization.
9 The notches extend to: ±1.58 × 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼 (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)
√𝐼𝐼
. Notches are useful to display a simplified guidance to 
significance of difference of medians. If notches of two boxplots do not overlap, there is “strong evidence”, 
although not a formal test, that those two medians differ (Chambers, Cleveland, Kleiner & Tukey, 1983). 
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Figure 8: Time series plot showing the effects in the formal network 
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Figure 9: Boxplots of hitting times showing the effects in the formal network 
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Together, the above results clearly show that the two downsizing strategies lead to 
significantly different performance outcomes: thinning is preferable for all turnover rates. The 
key explanation is that blue-collar workers only hold knowledge whereas middle managers 
both hold and process knowledge. Middle managers acquire raw, unfiltered beliefs from their 
subordinates, assess their accuracy and adapt their own beliefs before they pass on their 
knowledge to vice presidents. Consequently, the firm loses parts of its aggregated knowledge 
processing capacity with fewer middle managers. Thus, median hitting times increase in 
organizations with fewer middle managers. Further, the results indicate that difference in 
performance between the downsizing strategies is smallest for a medium turnover rate (i.e., 
higher for low and high levels). Applying the organizational learning perspective, this means 
that an appropriate level of employee turnover compensates for negative effects from 
inhibited knowledge processing. Having discussed the influence of the formal network 
position of downsized employees, we next shed light on the influence of how friendship 
relationships among employees are distributed (i.e., a firm’s informal network).   
3.5.2. The influence of the informal network  
Informal network disruptions are specifically important in order to understand 
performance outcomes of workforce downsizing as Shah (2000) found out that the survivor 
syndrome (i.e., reduced individual knowledge processing capacity) is particularly strong for 
survivors who lose friends. Consequently, knowing about who is friends with whom (i.e., a 
firm’s informal network configuration) is specifically relevant. In order to structurally 
advance the discussion on performance outcomes induced by the survivor syndrome, we 
model five informal network configurations that are characterized by different levels of status 
homophily (i.e., the extent to which friendship ties are limited to groups of employees of the 
same hierarchical level) and two levels of severity of the survivor syndrome (i.e., moderate 
and strong, corresponding to confusion and intentional manipulation as described in the 
model section). 
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Figure 10 displays the boxplots of the hitting times given a moderate survivor 
syndrome as a function of employee turnover and status homophily in the informal network. 
In each plot, we also demonstrate the median hitting time obtained in the absence of a 
survivor syndrome as a solid horizontal line (reference case). 
In the case of delayering (first row), the informal network configurations 1 and 3 lead 
to median hitting times that are identical to the reference scenario. For the informal network 
configurations 2, 4 and 5, the median hitting times are above the reference value for low and 
moderate levels of employee turnover. The pattern changes for high employee turnover as the 
median hitting time in the case of informal network configuration 2 is even smaller than the 
reference value, while the median hitting time of configuration 4 again exceeds this value. For 
configuration 5, the median hitting time is very close to the reference value. 
In the case of thinning, the informal network configurations 3, 4 and 5 lead to larger 
hitting times given high turnover. While this pattern is also valid for configuration 3 and 4 
given a low level of employee turnover, the median hitting time for informal network 
configuration 5 is even smaller than in the reference scenario. In the case of moderate 
turnover, the median hitting times of all three configurations are very close to the reference 
case.  
Figure 11 displays the boxplots of the hitting times given a strong survivor syndrome 
as a function of employee turnover and status homophily in the informal network. 
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Figure 10: Boxplots of hitting times showing the influence of five informal network configurations given a moderate survivor syndrome 
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Figure 11: Boxplots of hitting times showing the influence of five informal network configurations given a strong survivor syndrome 
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In the case of delayering (first row), the informal network configurations 2, 4 and 5 
lead to significantly larger hitting times than the informal network configurations 1 and 3. 
While this pattern occurs for all three levels of turnover, the difference between the median 
hitting times of these two groups of informal network configurations is particularly large 
given low employee turnover. Moreover, informal network configurations 1 and 3 lead to 
median hitting times identical to those in the reference scenario. 
In the case of thinning, the informal configurations 3, 4 and 5 consistently lead to 
larger hitting times compared with the informal network configurations 1 and 2. The 
difference between these hitting times is largest for a low level of employee turnover while 
this difference significantly shrinks for moderate and high levels. 
In order to further demonstrate how fundamental the impact of a strong survivor 
syndrome might be, Figure 12 displays time series plots for both downsizing strategies given 
informal network configuration 5 and low turnover. In both time series, organizational 
performance declines to 0.5 which is below the expected performance level of an organization 
whose behavior would be completely random.10 This is because employees that severely 
suffer from the survivor even induce adverse learning as they might select less accurate 
subordinates. 
Together, we see that there are informal network configurations in which even a strong 
survivor syndrome does not affect performance adversely. This specifically occurs when the 
informal network is characterized by high levels of status homophily. The explanation is that 
all employees who are susceptible to the survivor syndrome are either themselves part of the 
layoff (as is the case for delayering) or incapable of processing knowledge in the first place 
(as is the case for thinning).  
10 The expected relative congruence of a random set of beliefs is 67%. 
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Figure 12: Time series plot showing the influence of network configuration 5 given a strong survivor syndrome and low turnover 
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However, not all status homophily configurations render the firm immune to the 
survivor syndrome as we also find that organizational performance can substantially 
deteriorate given specific informal network configurations. In the case of delayering, informal 
network configurations 2, 4 and 5 deteriorate performance (see Figure 10). All three informal 
network configurations have in common that top managers (or at least some of them) are 
friends with laid-off middle managers. Thus, the individual knowledge processing capacity of 
top managers (i.e., employees who process knowledge) is negatively affected. In the case of 
thinning, performance outcomes also deteriorate for status homophily configurations 3, 4 and 
5 because middle managers and/or top managers might have friends among the laid-off blue-
collar workers. Again, employees who substantially process knowledge are plagued by the 
syndrome in all three cases. Additionally, this performance deteriorating effect increases 
when the syndrome moves higher in the hierarchy (compare configurations 3 and 5).  
Lastly, we also find that performance outcomes might improve in the aftermath of 
downsizing given a moderate survivor syndrome. This takes place in two specific cases: (i) 
delayering given high turnover and informal network configuration 2 and (ii) thinning given 
low turnover and informal network configuration 5. Against the backdrop of how we model a 
moderate survivor syndrome (i.e., random adoption of beliefs regardless of their accuracy), 
we see that the preservation and transmission of erroneous beliefs sometimes improves 
performance. In other words, employees who suffer from a moderate survivor syndrome, 
because they preserve diversity and beliefs, represent a remedy for insufficient turnover. In 
other words, some amount of confusion can also serve as a substitute for employee turnover. 
These findings therefore complement the initial results on the influence of the formal 
network and underpin the considerable influence of the informal network on performance 
outcomes of workforce downsizing. Further, these findings therefore emphasize that not only 
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the question on who is downsized but also the question on who is friends with whom 
determine how organizational learning evolves in the aftermath of downsizing. 
3.5.3. The influence of increased employee turnover 
Another important implication of the survivor syndrome is that survivors tend to also 
leave the organization in the aftermath of downsizing (Trevor & Nyberg, 2008). Downsizing 
literature considers increasing levels of employee turnover an additional cost (e.g., Cascio, 
2000; Sturman et al., 2003). From an organizational learning perspective, performance 
outcomes of (increasing) employee turnover though rather depend on to what extent firms 
manage to acquire and internalize novel knowledge. 11 
In the following, we demonstrate performance outcomes of firms characterized by low 
levels of employee turnover prior to the downsizing event and an informal network 
configuration that allocates friendship relationships across all hierarchical levels (i.e., low 
status homophily, such as in network configuration 5) as these firms severely suffer from 
workforce downsizing and are particularly vulnerable to the survivor syndrome. Figure 13 
displays the boxplots for the hitting times of the 95% congruence threshold for both 
downsizing strategies. 
As shown in the first row, an increase from low to moderate levels of employee 
turnover leads to a lower median hitting time. A strong increase also decreases the median 
hitting time but not as much as a moderate increase. For thinning, the increases to moderate 
employee turnover as well as to high levels of employee turnover lead to a significantly lower 
median hitting time. 
11 It is worth emphasizing that although in this model turnover does not have an explicit cost, it does have a high 
implicit cost. Low turnover is good because it brings in novelty without destabilizing selection (thereby allowing 
an exhaustive search of the belief space) but large turnover rates imply the frequent dismissal and replacement of 
the knowledge processing employees who hold the most accurate beliefs. This renders search memoryless and 
makes learning almost impossible. 
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Figure 13: Boxplots of hitting times showing the influence of increased turnover 
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We therefore show that an increase of employee turnover can in fact help improving 
performance outcomes for two reasons. The first and intuitive reason is that increased 
turnover might help the firm reach a better level of diversity in its pool of beliefs that it had 
not reached before. The second and less intuitive reason is that an increase of employee 
turnover increases the likelihood that employees who severely suffer from the survivor 
syndrome are replaced by new employees whose knowledge processing capacity is not 
reduced. 
Together, our results not only show how the disruptions of both organizational 
networks (i.e., a firm’s formal and informal network) affect organizational learning 
subsequent to workforce downsizing but also that increased levels of employee turnover can 
help improving the effectiveness of learning. Building on these results, we next discuss both 
their theoretical and managerial implications. 
 
3.6. Discussion and conclusion 
This study adopts an organizational learning perspective by theoretically deriving and 
rigorously investigating factors that explain negative performance outcomes of workforce 
downsizing using a simulation approach. In a nutshell, there are three main factors: (i) loss of 
knowledge, (ii) disrupted knowledge flows and (iii) reduced knowledge processing capacities. 
While there is consensus that the extent of knowledge losses depends on the quality of the 
knowledge held by the employees leaving the firm, the latter two factors deserve a more 
precise understanding of the disruptions of organizational networks caused by workforce 
downsizing and individual outcomes of survivors. 
In order to investigate how knowledge flow disruptions impact performance outcomes 
of workforce downsizing, we compare two structurally different downsizing strategies. We 
consider delayering as the downsizing of middle managers and thinning as the downsizing of 
blue-collar workers. As visualized by Figure 7, delayering implies that knowledge cannot 
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flow through the layer of middle managers anymore whereas the post-downsizing formal 
network in the case of thinning still includes this hierarchical layer. While our results show 
that workforce downsizing on average deteriorates organizational performance, we 
specifically find that thinning should be preferred as delayering leads to significantly worse 
performance outcomes. This finding thus contradicts the fact that downsizing a firm’s middle 
managers in order to reduce redundancies and speed up decision-making has been a very 
prominent downsizing strategy in the recent past (Friedman et al., 2006; Littler et al., 2003; 
Shaw & Schneier, 1993; Wulf, 2012). At the same time, it underpins a specifically important 
contribution to the aggregated knowledge processing of a firm that middle managers are 
known for.12 Their prominent role as knowledge brokers emerges from their hierarchical 
position as they connect upper and lower parts of a firm’s hierarchy and thereby allow 
accurate bidirectional knowledge flows (Delmestri & Walgenbach, 2005). Thus, a firm 
without middle managers (i.e., in the aftermath of delayering) disrupts important knowledge 
flows while thinning leaves them intact and only lowers a firm’s overall knowledge base due 
to the outflow of knowledge. In essence, our first finding specifically emphasizes the 
importance of middle managers as “linking pins” (Likert, 1961) and the value of their ability 
to both transform knowledge obtained from lower hierarchical levels into a valuable input for 
top management decision making, and disseminate the word of top management downwards 
again (e.g., Kanter, 1981; Nonaka, 1988; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990; Wooldridge, Schmid, & 
Floyd, 2008). 
We further draw on reduced individual knowledge processing capacities as another 
factor that explains negative performance outcomes of workforce downsizing applying the 
organizational learning theory. We therefore investigate how performance outcomes of 
workforce downsizing evolve given different informal network configurations. The essential 
12 Not all is positive about middle-management practices however, as it has also been identified that middle 
managers might also process and transmit knowledge in a way that favors their own career perspectives (e.g., 
Guth and MacMillan, 1986; Wooldridge and Floyd, 1990).  
70 
 
                                                 
argument for why the configuration of a firm’s informal network additionally contributes to a 
better understanding of performance outcomes of workforce downsizing draws on Shah 
(2000). The major finding of this study is that employees who lose friends through workforce 
downsizing suffer from a specifically strong survivor syndrome (i.e., lower levels of trust, 
commitment and loyalty). From an organizational learning perspective, the individual 
knowledge processing capacities of those employees (i.e., former friends of downsized 
employees) are thus reduced. In order to better understand the influence of the informal 
network, we investigate five informal network configurations that are characterized by 
different levels of status homophily (i.e., the extent to which friendship ties are limited to 
groups of employees of the same hierarchical level). The underlying rationale for why the 
level of status homophily is best suitable to describe different informal network 
configurations draws on sociology research suggesting that employees intuitively tend to have 
friends among colleagues (i.e.,  the same hierarchical level) (Carley, 1991; Lazarsfeld & 
Merton, 1954; McPherson & Smith-Lovin, 1987; Verbrugge, 1977) while various HR policies 
involving social events, training, job rotation and coaching initiatives might work against this 
tendency and additionally create friendship relationship between employees at different 
hierarchical levels. Our results indicate that, for both downsizing strategies, high levels of 
status homophily help mitigating negative performance outcomes induced by the survivor 
syndrome. However, we also find that performance outcomes can also be more negative for 
other informal network configurations (low and/or medium levels of status homophily). Table 
5 summarizes the main findings regarding the performance outcomes given the combination 
of the downsizing strategy and the informal network configuration.     
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Table 5: Performance outcomes for given downsizing strategy and informal network 
configuration 
 
Given a high level of status homophily (see right column of Table 5), those employees 
who are downsized are friends of one another. As an intuitive consequence, those employees 
who would severely suffer from the survivor syndrome (i.e., those employees with reduced 
knowledge processing capacities) also leave the organization. This essentially means that 
nobody is actually affected by the survivor syndrome given an informal network with a high 
level of status homophily. Thus, the performance outcomes for both downsizing strategies 
given high levels of status homophily are positive. This, however, changes with decreasing 
levels of status homophily. As shown in Table 5, the performance outcomes given thinning 
and low levels of status homophily are negative. This is because many employees who keep 
important knowledge flows intact (i.e., middle managers) are affected by the survivor 
syndrome and thereby again lower the effectiveness of these knowledge flows. As a result, the 
performance outcomes are negative for both downsizing strategies in this case. As middle 
managers again suffer from the survivor syndrome as a result of medium levels of status 
homophiliy, we find a significant difference between the performance outcomes for both 
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downsizing strategies. Consequently, the performance outcomes of thinning which has been 
shown to be the dominant downsizing strategy significantly deteriorate. This, however, does 
not happen in the case of delayering. Together, we thus show that performance outcomes of 
workforce downsizing not only depend on who is downsized (i.e., the downsizing strategy) 
but also on the information about who is friends with whom (i.e., the informal network 
configuration). 
Lastly, we investigate how an increasing number of employees leaving the firm 
subsequent to workforce downsizing affect organizational learning. We thereby draw on the 
seminal finding by Trevor and Nyberg (2008) suggesting a positive relationship between 
workforce downsizing and employee turnover. Thereby, we question the common view that 
increased post-downsizing employee turnover is only a negative side effect of workforce 
downsizing, imposing additional costs related to employee replacement, training and 
outplacement (Cascio, 2000; Johnson, 1995; Sturman et al., 2003). From an organizational 
perspective, there is, however, no reason why increased employee turnover should 
systematically deteriorate performance as new employees might add new and valuable 
knowledge. Excessive levels of employee turnover might be detrimental though while certain 
levels of novel knowledge can significantly improve performance outcomes March (1991) 
though. Whether or not additional levels of employee turnover that result from workforce 
downsizing might improve performance outcomes seem to essentially boil down to the 
question on the extent to which firms manage to acquire and internalize novel knowledge. In 
fact, we can demonstrate that increased levels of employee turnover in the aftermath of 
workforce downsizing can improve organizational performance.  
Together, our results underpin that performance outcomes of workforce downsizing 
specifically depend on three factors: the position of downsized employee in the formal 
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network, the distribution of friendship relationships among employees and the level of 
employee turnover in the aftermath of downsizing.  
3.6.1. Theoretical implications 
Our study contributes to organizational learning theory and research on the interplay 
and performance outcomes of both workforce downsizing and employee turnover. First, we 
specifically enrich the organizational learning perspective in explaining performance 
outcomes of workforce downsizing. Applying the organizational learning perspective, we 
discuss structural implications (i.e., organizational network disruptions) and individual 
outcomes (i.e., the survivor syndrome) workforce downsizing and thereby explain the 
existence of negative and positive performance effects. Drawing on these theoretical 
underpinnings, we use our simulation approach to investigate the strength of each effect as 
well as their interplay. We demonstrate that, in particular, disrupted knowledge flows 
resulting from network disruptions and reduced individual knowledge processing capacities of 
survivors can significantly lower organizational performance in the aftermath of workforce 
downsizing. Applying learning-based explanations, our simulation results thereby provide a 
sound underpinning for the existence of negative performance outcomes of workforce 
downsizing. However, our study goes beyond this as we also demonstrate how and why 
workforce downsizing might be also be associated with subsequent performance 
improvements. Again applying the organizational learning perspective, we identify increased 
employee turnover in the aftermath of workforce downsizing as a means to acquire and 
internalize novel knowledge in order to (over)compensate for negative effects. The seminal 
finding on increasing levels of employee turnover subsequent to workforce downsizing by 
Trevor and Nyberg (2008) specifically underpins the relevance of this potential performance 
improving effect. Together, our simulation approach demonstrates that the learning-based 
perspective specifically contributes to resolve the ambiguity of findings on performance 
outcomes of workforce downsizing.  
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Further, we add to research on the interplay and performance outcomes of both 
workforce downsizing and employee turnover. Following the call for more research on this 
interplay by Hancock et al. (2013), we advance the finding by Trevor and Nyberg (2008) on 
increased levels of employee turnover in the aftermath of workforce downsizing. Our 
simulation approach allows isolating the performance effect of employee leaving because of 
previously conducted job cuts which seems very challenging an empirical setting. Finding 
that the increasing tendency of employees to leave the organization as a consequence of 
workforce downsizing might help improving organizational performance, we essentially 
address research gaps of two literature streams (i.e., outcomes of employee turnover and 
workforce downsizing). Our learning-based explanations underpin how and why performance 
outcomes of employee turnover subsequent to workforce downsizing can be positive 
supporting and thereby questioning the general assumption that the turnover-performance 
relationship is straightforwardly negative (Hancock et al., 2013; Hancock, Allen, & Soelberg, 
2017). In other words, our simulation approach allows investigating how a specifically 
relevant individual outcome of workforce downsizing (i.e., a survivor’s decision to also leave 
the organization) affects organizational performance contributing to an advanced 
understanding of the outcomes of employee turnover (Allen, Hancock, & Vardaman, 2014). 
We therefore relate individual and organizational outcomes of workforce downsizing by 
demonstrating a specifically strong mediating influence of increased levels of employee 
turnover in the aftermath of workforce downsizing.   
3.6.2. Practical implications 
Our study also offers several important managerial insights. Our study cautions 
managers to underestimate negative effects on organizational learning in the aftermath of 
downsizing. While we clearly find negative performance outcomes for downsizing 
organizations compared with non-downsizing organizations (see Figure 9), our study explains 
the exact mechanisms for why and how organizational learning is negatively affected and 
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these mechanisms formulate practical implications. First, cutting at the upper half of a firm’s 
hierarchy (e.g., delayering) leads to adverse implications for organizational learning that go 
beyond knowledge losses. Delayering disrupts essential knowledge flows that might be very 
complex and costly to re-establish. From an organizational learning perspective, cutting at the 
bottom of a firm’s hierarchy seems preferable as most of the essential knowledge flows are 
kept intact. We therefore question the positive view on delayering as a downsizing strategy 
that might come with faster decision-making, less redundancies and more organizational 
agility (e.g., Friedman et al., 2006; Shaw & Schneier, 1993; Wulf, 2012).  
Moreover, our findings on status homophily imply that managers have two ways to 
develop or restructure informal networks in order to mitigate negative performance outcomes 
induced by the survivor syndrome. First, high levels of status homophily seem to be a 
dominant strategy. This is because high levels of status homophily imply clustered networks 
(i.e., network in which friends of an employee tend to be also friends with one another) and 
employees who are members of these clusters might be downsized without any negative effect 
of the survivor syndrome among friends. In essence, this speaks for a positive ring-fencing 
effect which has also been shown to be positive for divestitures of entire units (e.g., 
Laamanen, Brauer, & Junna, 2014). Second, the information on both the informal network 
configuration and the used downsizing strategy need to aligned. This is because we find that 
medium levels of status homophily can also be helpful when firms delayer but might 
deteriorate performance for firms that cut at the lower end of the hierarchy (see Table 5).  
3.6.3. Limitations and suggestions for future research 
While our simulation approach allows elaborating on non-trivial learning-based 
explanations for negative performance outcomes of workforce downsizing (i.e., disrupted 
knowledge flows, reduced individual knowledge processing capacities) by isolating effects 
from different organizational networks, by decoupling workforce downsizing and employee 
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turnover as well as by incorporating different strengths of the survivor syndrome, an empirical 
testing might come with greater generalizability and less parameters to be specified.  
In terms of model refinements, we believe that the modeling of employee turnover 
could deserve a more detailed treatment. Our simulation model could be modified to 
incorporate various onboarding procedures leading to different, evolving patterns of 
friendship relationships in the pre- and post-downsizing phases. For example, we think of 
specific onboarding strategies that exclusively allocate friendship relationship at specific 
hierarchical levels and thereby explicitly generate certain levels of status homophily. Such 
modifications, however, will come at the cost of additional complexity of the model and could 
therefore complicate to again properly disentangle various effects from one another. 
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4. DETERMINANTS AND PERFORMANCE IMPLICATIONS OF TURNAROUND 
DURATION  
 
(This chapter is based on a paper co-authored by Matthias Brauer) 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Research on organizational decline and turnaround management focuses on explaining 
why and how some firms are more effective in reversing organizational declines than others 
(see Trahms et al., 2013 for a review). Building on the seminal turnaround model by Pearce 
and Robbins (1993) and more recent extensions (Trahms et al., 2013), scholarly contributions 
widely agree that turnaround success is predominantly influenced by how managers perceive 
and interpret the organizational decline as well as the extent to which firms engage in 
turnaround actions (e.g., Anand & Singh, 1997; Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; Barker & 
Duhaime, 1997; Barker & Mone, 1994; Lim, Celly, Morse, & Rowe, 2013; Morrow et al., 
2004; Morrow, Sirmon, Hitt, & Holcomb, 2007; Ndofor et al., 2013; Sudarsanam & Lai, 
2001; Trahms et al., 2013). Managers’ perceptions and interpretations of the organizational 
decline are primarily shaped by its extent of severity (Musteen et al., 2011). Turnaround 
actions comprise of two major types: retrenchment actions that are largely exploitative in 
nature and involve physical and human asset reductions to improve operational efficiency and 
recovery actions that are largely explorative in nature, aiming at strategic repositioning via 
changes in product diversification scope or CEO replacements (e.g., Barker & Duhaime, 
1997; Pearce & Robbins, 1993).13  
Though there is broad consensus and evidence that managerial cognition and 
turnaround actions are central to turnaround processes, a critical review of the literature 
reveals that research on the determinants of turnaround outcomes is plagued by inconsistent 
13 Hence, retrenchment actions have also been labeled operational actions and recovery actions have been labeled 
strategic actions (e.g., Trahms et al., 2013). 
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findings. Extant research on turnaround management provides insufficient knowledge on the 
exact role of managerial cognition. For example, some studies argue that the perception and 
interpretation of the severity of declines determine turnaround outcomes (e.g., Francis & 
Desai, 2005) and other scholars suggest that the severity of performance declines is associated 
with the type of turnaround action that is implemented (e.g., Musteen et al., 2011). In the 
same vein, prior work on the effectiveness of turnaround actions seems ambivalent. Some 
studies find that retrenchment actions improve firm performance (e.g., Bruton et al., 2003), 
others present evidence for negative effects of retrenchment actions on turnaround outcomes – 
both in terms of lower financial performance as well as losses in human and social capital 
(e.g., Morrow et al., 2004; Ndofor et al., 2013; Pennings et al., 1998). Again other studies find 
no significant effect of retrenchment actions on turnaround performance (e.g., Barker & 
Mone, 1994; Castrogiovanni & Bruton, 2000). Against the backdrop of these inconsistencies, 
requests for a more detailed understanding of the perception and interpretation of 
organizational declines and greater sensitivity to contingency effects have been voiced to 
more accurately determine the performance implications of retrenchment and recovery actions 
in turnarounds (Trahms et al., 2013).  
With our study, we aim to extend both very limited prior work on the role of 
managerial cognition and research on critical contingencies governing the effectiveness of 
retrenchment and recovery actions in turnarounds. However, in contrast to prior work we 
draw attention to turnaround duration as an important contingency factor that may mediate the 
relationship between managerial cognition as well as two major types of turnaround actions 
(i.e., retrenchment, recovery) and turnaround outcomes. Our primary focus on turnaround 
duration as an important characteristic of turnaround processes is motivated by a number of 
factors. First, related research on portfolio restructuring (i.e., acquisitions, divestitures) has 
shown that greater attention to the temporal dynamics of restructuring activity might offer 
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both more accurate and useful explanations for disparate restructuring outcomes (e.g., Brauer 
& Wiersema, 2012; Shi & Prescott, 2011; Shi, Sun, & Prescott, 2012). Second, the most 
recent research efforts on turnarounds have provided initial evidence that attention to 
temporal dynamics can help generate more accurate insights on the effectiveness of 
turnaround actions and turnaround outcomes (Schmitt & Raisch, 2013; Tangpong et al., 
2015). Third, time pressure and duration are common building blocks of definitions of 
organizational crises. Specifically, organizational crises have been argued to involve major 
goal reorientation and “time pressured change relative to standard operating procedures” 
(Combe & Carrington, 2015: 308; Mumford, Friedrich, Caughron, & Byrne, 2007; Williams, 
Pillai, Deptula, & Lowe, 2012). By incorporating the perception and interpretation of the 
severity of performance declines, we specifically investigate the role of time pressure in 
turnaround situations. Though there is no doubt that time pressure is central to turnaround 
processes, we hold very little knowledge on how this relates to turnaround outcomes and 
more generally our scholarly understanding of what determines turnaround duration, and how 
turnaround duration influences outcomes is specifically underdeveloped.  
Building on this motivation, our study seeks to better understand turnaround duration 
by addressing two major issues: First, we examine the relationships between managerial 
cognition as well as turnaround actions (i.e., retrenchment and recovery) and turnaround 
duration. Second, we analyze how turnaround duration relates to turnaround performance and 
whether turnaround duration mediates the relationship between recovery/retrenchment actions 
and turnaround performance. Figure 14 provides an overview of our research model and the 
suggested direct and mediating effects. 
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Figure 14: Research model 
 
 
81 
 
Empirical findings derived from the analysis of a multi-year (1988-2015), large scale, 
cross-industry sample of declining firms suggest that recovery actions (i.e., expansions of 
diversification scope and CEO replacements) are associated with longer turnaround duration. 
On the other hand, we find a negative relationship between firms’ severity of decline and 
turnaround duration. Importantly, our study’s findings further suggest that turnaround 
duration is positively associated with turnaround performance. Interestingly, our mediation 
analyses also reveal that recovery actions do not have a direct effect on turnaround 
performance. Instead, turnaround duration is found to fully mediate the relationship between 
these frequently applied turnaround actions and turnaround performance, suggesting that their 
effect on turnaround performance is time-dependent. Thereby, our study offers an explanation 
for the failure of prior studies to generate consistent results on the effectiveness of recovery 
actions in turnarounds. In contrast and counter to our initial predictions, we further find that 
turnaround duration does not mediate the relationship between asset retrenchment and 
turnaround duration. Instead, we find that asset retrenchment is positively related with 
turnaround success regardless of the duration of the turnaround process. Moreover, we find an 
inconsistent mediation regarding the severity of declines suggesting that more severe declines 
lead to shorter turnaround duration and thus lower turnaround performance while more severe 
declines, on average and independent from turnaround duration, are directly associated with 
greater turnaround performance.     
Collectively, our study’s focus and findings contribute to organizational decline 
literature and organization theory in several ways. First, the consideration of turnaround 
duration allows us to inform the ongoing, controversial discussion on the effectiveness of 
retrenchment and recovery actions in turnaround processes (e.g., Robbins & Pearce, 1992; 
Schmitt & Raisch, 2013; Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001; Trahms et al., 2013). Most importantly, 
we demonstrate that retrenchment and recovery have disparate effects on both turnaround 
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duration and performance. Recovery actions are associated with longer turnaround duration. 
Further, turnaround duration is found to fully mediate the relationship between these 
frequently applied turnaround actions and turnaround performance, suggesting that their effect 
on turnaround performance is time-dependent. In contrast, asset retrenchment is found to be 
an effective means to achieve turnaround success regardless of the duration of the turnaround 
process. Collectively, these insights help partially resolving the ambiguity that has plagued 
prior work on the effectiveness of recovery and retrenchment actions in turnaround processes, 
with some studies finding positive effects, and others finding negative or non-significant 
effects. 
Second, we extend organizational decline and turnaround literature by introducing a 
temporal perspective on turnaround processes. By viewing turnaround duration as a mediating 
factor, we break with the established logic and research approach of prior work that has 
exclusively attempted to unravel direct linkages between retrenchment/recovery actions and 
turnaround success. In doing so, our study not only helps partially resolving the equivocal 
findings on the effectiveness of retrenchment and recovery actions but also enriches extant 
theorizing on turnarounds by introducing a temporal perspective that draws on insights from 
(behavioral) decision theory and strategic decision-making process literature.  
Third, our findings contribute to a better understanding of the role of managerial 
cognition in turnaround management research. By thoroughly interpreting the inconsistent 
mediation regarding the severity of decline, we underpin that the perception and interpretation 
of the severity of decline resulting in corresponding levels of urgency might lead to two 
contrary effects. In some cases, it might speed up managerial decision making and thereby 
lower the underlying effectiveness while we also find that more severe decline and thus 
higher levels of the implied urgency, on average and independent from turnaround duration, 
increases the effectiveness of turnaround outcomes. This seems to point to a motivational 
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component which might also arise from high-pressure situations. We therefore complement 
research on the complex role of managerial cognition in turnaround management research by 
showing that the perception and interpretation of organizational decline can determine both 
speed and effectiveness of managerial decision making.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following, we discuss prior 
turnaround research and develop our mediation model. Next, we present our empirical design 
and the results of our empirical analyses. We then discuss our findings and their theoretical 
and practical implications. We conclude with an outline of our study’s limitations and 
resulting avenues for future research. 
 
4.2. Background and hypotheses 
Research on organizational decline and turnaround management focuses on 
understanding why and how some firms emerge stronger than others subsequent to a period of 
severely declining firm performance. A review of past work in this domain shows that 
conceptual and empirical findings are largely consistent in showing that managers’ awareness, 
perception and interpretation of the organizational decline (i.e., response factors) and their 
actual action repertoire to reverse organizational declines (i.e., turnaround actions) determine 
turnaround outcomes (see Trahms et al., 2013).  
Extant research on response factors suggests that managers’ ability to identify the true 
cause(s) of decline paired with their ability to accurately assess its severity are necessary 
preconditions to effectively manage a firm’s turnaround (e.g., Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; 
Barker & Patterson, 1996; Ford, 1985; Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Trahms et al., 2013). In this 
vein, past work has argued and found that managers often lack awareness, and are thus late to 
respond to organizational decline (e.g., Dranikoff, Koller, & Schneider, 2002; Ravenscraft & 
Scherer, 2011). Further, in their interpretation of causes for decline managers have been 
shown to have the tendency to attribute decline to external factors (e.g., Barker & Patterson, 
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1996; Olson, Van Bever, & Verry, 2008). This tendency has been found to be particularly 
pronounced for longer-tenure top management teams (Barker & Patterson, 1996). Lastly, the 
severity of decline has been argued to constitute an important determinant of managerial 
cognition and behavior. Specifically, the severity of decline has been argued to increase 
managerial awareness as well as heighten their sense of urgency in taking action (e.g. 
Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001). Further, managers tend use the severity of declines in order to form 
urgency levels that underlie their decision making und action taking (e.g., Francis & Desai, 
2005; Kiesler & Sproull, 1982; Musteen et al., 2011). However, extant research has not yet 
shown the exact role of the perception and interpretation of the severity of declines as there is 
no consensus about whether the severity of decline is a determinant of the choice of 
turnaround actions or turnaround outcomes. For example, Francis and Desai (2005) argue and 
find that there is negative relationship between the severity of decline and turnaround 
outcomes suggesting that less severe performance decline can more effectively be reversed 
than sharper performance drops. In conceptual contrast to that, Musteen et al. (2011) suggest a 
positive relationship between the perceived severity of firm decline and the extent of 
retrenchment activity in response.    
While extant research on response factors has tried to better understand managerial 
cognition in turnarounds and hence their responsiveness to organizational decline, research on 
turnaround actions has primarily focused on identifying the most widely applied managerial 
practices to address organizational decline and their effectiveness. Prior work has identified 
two types of action repertoires: retrenchment and recovery (e.g. Morrow et al., 2004; Morrow 
et al., 2007; Ndofor et al., 2013; Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Schmitt & Raisch, 2013; Trahms et 
al., 2013). Retrenchment actions are exploitative in nature and mainly involve physical and 
human asset reductions to improve operational efficiency (Ndofor et al., 2013; Trahms et al., 
2013). In comparison, recovery actions are explorative in nature, involving strategic 
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repositioning via product diversification and CEO replacements (e.g., Barker & Duhaime, 
1997; Pearce & Robbins, 1993).  
Though there is broad consensus in the literature that recovery and retrenchment 
actions resemble the action repertoire of managers during turnaround processes, 
inconsistencies and ambivalent findings have plagued work on the effectiveness of these two 
types of turnaround actions. In particular, research on the effectiveness of retrenchment 
actions has produced highly ambiguous findings. While some studies find that retrenchment 
actions improve firm performance (e.g., Bruton et al., 2003), others present evidence for 
negative effects of retrenchment actions on financial performance and a firm’s resource base 
(i.e., losses in social and human capital) (e.g., Morrow et al., 2004; Ndofor et al., 2013; 
Pennings et al., 1998). Some other studies even find no significant effect of retrenchment 
actions on firm performance (e.g., Barker & Mone, 1994; Castrogiovanni & Bruton, 2000).  
Collectively, prior work shows that previous research efforts that have tried to directly 
relate turnaround actions with turnaround outcomes have failed to generate a consistent 
pattern of results. As highlighted by some studies (e.g., Barker & Duhaime, 1997; Moulton, 
Thomas, & Pruett, 1996; Wan & Yiu, 2009), greater sensitivity to industry, firm and 
managerial characteristics might prove useful to produce more generalizable findings. With 
our study, we would like to extend this important work on critical contingencies governing 
the effectiveness of retrenchment and recovery actions in turnaround processes. However, in 
contrast to prior work we would like to draw attention to temporality (i.e., turnaround 
duration) as an important contingency factor that may mediate the relationship between how 
managers perceive and interpret the severity of declines as well as the two major types of 
turnaround actions (i.e., retrenchment, recovery) and turnaround outcomes. Our primary focus 
on turnaround duration as an important characteristic of turnaround processes is motivated by 
a number of factors. First, related research on portfolio restructuring (i.e., acquisitions, 
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divestitures) has shown that greater attention to the temporal dynamics of restructuring 
activity might offer far more accurate and useful explanations for restructuring outcomes 
(e.g., Brauer & Wiersema, 2012; Shi & Prescott, 2011; Shi et al., 2012) and outcomes of 
organizational change more generally (see Kunisch, Bartunek, Mueller, & Huy, 2017 for a 
comprehensive review). Second, most recent research efforts on turnarounds have provided 
initial evidence that attention to temporal dynamics can help generate more accurate insights 
on the effectiveness of turnaround actions and turnaround outcomes. Specifically, Tangpong 
et al. (2015) use a matched pair sample of 96 US firms and find that early retrenchment 
actions are more effective than late retrenchment actions. We believe that insights on 
turnaround duration help extend knowledge on the sequencing of turnaround actions.14 Third, 
considering turnaround duration also allows better understanding the exact role of managerial 
cognition. Decision theory specifically suggests that urgency levels which essentially stem 
from the perception and interpretation of the severity of declines determine decision making 
speed that corresponds with the time it takes to turnaround declining firm performance. 
Fourth and more generally, turnaround duration is a factor of utmost importance to managers 
as well as other key stakeholders (i.e., employees, creditors, investors) involved in the 
turnaround process. The importance granted to turnaround speed is intuitive as employee 
morale and thus overall productivity are likely to decline even further if turnaround processes 
drag out for long. Similarly, creditors and investors may lose patience, and deny further 
extensions of credit lines or capital injections in dragged out turnaround processes. In 
contrast, very swift turnaround processes may come at the cost of less sustainable and lower 
performance improvements in the post-turnaround period. Yet, our scholarly understanding of 
14 At the same time, we see an advantage in focusing on turnaround duration rather than sequence because 
studies on action sequences (or rhythm) rely on the debatable assumption that organizations follow an explicit 
and deliberate order in their activities (see Kunisch et al., 2017 for a discussion). Moreover, prior work on 
turnarounds has criticized that retrenchment and recovery actions in fact are taken concurrently rather than 
sequentially (Arogyaswamy et al., 1995). 
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what determines turnaround duration, and how turnaround duration influences outcomes is 
underdeveloped.  
Against the backdrop of the ambiguity of past findings on managerial cognition and 
turnaround actions as well as the neglect of prior conceptual and empirical work to consider 
turnaround duration, our work investigates how both the severity of declines and turnaround 
actions (i.e., retrenchment vs. recovery) relate to turnaround duration. In a subsequent step, 
we then examine how turnaround duration links to turnaround performance and whether 
turnaround duration mediates the relationship between retrenchment/recovery actions and 
turnaround outcomes.  
4.2.1. Managerial cognition and turnaround duration  
As outlined before, turning around performance declines depends on how managers 
perceive and interpret the severity of such declines (Musteen et al., 2011; Pearce & Robbins, 
1993; Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001; Trahms et al., 2013). More precisely, we though argue the 
perception and interpretation of how severe declines are initially impact how fast managers 
make decisions. We therefore draw on research on decision making speed suggesting that 
decision making speed increases with the urgency under which decisions are made and argue 
that the perception of the severity of declines forms such urgency levels (Perlow, Okhuysen, 
& Repenning, 2002).  
Severe performance declines not only indicate that current strategies and/or resources 
are not sufficiently effective but also signal managers that change is inevitable (Chowdhury & 
Lang, 1993). More severe declines heighten managers’ sense of urgency as the general range 
of actions becomes limited and very detailed analyses underlying lengthy decision making 
processes might come at the cost of bankruptcy (Robbins & Pearce, 1992). As a consequence, 
managers feel specifically pressured to reverse declining firm performance, seek for “quick 
fixes” and therefore engage in only sufficiently effective, but most importantly, fast decision 
making. Therefore, they tend to ignore and simplify information, for example about the true 
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causes of decline, for the sake of fast decisions (e.g., Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985; Schwenk, 
1984). Further, such decision making processes typically draw on lower information densities 
with the effect that only crucial information is incorporated and more detailed or even 
redundant information is consciously excluded. Together, we argue that very severe 
performance declines increase managers’ decision making and thus shorten turnaround 
duration.             
In contrast, less severe performance declines reduce the pressure to respond that 
managers are confronted with. More precisely, the less threatening performance declines are, 
the more inert managers become as they might interpret less severe declines as less complex 
tasks that do not require immediate response strategies (Staw et al., 1981). In this vein, extant 
research on turnaround management and decision making theory suggest that managers tend 
to first attribute less severe declines to easily controllable factors and potentially 
underestimate how threatening the situation is. Thus, less severe declines slow down 
managerial decision making with the effect of the emergence of longer turnaround duration. 
Together, we therefore hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 1: Severity of decline is negatively associated with turnaround duration. 
 
4.2.2. Turnaround actions and turnaround duration 
In the following, we theorize about how retrenchment and recovery actions influence 
turnaround duration. Given the distinct nature of the two types of turnaround actions, we 
propose disparate effects on turnaround duration for the two types of actions. Specifically, we 
argue that exploitation focused asset retrenchment reduces contextual complexity and is thus 
likely to be associated with shorter turnaround duration. Similarly, we draw on behavioral 
decision theory and literature to argue that exploration focused recovery actions increase the 
need for more distant and comprehensive search and analysis due to heightened 
organizational complexity. Specifically, we distinguish between expansions to diversification 
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scope as an organizational means to strategically reposition the firm and CEO replacements as 
an individual means. Since in both cases heightened organizational complexity results, we 
argue that recovery is associated with longer turnaround durations. 
Retrenchment actions and turnaround duration. Asset retrenchment involves the 
elimination of physical assets through plant closures and/or through reductions in stocks of 
property, equipment and inventory via asset sales (Lim et al., 2013; Morrow et al., 2004). 
Prior empirical studies in strategy and corporate finance have argued and found that asset 
retrenchment reduces organizational complexity by streamlining processes and reducing 
redundancies (e.g., Brauer, 2006; Castrogiovanni & Bruton, 2000; Vijh, 2002). Reduced 
complexity facilitates information processing and frees up managerial cognitive capacity 
which allows managers to dedicate more attention to preserved assets as well as to make 
decisions faster (Cyert & March, 1963). Due to lower organizational complexity and positive 
effects on managerial cognition, asset retrenchment is thus likely to shorten turnaround 
duration. 
Moreover, asset retrenchment is generally indicative of a firm having a stronger 
exploitation than exploration focus (Lim et al., 2013; Schmitt & Raisch, 2013). Exploitation 
in contrast to exploration only necessitates near search to seek incremental and near-term 
performance improvements. Increases in resource efficiency are mainly achieved by sharing 
and transferring existing assets across the organization (i.e., Ricardian rent generation) rather 
than by novel resource re-combinations (i.e., Schumpeterian rent generation). As a result, 
asset retrenchment usually involves much less experimentation (Schmitt & Raisch, 2013), and 
thereby is able to realize much more near-term performance improvements (Andriopoulos & 
Lewis, 2009; Morrow et al., 2007). The most recent empirical results by Tangpong et al. 
(2015) finding that early retrenchment actions are more effective than late retrenchment 
actions are supportive of this reasoning.  
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In summary, this conceptual reasoning suggests that asset retrenchment leads to 
shorter turnaround duration by (1) reducing organizational and cognitive complexity, and thus 
allowing for faster decision-making, and by (2) focusing on resource exploitation, allowing 
for near term performance improvement. Consequently, we predict: 
Hypothesis 2: Asset retrenchment is associated with shorter turnaround duration.  
 
Recovery actions in form of expansions of diversification scope and turnaround duration. 
While retrenchment refers to a planned shrinking of the scope of a firm, recovery actions 
describe a strategic repositioning in turnarounds that is frequently brought about by changes 
to diversification scope (e.g., Barker et al., 2001). Expansions to firm diversification scope by 
introducing new products, by marketing established products in related product markets or by 
completing unrelated acquisitions are frequently sought in turnarounds. This is because these 
diversifying activities help diversify revenue streams as well as to open up new sources of 
income. During the subprime crisis (2007-2010), for instance, numerous high-profile 
companies facing severe declines in performance dramatically adjusted their diversification 
scope. For instance, KUKA, a world-leading German-based robotics company, which 
generated 90 percent of its revenues with clients from the automotive industry experienced 
sharp drops in performance in the first years of the crisis. As a response, executive managers 
broadened KUKA’s service and product portfolio in robot-based automation and started 
diversifying into healthcare, pharmaceutical, e-commerce and consumer goods industries. 
This allowed KUKA to achieve a highly successful turnaround in the subsequent three to five 
years.  
Though the benefits associated with major adjustments to a firm’s scope of 
diversification might be substantial as illustrated by this example, adjustments to 
diversification scope which essentially reflect changes in corporate strategy need time to be 
initiated as well as time to materialize. This is for several reasons. First, comprehensive 
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analysis which involves extensive information collection and analysis as well as the survey of 
multiple alternatives is needed to identify suitable new product markets (Elbanna & Child, 
2007; Miller, 2008; Papadakis et al., 1998). Second, it is most likely that established products 
and services need to be modified to fit the needs of the new product markets. In some 
instance, even complete new product development might be required. Third, given that the 
firm lacks prior experience in these new product markets (“liability of newness”), decisions 
and actions need more time (e.g., Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002). As a result, the payback 
periods of these new strategic initiatives are likely to be longer. Lastly, scope expansions 
increase organizational complexity which further slows decision-making speed (Lorsch & 
Allen, 1973). Slowdowns in decision-making speed in the face of increased organizational 
complexity are likely to be particularly pronounced in turnarounds because erroneous 
decision-making is survival threatening. Behavioral theory suggests that managers become 
very risk-averse under such conditions and value greater amounts of information and high 
levels of information accuracy (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Collectively, all these effects 
lead to slower decision-making speed and action. We thus hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: Recovery actions in form of diversification scope expansions are 
associated with longer turnaround duration. 
 
Recovery actions in form of CEO replacements and turnaround duration. Strategic 
repositioning in turnarounds cannot only be brought about by changes to the diversification 
scope but also by CEO replacements (e.g., Barker et al., 2001; Chen & Hambrick, 2012; 
Hofer, 1980; Kanter, 2003). New CEOs have been argued to be “critically important in the 
context of sensemaking under crises” (Combe & Carrington, 2015: 308) so that CEO 
replacements are likely to substantially affect decision-making speed. By focusing on CEO 
replacements, we are also responsive to calls for greater consideration of strategic leadership 
factors in research on turnarounds (Trahms et al., 2013). 
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While studies show that CEO replacements frequently occur in turnarounds, Trahms et 
al. conclude in their review of turnaround literature that “conflicting evidence remains 
regarding the need for CEO replacement” (2013: 1291). Ndofor et al. (2013), for instance, 
document a positive effect of CEO succession on turnaround performance for declining firms. 
In contrast, studies by Winn (1997) and by Barker et al. (2001) show that CEO replacement is 
much more likely to occur in less successful turnaround processes. At the same time, studies 
on short-term investor reaction to CEO replacement in distressed situations have found 
positive effects (Davidson, Worrell, & Dutia, 1993).  
Though it remains widely unclear of whether CEO replacements constitute an 
effective action in turnarounds, upper echelons literature and insights from behavioral 
decision theory suggest that CEO replacement extends turnaround duration. This is for several 
reasons: Being usually more unfamiliar with the situation and having less intimate knowledge 
about the firm than longstanding CEOs, new CEOs have been argued and found to invest 
much more time and effort in sensemaking (Combe & Carrington, 2015; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 
1991). While sensemaking in crisis contexts is perceived as inherently complex and 
commonly considered to take considerable amount of time (Mumford et al., 2007), new CEOs 
lacking intimate knowledge about the organization and having less extensive social networks 
face an even greater challenge in developing consensus in how to deal with the crisis (Combe 
& Carrington, 2015). Collectively, the more drawn out sensemaking by new CEOs slows 
decision-making and delays action taking, leading to longer turnaround duration.  
But not only sensemaking processes are likely to be prolonged for new CEOs. New 
CEOs have been suggested to more readily question existing structures and processes and to 
engage in more substantial resource orchestration (e.g., Chen, 2015; Greiner & Bhambri, 
1989). This greater inclination to question internal processes and structures stems from a 
greater willingness of new CEOs to attribute the crisis to internal rather than merely external 
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factors (Barker & Patterson, 1996; Ford, 1985). When undertaking more extensive and more 
substantial changes to structures and processes, turnaround duration is likely to increase 
because resource orchestration and the accompanying rebuild of organizational routines are 
time-consuming (Feldman, 2000; Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007). Building on the above 
theoretical and empirical insights, we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 4: Recovery actions in form of CEO replacements during turnaround 
processes are associated with longer turnaround duration. 
 
4.2.3. Turnaround duration and turnaround performance 
Having discussed the determinants of turnaround duration, we next reflect upon the 
relationship between turnaround duration and turnaround performance. Drawing on 
(behavioral) decision theory and on empirical insights on the influence of decision making 
speed on decision outcomes in strategic decision-making process theory, we predict that 
turnaround processes of shorter duration which are reflective of high decision speed are 
associated with lower turnaround performance than turnaround processes of longer duration. 
Short turnaround duration essentially signals that managers perceive greater time 
pressure and hence take decisions with greater speed. Decision theory and individual as well 
as group level empirical psychology research suggest that greater decision speed often comes 
at the expense of decision accuracy. This has been labelled the speed-accuracy tradeoff (e.g., 
Donkin, Little, & Houpt, 2014; Hick, 1952; Schouten & Bekker, 1967; Wickelgren, 1977).15 
Lack of accuracy in fast decision-making often results from the fact that managers ignore 
crucial information or oversimplify information by applying ill-fitting decision rules and 
heuristics (Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985; Schwenk, 1984). As a consequence, fast decisions 
typically lack accuracy, and are associated with poorer outcomes (e.g., Donkin et al., 2014; 
Perlow et al., 2002; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002).  
15 The speed-accuracy tradeoff essentially describes the relationship between an individual’s willingness to 
respond slowly and reduce mistakes compared with their individual willingness to engage in fast responses that 
are more prone to mistakes. 
94 
 
                                                 
In contrast, longer turnaround duration indicates that managers allow themselves more 
time for decision-making and rely on a more comprehensive decision approach. A 
comprehensive decision-making approach is characterized by extensive information 
collection, by qualitative and quantitative analysis and by an exhaustive survey of alternative 
options (Elbanna & Child, 2007; Forbes, 2007; Miller, 2008). Though far more time-
consuming than intuition-based decision-making, comprehensive decision approaches have 
been found to be associated with significantly better decision outcomes in most decision 
settings (Dean & Sharfman, 1996; Miller, 2008; Papadakis, Lioukas, & Chambers, 1998). 
Importantly, in the turnaround context equally positive effects of a comprehensive decision 
approach can be expected. By engaging in systematic and extensive information search and 
analysis as well as a careful review of alternative options, comprehensive decision-making 
allows managers to identify and to fully understand the true causes of decline, and thus to take 
appropriate and sufficient action.  
Next to greater decision comprehensiveness, lower decision-making speed has also 
been argued and found to be associated with higher degrees of conflict resolution (Hickson, 
Butler, Cray, Mallory, & Wilson, 1986; Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976) and 
consensus (Dooley, Fryxell, & Judge, 2000). Again, these decision process characteristics are 
likely to produce particularly positive effects in conflict-laden decision contexts such as 
turnarounds.  
Lastly, our theorizing on the determinants of turnaround duration suggested that longer 
turnaround duration is the product of managerial efforts to change the strategic orientation of 
the firm by engaging in product diversification and/or by putting a new CEO in place. Though 
such changes to a firm’s strategic orientation take more time to introduce and to take effect, 
prior research has shown that their final impact on firm performance is likely to be greater 
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than the impact of exploitative measures (e.g., Morrow et al., 2007; Ndofor et al., 2013; Wan 
& Yiu, 2009). Together, we thus hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 5: Turnaround duration is positively associated with turnaround 
performance. 
 
4.2.4. The mediating role of turnaround duration 
The preceding hypotheses link together in an overall mediation model: Hypotheses 1 - 
4 relate turnaround actions to turnaround duration, while Hypothesis 5 links turnaround 
duration to turnaround performance. We therefore argue that all three turnaround actions 
affect turnaround performance through their effects on turnaround duration. The mediation 
model thereby intends to explicate the relevance of turnaround duration for turnaround 
performance beyond the simple direct effect, and to help resolve the existing ambiguity in 
research on the direct relationship between recovery/retrenchment actions and turnaround 
performance and advances our understanding of the exact role of managerial cognition.  
In line with our earlier theorizing, we predict that specifically severe declines and asset 
retrenchment which has been argued to be associated with shorter turnaround duration leads 
to lower turnaround performance. In contrast, efforts to strategically reposition the firm 
through changes in product diversification and CEO replacements have been argued to be 
associated with longer turnaround duration, and hence are predicted to lead to greater 
performance improvements. Consequently, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 6:  Turnaround duration mediates the relationship between firm’s severity 
of decline and turnaround performance. 
Hypothesis 7: Turnaround duration mediates the relationship between retrenchment 
as well as recovery actions (i.e., expansions of product diversification scope and CEO 
replacements) and turnaround performance. 
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4.3. Methods 
Our empirical analyses rely on a full survey of all single business firms included in the 
Compustat North America Database which experienced organizational decline within the 
timeframe of 1988 to 2015.16 The focus on single business firms is the most common research 
approach in organizational decline and turnaround literature as it specifically reduces 
extraneous variance and increases the accuracy of measures and results (Morrow et al., 2007). 
Importantly, a focus on single businesses also allows for more accurate identification and 
isolation of the causes of organizational decline.  
Following Ndofor et al. (2013), we consider firms to experience an organizational 
decline that have at least two consecutive years of declining return on assets (ROA) after the 
base year being greater or equal to five percent while the second year of decline is 
additionally characterized by a net loss (i.e., negative ROA). By applying these criteria, we 
ensure that firms truly experience a survival-threatening event which extant research treats as 
the most relevant characteristic of organizational decline (Barker & Mone, 1994; Chen & 
Hambrick, 2012; Ndofor et al., 2013). In total, we identified 3481 cases of organizational 
decline, of which 1005 completed a turnaround. This indicates a turnaround success rate of 
slightly less than 29 percent. This success rate compares well with prior studies’ findings.17  
4.3.1. Dependent variables 
Turnaround duration. Turnaround duration is operationalized as the time elapsed between 
onset of the organizational decline and the year of successful turnaround. Successful 
turnaround is the first year in which the firm manages to restore pre-decline financial 
performance. On average, firms in our sample achieve the turnaround within a little over 3.5 
years.  
16 In keeping with standard practice, we exclude financial service and utility firms from our sample given that 
they are subject to specific industry regulation and their asset structure lacks comparability. 
17 In their study of the software industry, Ndofor et al. (2013) report a turnaround success rate of slightly less 
than 32 percent. 
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Turnaround performance. We measure turnaround performance as the increase in firm 
performance (i.e., return on assets) in the year of successful turnaround relative to the base 
year (i.e., the year prior to decline). Figure 15 visualizes our operationalization of turnaround 
duration and turnaround performance. 
4.3.2. Independent variables 
Severity of decline. is assessed by the change in a firm’s ROA during the organizational 
decline relative to a firm’s base performance (e.g., Ndofor et al., 2013; Robbins & Pearce, 
1992). Higher values indicate more severe decline. 
Retrenchment. Following conceptual definitions and prior work (e.g., Bruton et al., 2003; 
Michael & Robbins, 1998; Morrow et al., 2004), we measure asset retrenchment as the 
percentage change in assets between the first year of decline and the year of turnaround. Asset 
reductions indicate that a firm closed or sold any of its physical assets (Ndofor et al., 2013). 
We reverse coded the variable so that larger values indicate greater asset retrenchment.  
Recovery. In line with prior work (e.g., Barker & Duhaime, 1997; Ginsberg, 1988), we proxy 
the extent to which the firm engages in recovery actions by the change in a firm’s scope of 
product diversification relative to its pre-decline level using Jacquemin’s and Berry’s entropy 
measure (Jacquemin & Berry, 1979).18 Next to this organizational recovery measure, we 
assess CEO replacement as a particular individual form of a firm’s strategic repositioning 
using the Execucomp database. We code CEO retrenchment as “1” if the CEO was replaced 
during the turnaround process and “0” otherwise (Chen & Hambrick, 2012). 
 
18 Change in diversification scope seems a useful aggregate measure as it is of secondary interest to us of 
whether the strategic repositioning via product diversification is achieved through alliances, acquisitions or new 
product introductions. 
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Figure 15: Visualization of turnaround duration and turnaround performance 
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4.3.3. Control variables 
To be able to accurately isolate our main effects, we control for a number of firm and 
industry characteristics that could influence turnaround duration and performance. We 
account for firm size using the natural logarithm of total assets (Laamanen & Keil, 2008). 
Firm slack is measured as the ratio of current assets to current liabilities (i.e., the current ratio) 
(Bromiley, 1991). Firm leverage is measured as the ratio of total liabilities to shareholder 
equity (Bromiley, 1991). We also control for firm geographic diversification as the ratio of 
foreign sales to total sales (Kang, 2013; Tallman & Li, 1996). Additionally, we control for 
potential timing effects of implemented turnaround actions (Tangpong et al., 2015). We assess 
early acquisition activity, early divestiture activity and early alliance formation as the number 
of acquisitions and divestitures conducted and the number of newly formed alliances in the 
first year of the turnaround process. Acquisition, divestiture and alliance data was retrieved 
from SDC Platinum. Lastly, we control for industry munificence, as the regression slope 
coefficient (sales over time) divided by the corresponding mean value of industry sales, and 
industry dynamism, as the standard error of the regression slope coefficient divided by the 
mean value of industry sales (Dess & Beard, 1984). Both industry variables are based on four-
digit SIC codes and are calculated for the full time span of the organizational decline. 
4.3.4. Data analysis 
For our regression analyses, we used pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions 
with clustered standard errors. Subsequent collinearity diagnostics using the variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) indicated no multicollinearity problems, as none of the VIFs approached the 
threshold of 10 (Cohen et al., 2013; Neter et al., 1996). The mean VIF for the variables used 
in our regression model amounts to 1.26 with a maximum VIF of 1.98.  
For the mediation analyses, we perform a Sobel (1982) test as this procedure is a more 
powerful alternative for assessing indirect effects (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Shrout & Bolger, 
2002) than the stepwise procedure suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986). 
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4.4. Results 
Table 6 depicts means, standard-deviations, and correlations for all variables included 
in our study. 
Table 7 presents the results of estimating the effects of our explanatory and control 
variables on turnaround duration (Models 1 and 2) and on turnaround outcome (Models 3, 4). 
As indicated by the F-test statistics, all models are highly significant and the full model fits 
the data significantly better than the control model. 
Model 1 in Table 7, the control model, indicates that early divestiture activity is 
significantly, negatively (b = -0.37, p < 0.05) associated with turnaround duration, suggesting 
that conducting divestitures in an early stage of the turnaround process shortens the 
turnaround duration.   
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics and correlationsc 
 Variables Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Turnaround 
performance 
0.08 0.14 1.00               
2 Turnaround duration 3.67 2.29 0.08 1.00              
3 Firms’ decline 
severity 
0.23 0.19 0.17 -0.08 1.00             
4 Asset retrenchment  -0.28 0.99 0.12 -0.07 0.12 1.00            
5 Product diversification 0.10 0.29 0.00 0.12 0.02 -0.12 1.00           
6 CEO replacement 0.12 0.33 -0.04 0.14 -0.01 -0.07 0.11 1.00          
7 Firms’ base 
performance 
0.10 0.07 -0.14 -0.05 -0.14 0.08 0.01 0.35 1.00         
8 Firm size 4.36 1.97 -0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.12 1.00        
9 Firm slack 3.03 2.50 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.07 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.12 1.00       
10 Firm leverage 0.11 0.53 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.25 0.02 -0.02 1.00      
11 Geographic 
diversification 
0.13 0.25 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.17 0.04 0.11 0.14 -0.05 0.05 0.04 1.00     
12 Early acquisition 
activity 
0.14 0.58 -0.02 -0.08 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.22 -0.07 -0.01 0.10 0.15 1.00    
13 Early divestiture 
activity 
0.10 0.42 -0.03 -0.05 0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.14 0.20 -0.01 -0.03 0.12 0.22 0.20 1.00   
14 Early alliance 
formation 
0.12 0.32 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 0.07 -0.04 -0.14 0.04 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.03 1.00  
15 Industry munificence 0.07 0.16 0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.12 1.00 
16 Industry dynamism 0.05 0.07 0.03 -0.14 -0.01 0.07 -0.05 0.03 0.26 -0.02 -0.08 0.07 -0.03 0.02 -0.11 -0.26 -0.06 
          c N = 1005. Correlations greater than 0.06 are significant at p < .05. 
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Table 7: Results of regression analysis predicting turnaround duration and performanced 
Explanatory Variables DV: Turnaround duration  DV: Turnaround performance 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4  
Turnaround duration                               0.01***  
                        (0.00)  
Firms’ severity of decline                             -0.15**                             0.02***  
                           (0.06)                      (0.00)  
Asset retrenchment                             -0.06                             0.02**  
                           (0.09)                      (0.01)  
Product diversification                                  0.81***                             0.00  
                           (0.27)                         (0.01)  
CEO replacement                                  1.19***                             0.00  
                           (0.26)                         (0.01)  
Firm size                        0.02                             -0.06                         -0.01***                       -0.01***  
                    (0.04)                          (0.04)                       (0.00)                     (0.00)  
Firm slack                        0.05                                 0.04                         -0.00                       -0.00  
                    (0.03)                          (0.03)                       (0.00)                    (0.00)  
Firm leverage                    -0.00                                 0.04                         -0.01                       -0.01  
                    (0.10)                          (0.10)                       (0.01)                    (0.01)  
Geographic diversification                    -0.15                            -0.08                             0.03                           0.03  
                 (0.29)                          (0.28)                         (0.02)                       (0.02)  
Early acquisition activity                    -0.03                             -0.10                         -0.01**                        -0.00  
                 (0.13)                          (0.12)                       (0.00)                      (0.00)  
Early divestiture activity                    -0.37**                             -0.37**                             0.00                           0.00  
                 (0.16)                          (0.15)                         (0.01)                    (0.01)  
Early alliance formation                    -0.35                             -0.38                             0.00                           0.00  
                 (0.24)                          (0.24)                         (0.01)                    (0.01)  
Industry munificence                    -0.68                             -0.78*                             0.01                           0.02  
                 (0.46)                          (0.43)                         (0.03)                    (0.03)  
Industry dynamism                        0.22                                 0.56                             0.03                           0.05  
                 (1.13)                          (1.10)                         (0.05)                     (0.05)  
Constant           123.65***                    110.90***                         -3.22**                       -3.71**  
           (23.23)                    (22.86)                      (1.60)                    (1.57)  
F-value                       3.590***                                6.213***                             3.180***                           5.366***  
R²                       0.04                                0.08                             0.03                           0.08  
                   d N = 1005; Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown; year dummies included.  
            *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05.  * p<0.1 
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Hypothesis 1 predicted a negative relationship between firms’ severity of decline and 
turnaround. As shown in Model 2 of Table 7, firm’s severity of decline is significantly, 
negatively (b = -0.15, p < 0.05) associated with turnaround duration. Thus, Hypothesis 1 finds 
support.  
Hypothesis 2 suggested a negative relationship between asset retrenchment and 
turnaround duration. As shown in Model 2 of Table 7, asset retrenchment not is found to be 
significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 does not find support. Further, product diversification is 
found to be significant and positively related to turnaround duration (b = 0.81, p < 0.01), 
supporting Hypothesis 3. Further, Hypothesis 4 proposed a positive relationship between 
CEO replacement and turnaround duration. As shown in Model 2 of Table 7, CEO 
replacement is found to be significant and positively related to turnaround duration (b = 1.19, 
p < 0.01). Hypothesis 4 thus finds support. Together, we find support for a positive 
relationship between recovery actions and turnaround duration while we do find support for a 
negative relationship between retrenchment and turnaround duration. 
Model 3 displays the effects of the control variables on turnaround performance with 
firm size and early acquisition activity being negatively related to turnaround performance. 
Model 4 provides a test for Hypothesis 5 which argued for a positive relationship between 
turnaround duration and turnaround performance. Turnaround duration is found to be 
significant and positively related to turnaround performance (b = 0.01, p < 0.01). Hypothesis 
5 thus finds support. To examine Hypotheses 6 and 7 which suggested a mediating effect of 
turnaround duration, we conducted a Sobel (1982) test to complement our regression results. 
Table 8 shows the results of the Sobel test.  
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Table 8: Sobel test for indirect effectse 
 Sobel test statistics 
Firms’ severity of decline             2.05*  
Asset retrenchment             0.53 
Product diversification             2.23* 
CEO replacement             2.74** 
                                         e Sobel tests were conducted using full model estimates. 
         ** p<0.01. * p<0.05.  
 
The Sobel test statistics are significant (p < .05) for product diversification and CEO 
retrenchment. When inspecting the direct effects of asset retrenchment, product 
diversification and CEO replacement on turnaround performance, we find that only asset 
retrenchment (b = 0.01, p < 0.01) is significantly related with turnaround performance. Taken 
together, this suggests that turnaround duration fully mediates the relationship between 
recovery actions and turnaround performance. Further, we unravel the interesting finding of 
an inconsistent mediation regarding firms’ severity of decline as the sign of the direct effect of 
firms’ severity of decline on turnaround performance is positive while the multiplied sign of 
the indirect effect (see Model 2 and 4 in Table 7: 𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 < 0 and 𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼 > 0) is 
negative. This finding means that specifically severe declines lead to shorter turnaround 
durations which again are associated with lower turnaround performance. However, more 
severe performance declines, on average and independent from turnaround durations, are 
directly associated with greater turnaround performance. Together, Hypothesis 6 finds support 
while Hypothesis 7 finds only partial support as the mediation can only be confirmed for 
recovery actions. 
4.4.1. Supplementary analyses  
We performed several supplementary tests to assure the robustness of our results. 
First, given that prior research suggested that industry characteristics may have a significant 
moderating influence on the relationship between retrenchment/recovery actions and 
turnaround performance (e.g., Barker & Duhaime, 1997; Moulton et al., 1996; Wan & Yiu, 
2009), we included those interaction terms as additional control variables in our models. 
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However, we find no significant moderating influence of industry munificence or dynamism 
on our key relationships. Additionally, we tested whether severity of decline moderates the 
relationship between retrenchment/recovery actions and turnaround duration. We tested this 
influence because it could be argued that retrenchment/recovery actions might take different 
forms depending on decline severity. Our interaction analyses, however, do not provide 
evidence for a significant moderating influence of decline severity. Furthermore, we checked 
upon the robustness of our finding regarding CEO retrenchment by adding a control for 
general personnel retrenchment, using the percentage change in the number of employees 
during the turnaround process. Personnel retrenchment, however, is not found to have a 
significant effect on our outcome variables, and also does not impact our reported findings for 
CEO retrenchment. Additionally, we created a categorical variable for CEO retrenchment (0= 
No replacement, 1=Internal replacement, 2=External replacement) to be better able to assess 
whether there are material differences between internal and external CEOs. We find that 
results remain fully consistent when using this alternative operationalization. Descriptive 
analyses (i.e., mean difference tests) also do not bring to light any material differences 
between internal and external CEOs (t = 0.123, for testing the difference in turnaround 
duration between internal and external replacements). CEO replacements take place in 14 % 
of all turnaround processes and 32 % of these replacements are external replacements. 
Moreover, the correlation between the categorical variable for CEO retrenchment (i.e., 
differentiating between internal and external replacements) and turnaround duration equals 14 
% which is only slighter higher than the correlation of 12 % between CEO retrenchment and 
turnaround duration presented in our study.   
 
4.5. Discussion and implications 
Given strategic management scholars’ strong interest in the notion of competitive 
advantage and firm survival, it is surprising to see that our understanding of how firms can 
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effectively reverse organizational decline is relatively underdeveloped. Against the backdrop 
of more frequent and severe macroeconomic and industry shocks, the shortage of scholarly 
knowledge on how to effectively manage turnarounds not only seems lamentable from an 
academic perspective but also from a business practitioner perspective.  
Despite the scarcity of research on turnarounds, prior work has generated some 
valuable insights into the role of how managers perceive and interpret declines but also into 
what kind of actions (i.e., retrenchment vs. recovery) are taken in order to reverse declining 
performance (Trahms et al., 2013). Among the most important insights of prior work is that 
recovery and retrenchment actions constitute the main activities during turnaround processes 
(Barker & Duhaime, 1997; Barker & Mone, 1994; Lim et al., 2013; Morrow et al., 2004; 
Morrow et al., 2007; Ndofor et al., 2013; Schmitt & Raisch, 2013; Trahms et al., 2013). 
Empirical findings on the direct effects of retrenchment and recovery actions on turnaround 
success, however, have remained highly equivocal. As a result, a greater focus on contextual 
factors of turnaround processes has been called for (see Trahms et al., 2013). Similarly, extant 
research on the role of managerial cognition is very limited and inconclusive. Though there 
seems consensus that the accurate assessment of the severity of declines is of utmost 
importance for successful turnaround management (e.g., Arogyaswamy et al., 1995; Barker & 
Patterson, 1996; Ford, 1985; Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Trahms et al., 2013), we hold very 
little knowledge on the exact role of the perception and interpretation of the severity of 
declines. Some studies argue that the perception and interpretation of the severity of declines 
determines turnaround outcomes (e.g., Francis & Desai, 2005) while other scholars suggest 
that the severity of performance declines is associated with the type and extent of turnaround 
actions that are implemented (e.g., Musteen et al., 2011).    
In line with these shortcomings and requests, our study applies a temporal perspective 
on organizational decline and draws attention to turnaround duration as an important 
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contingency in turnaround processes. Our empirical findings based on a full survey of all 
North American single business firms between 1988 and 2015 suggest that recovery actions 
(i.e., expansions of diversification scope and CEO replacements) are associated with longer 
turnaround duration. Further, we find a negative relationship between firms’ severity of 
decline and turnaround duration. Additionally, our study’s findings further suggest that 
turnaround duration is positively associated with turnaround performance. Our mediation 
analyses also reveal that recovery actions do not have a direct effect on turnaround 
performance. Figure 16 summarizes the main findings of our study. 
Figure 16: Summary of main findings 
 
 
Turnaround duration is found to fully mediate the relationship between these 
frequently applied turnaround actions and turnaround performance, suggesting that their effect 
on turnaround performance is time-dependent. Counter to our line of reasoning, we find that 
turnaround duration does not mediate the relationship between asset retrenchment and 
turnaround duration, as highlighted by the rectangle which is valid for all levels of turnaround 
duration. Instead, we find that asset retrenchment is positively related with turnaround 
performance regardless of the duration of the turnaround process. Lastly, we find an 
inconsistent mediation regarding the severity of declines suggesting that more severe declines 
108 
 
lead to shorter turnaround duration and thus lower turnaround performance while more severe 
declines, on average and independent from turnaround duration, are directly associated with 
greater turnaround performance.  
Collectively, our study’s focus and findings contribute to organizational theory and 
organizational decline literature in several ways. First, the consideration of turnaround 
duration allows us to inform the ongoing, controversial discussion on the effectiveness of 
retrenchment and recovery actions in turnaround processes (e.g., Robbins & Pearce, 1992; 
Schmitt & Raisch, 2013; Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001; Trahms et al., 2013). Most importantly, 
we demonstrate that retrenchment and recovery have disparate effects on both turnaround 
duration and performance. Collectively, these insights help partially explaining the ambiguity 
that has plagued prior work on the effectiveness of recovery and retrenchment actions in 
turnaround processes, with some studies finding positive effects, and others finding negative 
or non-significant effects. 
Second, we extend organizational decline and turnaround literature by introducing a 
temporal perspective on turnaround processes. By viewing turnaround duration as a mediating 
factor, we break with the established logic and research approach of prior work that has 
exclusively attempted to unravel direct linkages between retrenchment/recovery actions and 
turnaround success. Specifically, our findings indicate that the consideration of turnaround 
duration is a critical explanatory factor in turnaround processes. Recovery actions (i.e., CEO 
replacement and product diversification) are not found to have a direct effect on turnaround 
outcomes but only through turnaround duration. This suggests that the effectiveness of both 
actions is time-dependent.  
Third, our findings contribute to a better understanding of the role of managerial 
cognition in turnaround management research. By thoroughly interpreting the inconsistent 
mediation regarding the severity of decline, we underpin that the perception and interpretation 
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of the severity of decline resulting in corresponding levels of urgency might lead to two 
contrary effects. In some cases, it allows speeding up managerial decision making and thereby 
lowers the underlying effectiveness. This is evidenced by the mediation effect. However, we 
also find that more severe declines and thus higher levels of implied urgency, on average and 
independent from turnaround duration, increases the effectiveness of turnaround outcomes. 
While this initially might sound like a counterintuitive phenomenon (i.e., increased 
effectiveness under high pressure), it eventually boils downs to a motivational element arising 
from high pressure situations and driving managerial excellence. We therefore also 
complement research on the complex role of managerial cognition in turnaround management 
research by showing that the perception and interpretation of organizational decline can affect 
both speed and efficacy of managerial decision making. 
4.5.1. Practical implications 
Our study also offers several prescriptions to managers on how to achieve successful 
turnarounds. A first recommendation from our study is that managers should engage in close 
dialogue with their stakeholders – especially their creditors and investors – to better 
understand the time pressure under which the turnaround needs to be realized. If turnaround 
needs to be realized within very short time periods, managers should de-prioritize recovery 
actions and try to reverse the situation with the CEO in place as both recovery actions are 
found to be associated with longer turnaround duration. At the same time, our results also 
offer the opportunity to managers to convince stakeholders that greater patience might pay 
off. Our mediation analyses indicate that while recovery actions may be associated with 
longer turnaround duration, they eventually can lead to very positive turnaround outcomes. 
Moreover, our findings are fully aligned with insights from divestiture research (see 
Brauer, 2006 for a review) in showing that asset retrenchment is a highly effective way of 
restoring financial performance. Based on our empirical analysis, however, it appears 
doubtful whether retrenchment really serves as a “quick fix”. Managers are thus cautioned to 
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have overly high expectations on achieving very near term performance improvements 
through asset retrenchment. 
Finally, our empirical findings serve as a cautious reminder to managers not to lose 
their ability to objectively judge and assess problems facing severe organizational declines. 
Though the pressure to respond that is associated with situations of severely declining firm 
performance makes it very challenging to retain patience, it seems beneficial as longer 
turnaround duration produces more positive turnaround outcomes. Thus, decision making 
processes require objective and clearly defined quality gates that significantly lower the 
propensity to engage in hasty and incomplete decisions in severe turnaround situations.  
4.5.2. Limitations and future research avenues 
Clearly, our large scale, cross-industry study is also subject to a natural set of 
limitations. First, by sampling the biggest possible universe of single business firms, we are 
unable to use more granular measures of retrenchment such as product withdrawals. 
Similarly, we were unable to capture the more granular recovery measures that may underlie 
changes in diversification scope such as the number of new product introductions. Future 
single industry studies which use these more nuanced measures to capture different 
approaches to retrenchment and recovery would thus be useful to further assess the validity of 
our findings. Second, we interpret the severity of a performance decline as a manager’s 
perception and interpretation of the urgency of the situation. In doing so, we might 
underrepresent personal preferences and characteristics of top managers towards the over- and 
underestimation of the severity situations. Therefore, we believe that the consideration of 
personal characteristics such as individual risk preferences as well as insights on preferred 
temporal foci of CEOs might additionally contribute to a better understanding of determinants 
and performance outcomes of different turnaround durations. Hence, we see great merit in 
future research efforts that also incorporate these alternative paths when studying the temporal 
dynamics of turnaround processes.  
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5. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
The question of how to effectively reverse declining firm performance has ever been 
an important question for both academic scholars and business practitioners. Though a 
profound answer to this question seems more and more important as today’s business 
landscape is becoming increasingly volatile amplifying the threat of facing organizational 
declines, extant research is still inconclusive. Against this backdrop, this dissertation project 
aims to better understand how declining firm performance can effectively be reversed. 
Therefore, this dissertation project identifies and rigorously investigates unexplored 
contingencies that better explain the effectiveness of turnaround actions and also breaks with 
established research approaches both conceptually and methodologically.   
The first study of this dissertation project applies the concept of resilience (i.e., 
buffering volatility in declines and subsequent performance recovery) originating from 
psychology to an organizational context. Extant research approaches have primarily focused 
on distinct turnaround actions in order to better understand how performance recovery can be 
achieved. The organizational resilience perspective suggests though that not only 
organizational behavior in the aftermath of declines but also during declines is equally 
important in order to reverse declining firm performance (i.e., the buffering of performance 
volatility). Moreover, it is the first study that empirically tests and confirms the existence of 
the concept of resilience in an organizational context. 
The second study unravels two important contingencies that govern the effectiveness 
of workforce downsizing as one of the most prominent managerial practices in order to 
reverse declining firm performance. Most importantly, this study adopting a simulation 
approach demonstrates that intra-organizational networks (i.e., the configuration of formal 
and informal networks) and the extent of employee turnaround significantly influence the 
effectiveness of workforce downsizing. Against the backdrop of the empirical nature of 
almost all existing studies on the performance outcomes of workforce downsizing, the 
112 
 
simulation approach enabling the investigation of these contingencies can help resolve parts 
of the ambiguity of findings on the effectiveness of workforce downsizing. 
The third study of this dissertation project introduces a temporal perspective to 
research on organizational decline and turnaround management and thereby draws attention to 
turnaround duration as an important contingency. This study first analyzes how managerial 
cognition (i.e., the severity of decline) and turnaround actions (i.e., retrenchment and 
recovery) relate to turnaround duration. In a subsequent step, the study examines how 
turnaround duration links with turnaround performance and whether turnaround duration 
mediates the relationship between managerial cognition as well as turnaround actions and 
turnaround performance. While extant research on the effectiveness of managerial cognition 
and turnaround actions has focused on direct performance effects and generated a remarkable 
ambiguity of findings, this study shows that the consideration of a temporal perspective 
contributes to a better understanding of how substantial performance recoveries can be 
achieved.   
Together, the three single studies of this dissertation project complement established 
knowledge on how to effectively reverse declining firm performance by transferring 
established concepts from other research disciplines to an organizational context (i.e., Chapter 
2 – Organizational resilience), by applying a simulation method in an empirically 
characterized research fields (i.e., Chapter 3 – Workforce downsizing) as well as by 
fundamentally breaking with the established research logic of assessing direct performance 
effects (i.e., Chapter 4 – Turnaround duration). 
113 
 
REFERENCES 
Alexander, D. E. 2013. Resilience and disaster risk reduction: An etymological journey. 
Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences, 13(11): 2707-2716. 
Allen, D. G., Hancock, J. I., & Vardaman, J. M. 2014. Analytical mindsets in turnover 
research. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 35(S1): 61-86. 
Amit, R. & Schoemaker, P. J. H. 1993. Strategic assets and organizational rent. Strategic 
Management Journal, 14(1): 33-46. 
Anand, J. & Singh, H. 1997. Asset redeployment, acquistions and corporate strategy in 
declining industries. Strategic Management Journal, 18(1): 99-118. 
Andriopoulos, C. & Lewis, M. W. 2009. Exploitation-exploration tensions and 
organizational ambidexterity: Managing paradoxes of innovation. Organization Science, 
20(4): 696-717. 
Annarelli, A. & Nonino, F. 2016. Strategic and operational management of organizational 
resilience: Current state of research and future directions. Omega, 62: 1-18. 
APA; The Road to Resilience; http://www.apa.org/helpcenter/road-resilience.aspx; 20 June 
2016, 2015. 
Arogyaswamy, K., Barker, V. L., & Yasai-Ardekani, M. 1995. Firm turnarounds: An 
integrative two stage-model. Journal of Management Studies, 32(4): 493-525. 
Askeland, D. & Wright, W. 2013. Essentials of materials science & engineering. Stamford: 
Cengage Learning. 
Audia, P. G. & Greve, H. R. 2006. Less likely to fail: Low performance, firm size, and 
factory expansion in the shipbuilding industry. Management Science, 52(1): 83-94. 
Barker, V. L. & Mone, M. A. 1994. Retrenchment: Cause of turnaround or consequence of 
decline? Strategic Management Journal, 15(5): 395-405. 
114 
 
 
Barker, V. L. & Patterson, P. W. 1996. Top management team tenure and top manager 
causal attributions at declining firms attempting turnarounds. Group & Organization 
Management, 21(3): 304-336. 
Barker, V. L. & Duhaime, I. M. 1997. Strategic change in the turnaround process: Theory 
and empirical evidence. Strategic Management Journal, 18(1): 13-38. 
Barker, V. L., Patterson, J. P. W., & Mueller, G. C. 2001. Organizational causes and 
strategic consequences of the extent of top management team replacement during turnaround 
attempts. Journal of Management Studies, 38(2): 235-269. 
Barney, J. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of 
Management, 17(1): 99-120. 
Baron, R. M. & Kenny, D. A. 1986. The moderator–mediator variable distinction in social 
psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 51(6): 1173-1182. 
Bettis, R. A. & Prahalad, C. K. 1995. The dominant logic: Retrospective and extension. 
Strategic Management Journal, 16(1): 5-14. 
Bloodgood, J. M. & Morrow, J. L. 2003. Strategic organizational change: Exploring the roles 
of environmental structure, internal conscious awareness and knowledge. Journal of 
Management Studies, 40(7): 1761-1782. 
Bonanno, G. A. 2004. Loss, trauma, and human resilience: Have we underestimated the 
human capacity to thrive after extremely aversive events? American Psychologist, 59(1): 20-
28. 
Bonanno, G. A., Romero, S. A., & Klein, S. I. 2015. The temporal elements of psychological 
resilience: An integrative framework for the study of individuals, families, and communities. 
Psychological Inquiry, 26(2): 139-169. 
Bowman, E. H. & Singh, H. 1993. Corporate restructuring: Reconfiguring the firm. Strategic 
Management Journal, 14: 5-14. 
115 
 
 
BP; Annual Report 2015; http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/investors/results-and-
reporting/annual-report/annual-reporting-archive.html; 20 June 2016, 2016. 
Bradley, S. W., Shepherd, D. A., & Wiklund, J. 2011. The importance of slack for new 
organizations facing ‘tough’ environments. Journal of Management Studies, 48(5): 1071-
1097. 
Brass, D. J. 1984. Being in the right place: A structural analysis of individual influence in an 
organization. Administrative Science Quarterly: 518-539. 
Brauer, M. 2006. What have we acquired and what should we acquire in divestiture 
research? A review and research agenda. Journal of Management, 32(6): 751-785. 
Brauer, M. & Wiersema, M. F. 2012. Industry divestiture waves: How a firm's position 
influences investor returns. Academy of Management Journal, 55(6): 1472-1492. 
Brauer, M. & Laamanen, T. 2014. Workforce downsizing and firm performance: An 
organizational routine perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 51(8): 1311-1333. 
Brockner, J., Konovsky, M., Cooper-Schneider, R., Folger, R., Martin, C., & Bies, R. J. 
1994. Interactive effects of procedural justice and outcome negativity on victims and 
survivors of job loss. Academy of Management Journal, 37(2): 397-409. 
Brockner, J., Spreitzer, G., Mishra, A., Hochwarter, W., Pepper, L., & Weinberg, J. 2004. 
Perceived control as an antidote to the negative effects of layoffs on survivors' organizational 
commitment and job performance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 49(1): 76-100. 
Bromiley, P. 1991. Testing a causal model of corporate risk taking and performance. 
Academy of Management Journal, 34(1): 37-59. 
Bruton, G. D., Ahlstrom, D., & Wan, J. C. C. 2003. Turnaround in East Asian firms: 
Evidence from ethnic overseas Chinese communities. Strategic Management Journal, 
24(6): 519-540. 
Cameron, K., Freeman, S., & Mishra, A. 1991. Best practices in white-collar downsizing: 
Managing contradictions. Academy of Management Perspectives, 5(3): 57-73. 
116 
 
 
Cameron, K. S., Kim, M. U., & Whetten, D. A. 1987. Organizational effects of decline and 
turbulence. Administrative Science Quarterly, 32(2): 222-240. 
Cameron, K. S. 1994. Strategies for successful organizational downsizing. Human Resource 
Management, 33(2): 189-211. 
Capron, L. & Mitchell, W. 2009. Selection capability: How capability gaps and internal 
social frictions affect internal and external strategic renewal. Organization Science, 20(2): 
294-312. 
Carley, K. 1991. A theory of group stability. American Sociological Review, 56(3): 331-
354. 
Carvalho, H., Barroso, A. P., Machado, V. H., Azevedo, S., & Cruz-Machado, V. 2012. 
Supply chain redesign for resilience using simulation. Computers & Industrial 
Engineering, 62(1): 329-341. 
Cascio, W. F. 1993. Downsizing: What do we know? What have we learned? Academy of 
Management Executive, 7(1): 95-104. 
Cascio, W. F., Young, C. E., & Morris, J. R. 1997. Financial consequences of employment-
change decisions in major US corporations. Academy of Management Journal, 40(5): 1175-
1189. 
Cascio, W. F. 2000. Costing human resources : The financial impact of behavior in 
organizations. Boston: Kent. 
Castrogiovanni, G. J. & Bruton, G. D. 2000. Business turnaround processes following 
acquisitions: Reconsidering the role of retrenchment. Journal of Business Research, 48(1): 
25-34. 
Chambers, J. M., Cleveland, W. S., Kleiner, B., & Tukey, P. A. 1983. Graphical methods 
for data analysis. Belmont: Wadsworth International Group. 
Chen, G. & Hambrick, D. C. 2012. CEO replacement in turnaround situations: Executive 
(mis) fit and its performance implications. Organization Science, 23(1): 225-243. 
117 
 
 
Chen, G. 2015. Initial compensation of new CEOs hired in turnaround situations. Strategic 
Management Journal, 36(12): 1895-1917. 
Chiu, S.-c., Johnson, R. A., Hoskisson, R. E., & Pathak, S. 2016. The impact of CEO 
successor origin on corporate divestiture scale and scope change. Leadership Quarterly, 
27(4): 617-633. 
Chowdhury, S. D. & Lang, J. R. 1993. Crisis, decline, and turnaround: A test of competing 
hypotheses for short-term performance improvement in small firms. Journal of Small 
Business Management, 31(4): 8. 
Ciravegna, L. & Brenes, E. R. 2016. Learning to become a high reliability organization in 
the food retail business. Journal of Business Research, 69(10): 4499-4506. 
Cohen, J., Cohen, P., West, S. G., & Aiken, L. S. 2013. Applied multiple 
regression/correlation analysis for the behavioral sciences. London: Routledge. 
Combe, I. A. & Carrington, D. J. 2015. Leaders' sensemaking under crises: Emerging 
cognitive consensus over time within management teams. Leadership Quarterly, 26(3): 307-
322. 
Cumming, G. S., Barnes, G., Perz, S., Schmink, M., Sieving, K. E., Southworth, J., Binford, 
M., Holt, R. D., Stickler, C., & Van Holt, T. 2005. An exploratory framework for the 
empirical measurement of resilience. Ecosystems, 8(8): 975-987. 
Cyert, R. M. & March, J. G. 1963. A behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Dane, E. 2011. Paying attention to mindfulness and its effects on task performance in the 
workplace. Journal of Management, 37(4): 997-1018. 
Dane, E. & Brummel, B. J. 2014. Examining workplace mindfulness and its relations to job 
performance and turnover intention. Human Relations, 67(1): 105-128. 
Datta, D. K., Guthrie, J. P., Basuil, D., & Pandey, A. 2010. Causes and effects of employee 
downsizing: A review and synthesis. Journal of Management, 36(1): 281-348. 
118 
 
 
Datta, D. K. & Basuil, D. A. 2015. Does employee downsizing really work? In M. Andresen 
& C. Nowak (Eds.), Human resource management practices: Assessing added value: 197-
221. Cham: Springer International Publishing. 
Davidson, W. N., Worrell, D. L., & Dutia, D. 1993. The stock market effects of CEO 
succession in bankrupt firms. Journal of Management, 19(3): 517-533. 
Davis, G. F. & Stout, S. K. 1992. Organization theory and the market for corporate control: 
A dynamic analysis of the characteristics of large takeover targets, 1980-1990. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 37(4): 605-633. 
Dean, J. W. & Sharfman, M. P. 1996. Does decision process matter? A study of strategic 
decision-making effectiveness. Academy of Management Journal, 39(2): 368-392. 
Delmestri, G. & Walgenbach, P. 2005. Mastering techniques or brokering knowledge? 
Middle managers in Germany, Great Britain and Italy. Organization Studies, 26(2): 197-
220. 
DeRue, D. S., Hollenbeck, J. R., Johnson, M. D., Ilgen, D. R., & Jundt, D. K. 2008. How 
different team downsizing approaches influence team-level adaptation and performance. 
Academy of Management Journal, 51(1): 182-196. 
Dess, G. G. & Beard, D. W. 1984. Dimensions of organizational task environments. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 29(1): 52-73. 
Dewitt, R.-L. 1998. Firm, industry, and strategy influences on choice of downsizing 
approach. Strategic Management Journal, 19(1): 59. 
Dinh, L. T., Pasman, H., Gao, X., & Mannan, M. S. 2012. Resilience engineering of 
industrial processes: Principles and contributing factors. Journal of Loss Prevention in the 
Process Industries, 25(2): 233-241. 
Donkin, C., Little, D. R., & Houpt, J. W. 2014. Assessing the speed-accuracy trade-off effect 
on the capacity of information processing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 40(3): 1183-1202. 
119 
 
 
Dooley, R. S., Fryxell, G. E., & Judge, W. Q. 2000. Belaboring the not-so-obvious: 
Consensus, commitment, and strategy implementation speed and success. Journal of 
Management, 26(6): 1237-1257. 
Dranikoff, L., Koller, T., & Schneider, A. 2002. Divestiture: Strategy's missing link. 
Harvard Business Review, 80(5): 74-83, 133. 
Duhaime, I. M. & Schwenk, C. R. 1985. Conjectures on cognitive simplification in 
acquisition and divestment decision making. Academy of Management Review, 10(2): 287-
295. 
Dutton, J. E. & Ashford, S. J. 1993. Selling issues to top management. Academy of 
Management Review, 18(3): 397-428. 
Elbanna, S. & Child, J. 2007. The influence of decision, environmental and firm 
characteristics on the rationality of strategic decision‐making. Journal of Management 
Studies, 44(4): 561-591. 
Espahbodi, R., John, T. A., & Vasudevan, G. 2000. The effects of downsizing on operating 
performance. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 15(2): 107-126. 
Fang, C., Lee, J., & Schilling, M. A. 2010. Balancing exploration and exploitation through 
structural design: The isolation of subgroups and organizational learning. Organization 
Science, 21(3): 625-642. 
Feldman, E. R. 2014. Legacy divestitures: Motives and implications. Organization Science, 
25(3): 815-832. 
Feldman, M. S. 2000. Organizational routines as a source of continuous change. 
Organization Science, 11(6): 611-629. 
Fiol, C. M. & O'Connor, E. J. 2003. Waking up! Mindfulness in the face of bandwagons. 
Academy of Management Review, 28(1): 54-70. 
Fisher, S. R. & White, M. A. 2000. Downsizing in a learning organization: Are there hidden 
costs? Academy of Management Review, 25(1): 244-251. 
120 
 
 
Forbes, D. P. 2007. Reconsidering the strategic implications of decision comprehensiveness. 
Academy of Management Review, 32(2): 361-376. 
Ford, J. D. 1985. The effects of causal attributions on decision makers' responses to 
performance downturns. Academy of Management Review, 10(4): 770-786. 
Francis, J. D. & Desai, A. B. 2005. Situational and organizational determinants of 
turnaround. Management Decision, 43(9): 1203-1224. 
Fredrickson, B. L. 2001. The role of positive emotions in positive psychology: The broaden-
and-build theory of positive emotions. American Psychologist, 56(3): 218. 
Fredrickson, J. W., Hambrick, D. C., & Baumrin, S. 1988. A model of CEO dismissal. 
Academy of Management Review, 13(2): 255-270. 
Friedman, D., Scullion, C., & Hill, J. 2006. Global delayering for competitive advantage. 
BCG Perspectives. 
GE; How GE works - governance - resilience; http://www.gesustainability.com/how-ge-
works/governance/resilience/; 20 June 2016, 2016. 
Gioia, D. A. & Chittipeddi, K. 1991. Sensemaking and sensegiving in strategic change 
initiation. Strategic Management Journal, 12(6): 433-448. 
Gittell, J. H., Cameron, K., Lim, S., & Rivas, V. 2006. Relationships, layoffs, and 
organizational resilience airline industry responses to September 11. Journal of Applied 
Behavioral Science, 42(3): 300-329. 
Gordon, S. S., Stewart, J. W. H., Sweo, R., & Luker, W. A. 2000. Convergence versus 
strategic reorientation: The antecedents of fast-paced organizational change. Journal of 
Management, 26(5): 911-945. 
Greene, W. H. 2003. Econometric analysis. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall. 
Greiner, L. E. & Bhambri, A. 1989. New CEO intervention and dynamics of deliberate 
strategic change. Strategic Management Journal, 10(S1): 67-86. 
121 
 
 
Guth, W. D. & MacMillan, I. C. 1986. Strategy implementation versus middle management 
self‐interest. Strategic Management Journal, 7(4): 313-327. 
Guthrie, J. P. & Datta, D. K. 2008. Dumb and dumber: The impact of downsizing on firm 
performance as moderated by industry conditions. Organization Science, 19(1): 108-123. 
Hambrick, D. C. & Snow, C. C. 1977. A contextual model of strategic decision making in 
organizations. Paper presented at the Academy of Management Proceedings, Kissimmee. 
Hambrick, D. C. & Fukutomi, G. D. 1991. The seasons of a CEO's tenure. Academy of 
Management Review, 16(4): 719-742. 
Hancock, J. I., Allen, D. G., Bosco, F. A., McDaniel, K. R., & Pierce, C. A. 2013. Meta-
analytic review of employee turnover as a predictor of firm performance. Journal of 
Management, 39(3): 573-603. 
Hancock, J. I., Allen, D. G., & Soelberg, C. 2017. Collective turnover: An expanded meta-
analytic exploration and comparison. Human Resource Management Review, 27(1): 61-86. 
Haunschild, P. R. 1993. Interorganizational imitation: The impact of interlocks on corporate 
acquisition activity. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38(4): 564-592. 
Haunschild, P. R. & Beckman, C. M. 1998. When do interlocks matter?: Alternate sources of 
information and interlock influence. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43(4): 815-844. 
Hausman, J. A. 1978. Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica: Journal of the 
Econometric Society, 46(6): 1251-1271. 
Hayward, M. L. A., Rindova, V. P., & Pollock, T. G. 2004. Believing one's own press: The 
causes and consequences of CEO celebrity. Strategic Management Journal, 25(7): 637-653. 
Helfat, C. E. & Peteraf, M. A. 2015. Managerial cognitive capabilities and the 
microfoundations of dynamic capabilities. Strategic Management Journal, 36(6): 831-850. 
Henderson, A. D., Miller, D., & Hambrick, D. C. 2006. How quickly do CEOs become 
obsolete? Industry dynamism, CEO tenure, and company performance. Strategic 
Management Journal, 27(5): 447-460. 
122 
 
 
Hick, W. E. 1952. On the rate of gain of information. Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 4(1): 11-26. 
Hickson, D., Butler, R., Cray, D., Mallory, G., & Wilson, D. 1986. Top decisions: Strategic 
decision making in organizations. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Hofer, C. W. 1980. Turnaround strategies. Journal of Business Strategy, 1(1): 19-31. 
Holling, C. S. 1973. Resilience and stability of ecological systems. Annual Review of 
Ecology and Systematics, 4: 1-23. 
Holling, C. S. 1996. Engineering resilience versus ecological resilience. In P. Schulze (Ed.), 
Engineering within ecological constraints: 31-44. Washington DC: National Academy 
Press. 
Hoskisson, R. E., Johnson, R. A., & Moesel, D. D. 1994. Corporate divestiture intensity in 
restructuring firms: Effects of governance, strategy, and performance. Academy of 
Management Journal, 37(5): 1207-1251. 
Jacquemin, A. P. & Berry, C. H. 1979. Entropy measure of diversification and corporate 
growth. Journal of Industrial Economics, 27(4): 359-369. 
Jenter, D. & Kanaan, F. 2015. CEO turnover and relative performance evaluation. Journal 
of Finance, 70(5): 2155-2184. 
Johnson, A. A. 1995. The business case for work-family programs. Journal of 
Accountancy, 180(2): 53-58. 
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. 1979. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. 
Econometrica, 47(2): 263-291. 
Kang, J.-K. & Shivdasani, A. 1997. Corporate restructuring during performance declines in 
Japan. Journal of Financial Economics, 46(1): 29-65. 
Kang, J. 2013. The relationship between corporate diversification and corporate social 
performance. Strategic Management Journal, 34(1): 94-109. 
123 
 
 
Kang, J. 2016. Labor market evaluation versus legacy conservation: What factors determine 
retiring CEOs' decisions about long-term investment? Strategic Management Journal, 
37(2): 389-405. 
Kanter, R. M. 1981. The middle manager as innovator. Harvard Business Review, 60(4): 
95-105. 
Kanter, R. M. 2003. Leadership and the psychology of turnarounds. Harvard Business 
Review, 81(6): 58-67. 
Karim, S. & Mitchell, W. 2000. Path-dependent and path-breaking change: Reconfiguring 
business resources following business. Strategic Management Journal, 21(10/11): 1061-
1081. 
Karim, S. 2006. Modularity in organizational structure: The reconfiguration of internally 
developed and acquired business units. Strategic Management Journal, 27(9): 799-823. 
Kesner, I. F. & Dalton, D. R. 1994. Top management turnover and CEO succession: An 
investigation of the effects of turnover on performance. Journal of Management Studies, 
31(5): 701-713. 
Kiesler, S. & Sproull, L. 1982. Managerial response to changing environments: Perspectives 
on problem sensing from social cognition. Administrative Science Quarterly, 27(4): 548-
570. 
Kleinbaum, A. M. & Stuart, T. E. 2014. Network responsiveness: The social structural 
microfoundations of dynamic capabilities. Academy of Management Perspectives, 28(4): 
353-367. 
Kossek, E. E. & Perrigino, M. B. 2016. Resilience: A review using a grounded integrated 
occupational approach. Academy of Management Annals, 10(1): 729-797. 
Kunisch, S., Bartunek, J. M., Mueller, J., & Huy, Q. N. 2017. Time in strategic change 
research. Academy of Management Annals, 11(2): 1005-1064. 
Laamanen, T. & Keil, T. 2008. Performance of serial acquirers: Toward an acquisition 
program perspective. Strategic Management Journal, 29(6): 663-672. 
124 
 
 
Laamanen, T., Brauer, M., & Junna, O. 2014. Performance of acquirers of divested assets: 
Evidence from the U.S. software industry. Strategic Management Journal, 35(6): 914-925. 
Langer, E. J. 1989. Minding matters: The consequences of mindlessness–mindfulness. In L. 
Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology, Vol. 22: 137-173. London: 
Academic Press. 
Lazarsfeld, P. F. & Merton, R. K. 1954. Friendship as a social process: A substantive and 
methodological analysis. Freedom and Control in Modern Society, 18(1): 18-66. 
Lengnick-Hall, C. A., Beck, T. E., & Lengnick-Hall, M. L. 2011. Developing a capacity for 
organizational resilience through strategic human resource management. Human Resource 
Management Review, 21(3): 243-255. 
Leonard-Barton, D. 1992. Core capabilities and core rigidities: A paradox in managing new 
product development. Strategic Management Journal, 13: 111-125. 
Levinthal, D. & Rerup, C. 2006. Crossing an apparent chasm: Bridging mindful and less-
mindful perspectives on organizational learning. Organization Science, 17(4): 502-513. 
Likert, R. 1961. New patterns of management. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Lim, D. S., Celly, N., Morse, E. A., & Rowe, W. G. 2013. Rethinking the effectiveness of 
asset and cost retrenchment: The contingency effects of a firm's rent creation mechanism. 
Strategic Management Journal, 34(1): 42-61. 
Linnenluecke, M. K. 2017. Resilience in business and management research: A review of 
influential publications and a research agenda. International Journal of Management 
Reviews, 19(1): 4-30. 
Littler, C. R., Wiesner, R., & Dunford, R. 2003. The dynamics of delayering: Changing 
management structures in three countries. Journal of Management Studies, 40(2): 225-256. 
Littler, C. R. & Innes, P. 2004. The paradox of managerial downsizing. Organization 
Studies 25(7): 1159-1184. 
125 
 
 
London, M. 1983. Toward a theory of career motivation. Academy of Management Review, 
8(4): 620-630. 
Lorsch, J. W. & Allen, S. A. 1973. Managing diversity and interdependence: An 
organizational study of multidivisional firms. Boston: Harvard University. 
Luthans, B. C. & Sommer, S. M. 1999. The impact of downsizing on workplace attitudes: 
Differing reactions of managers and staff in a health care organization Group & 
Organization Management, 24(1): 46-70. 
Luthar, S. S., Cicchetti, D., & Becker, B. 2000. The construct of resilience: A critical 
evaluation and guidelines for future work. Child Development, 71(3): 543-562. 
Mallak, L. 1998. Putting organizational resilience to work. Industrial Management, 40(6): 
8-13. 
March, J. G. 1991. Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. Organization 
Science, 2(1): 71-87. 
Marcus, A. A. & Nichols, M. L. 1999. On the edge: Heeding the warnings of unusual events. 
Organization Science, 10(4): 482-499. 
Massingham, P. 2008. Measuring the impact of knowledge loss: More than ripples on a 
pond? Management Learning, 39(5): 541-560. 
Masten, A. S., Best, K. M., & Garmezy, N. 1990. Resilience and development: Contributions 
from the study of children who overcome adversity. Development and Psychopathology, 
2(4): 425-444. 
Matta, E. & Beamish, P. W. 2008. The accentuated CEO career horizon problem: Evidence 
from international acquisitions. Strategic Management Journal, 29(7): 683-700. 
McKinley, W. 1993. Organizational decline and adaptation: Theoretical controversies. 
Organization Science, 4(1): 1-9. 
McKinley, W., Latham, S., & Braun, M. 2014. Organizational decline and innovation: 
Turnarounds and downward spirals. Academy of Management Review, 39(1): 88-110. 
126 
 
 
McPherson, J. M. & Smith-Lovin, L. 1987. Homophily in voluntary organizations: Status 
distance and the composition of face-to-face groups. American Sociological Review, 52(3): 
370-379. 
Mellor, S. 1992. The influence of layoff severity on postlayoff union commitment among 
survivors: The moderating effect of the perceived legitimacy of a layoff account. Personnel 
Psychology, 45(3): 579-600. 
Michael, S. C. & Robbins, D. K. 1998. Retrenchment among small manufacturing firms 
during recession. Journal of Small Business Management, 36(3): 35-45. 
Miller, D. 1993. Some organizational consequences CEO succession. Academy of 
Management Journal, 36(3): 644-659. 
Miller, K. D., Meng, Z., & Calantone, R. J. 2006. Adding interpersonal learning and tacit 
knowledge to March's exploration-exploitation model. Academy of Management Journal, 
49(4): 709-722. 
Miller, M. K. 2008. Judgment aggregation and subjective decision-making. Economics & 
Philosophy, 24(2): 205-231. 
Mintzberg, H., Raisinghani, D., & Theoret, A. 1976. The structure of "unstructured" decision 
processes. Administrative Science Quarterly: 246-275. 
Mone, M. A., McKinley, W., & Barker, V. L. 1998. Organizational decline and innovation: 
A contingency framework. Academy of Management Review, 23(1): 115-132. 
Morgan, G. P. & Carley, K. M. 2012. Modeling formal and informal ties within an 
organization: A multiple model integration. In A. Lomi & J. R. Harrison (Eds.), The garbage 
can model of organizational choice: Looking forward at forty 253-292. Bingley: Emerald 
Group Publishing Limited. 
Morrow, J. L., Johnson, R. A., & Busenitz, L. W. 2004. The effects of cost and asset 
retrenchment on firm performance: The overlooked role of a firm’s competitive 
environment. Journal of Management, 30(2): 189-208. 
127 
 
 
Morrow, J. L., Sirmon, D. G., Hitt, M. A., & Holcomb, T. R. 2007. Creating value in the 
face of declining performance: Firm strategies and organizational recovery. Strategic 
Management Journal, 28(3): 271-283. 
Moulton, W. N., Thomas, H., & Pruett, M. 1996. Business failure pathways: Environmental 
stress and organizational response. Journal of Management, 22(4): 571-595. 
Mumford, M. D., Friedrich, T. L., Caughron, J. J., & Byrne, C. L. 2007. Leader cognition in 
real-world settings: How do leaders think about crises? Leadership Quarterly, 18(6): 515-
543. 
Musteen, M., Liang, X., & Barker, V. L. 2011. Personality, perceptions and retrenchment 
decisions of managers in response to decline: Evidence from a decision-making study. 
Leadership Quarterly, 22(5): 926-941. 
Nadler, D., Tushman, M., & Nadler, M. B. 1997. Competing by design: The power of 
organizational architecture. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Ndofor, H. A., Vanevenhoven, J., & Barker, V. L. 2013. Software firm turnarounds in the 
1990s: An analysis of reversing decline in a growing, dynamic industry. Strategic 
Management Journal, 34(9): 1123-1133. 
Neter, J., Kutner, M. H., Nachtsheim, C. J., & Wasserman, W. 1996. Applied linear 
statistical models. Chicago: Irwin  
Newbert, S. L. 2008. Value, rareness, competitive advantage, and performance: A 
conceptual-level empirical investigation of the resource-based view of the firm. Strategic 
Management Journal, 29(7): 745-768. 
Newman, M. E. 2002. Assortative mixing in networks. Physical Review Letters, 89(20): 
208701. 
Nonaka, I. 1988. Toward middle-up-down management: Accelerating information creation. 
MIT Sloan Management Review, 29(3): 9-18. 
O'Neill, R. V. 1986. A hierarchical concept of ecosystems. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press. 
128 
 
 
Olson, M. S., Van Bever, D., & Verry, S. 2008. When growth stalls. Harvard Business 
Review, 86(3): 50. 
Ortiz-De-Mandojana, N. & Bansal, P. 2016. The long-term benefits of orgainzational 
resilience through sustainable business practices. Strategic Management Journal, 37(8): 
1615-1631. 
Padgett, J. F. 1980. Managing garbage can hierarchies. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
25(4): 583-604. 
Palmon, O. & Sun, H.-L. 1997. Layoff announcements: Stock market impact and financial 
performance. Journal of the Financial Management Association, 26(3): 54-68. 
Papadakis, V. M., Lioukas, S., & Chambers, D. 1998. Strategic decision‐making processes: 
The role of management and context. Strategic Management Journal, 19(2): 115-147. 
Pearce, J. A. & Robbins, K. 1993. Toward improved theory and research on business 
turnaround. Journal of Management, 19(3): 613-636. 
Pearce, J. A. & Robbins, D. K. 1994. Retrenchment remains the foundation of business 
turnaround. Strategic Management Journal, 15(5): 407-417. 
Pennings, J. M., Lee, K., & Van Witteloostuijn, A. 1998. Human capital, social capital, and 
firm dissolution. Academy of Management Journal, 41(4): 425-440. 
Perlow, L. A., Okhuysen, G. A., & Repenning, N. P. 2002. The speed trap: Exploring the 
relationship between decision making and temporal context. Academy of Management 
Journal, 45(5): 931-955. 
Perry, T. & Shivdasani, A. 2005. Do boards affect performance? Evidence from corporate 
restructuring. Journal of Business, 78(4): 1403-1431. 
Pimm, S. L. 1984. The complexity and stability of ecosystems. Nature, 307(5949): 321-326. 
Powell, T. C. 2001. Competitive advantage: Logical and philosophical considerations. 
Strategic Management Journal, 22(9): 875-888. 
129 
 
 
Prahalad, C. K. & Bettis, R. A. 1986. The dominant logic: A new linkage between diversity 
and performance. Strategic Management Journal, 7(6): 485-501. 
Preacher, K. J. & Hayes, A. F. 2004. SPSS and SAS procedures for estimating indirect 
effects in simple mediation models. Behavior Research Methods, 36(4): 717-731. 
Priem, R. L. & Butler, J. E. 2001. Is the resource-based "view" a useful perspective for 
strategic management research? Academy of Management Review, 26(1): 22-40. 
Puffer, S. M. & Weintrop, J. B. 1991. Corporate performance and CEO turnover: The role of 
performance expectations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(1): 1-19. 
Ravenscraft, D. J. & Scherer, F. M. 2011. Mergers, sell-offs, and economic efficiency. 
Washington: Brookings Institution Press. 
Reb, J., Narayanan, J., & Ho, Z. W. 2015. Mindfulness at work: Antecedents and 
consequences of employee awareness and absent-mindedness. Mindfulness, 6(1): 111-122. 
Robbins, D. K. & Pearce, J. A. 1992. Turnaround: Retrenchment and recovery. Strategic 
Management Journal, 13(4): 287-309. 
Romanelli, E. & Tushman, M. L. 1994. Organizational transformation as punctuated 
equilibrium: An empirical test. Academy of Management Journal, 37(5): 1141-1166. 
Rousseau, D. M. & Tijoriwala, S. A. 1998. Assessing psychological contracts: Issues, 
alternatives and measures. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 19(51): 679-695. 
Schemeil, Y. 2013. Bringing international organization in: Global institutions as adaptive 
hybrids. Organization Studies, 34(2): 219-252. 
Schilling, M. A. & Fang, C. 2014. When hubs forget, lie, and play favorites: Interpersonal 
network structure, information distortion, and organizational learning. Strategic 
Management Journal, 35(7): 974-994. 
Schmitt, A., Borzillo, S., & Probst, G. 2012. Don’t let knowledge walk away: Knowledge 
retention during employee downsizing. Management Learning, 43(1): 53-74. 
130 
 
 
Schmitt, A. & Raisch, S. 2013. Corporate turnarounds: The duality of retrenchment and 
recovery. Journal of Management Studies, 50(7): 1216-1244. 
Schouten, J. & Bekker, J. 1967. Reaction time and accuracy. Acta Psychologica, 27(1): 143-
153. 
Schreyögg, G. & Kliesch-Eberl, M. 2007. How dynamic can organizational capabilities be? 
Towards a dual-process model of capability dynamization. Strategic Management Journal, 
28(9): 913-933. 
Schwenk, C. R. 1984. Cognitive simplification processes in strategic decision-making. 
Strategic Management Journal, 5(2): 111-128. 
Shah, P. P. 2000. Network destruction: The structural implications of downsizing. Academy 
of Management Journal, 43(1): 101-112. 
Sharfman, M. P., Wolf, G., Chase, R. B., & Tansik, D. A. 1988. Antecedents of 
organizational slack. Academy of Management Review, 13(4): 601-614. 
Shaw, D. G. & Schneier, C. E. 1993. Making organization change happen: The keys to 
successful delayering. Human Resource Planning, 16(1): 1-18. 
Shi, W. & Prescott, J. E. 2011. Sequence patterns of firms' acquisition and alliance 
behaviour and their performance implications. Journal of Management Studies, 48(5): 
1044-1070. 
Shi, W., Sun, J., & Prescott, J. E. 2012. A temporal perspective of merger and acquisition 
and strategic alliance initiatives: Review and future direction. Journal of Management, 
38(1): 164-209. 
Shonin, E., Van Gordon, W., Dunn, T. J., Singh, N. N., & Griffiths, M. D. 2014. Meditation 
awareness training (MAT) for work-related wellbeing and job performance: A randomised 
controlled trial. International Journal of Mental Health and Addiction, 12(6): 806-823. 
Shrout, P. E. & Bolger, N. 2002. Mediation in experimental and nonexperimental studies: 
New procedures and recommendations. Psychological Methods, 7(4): 422-445. 
131 
 
 
Simon, H. A. 1987. Making management decisions: The role of intuition and emotion. 
Academy of Management Executive, 1(1): 57-64. 
Sirmon, D. G., Hitt, M. A., & Ireland, R. D. 2007. Managing firm resources in dynamic 
environments to create value: Looking inside the black box. Academy of Management 
Review, 32(1): 273-292. 
Sobel, M. E. 1982. Asymptotic confidence intervals for indirect effects in structural equation 
models. Sociological Methodology, 13: 290-312. 
Starke, F. A., Dyck, B., & Mauws, M. K. 2003. Coping with the sudden loss of an 
indispensable employee: An exploratory case study. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 
39(2): 208-228. 
Staw, B. M., Sandelands, L. E., & Dutton, J. E. 1981. Threat rigidity effects in 
organizational behavior: A multilevel analysis. Administrative Science Quarterly, 26(4): 
501-524. 
Sturman, M. C., Trevor, C. O., Boudreau, J. W., & Gerhart, B. 2003. Is it worth to win the 
talen war? Evaluating the utility of performance-based pay. Personnel Psychology, 56(4): 
997-1035. 
Sudarsanam, S. & Lai, J. 2001. Corporate financial distress and turnaround strategies: An 
empirical analysis. British Journal of Management, 12(3): 183-199. 
Tallman, S. & Li, J. 1996. Effects of international diversity and product diversity on the 
performance of multinational firms. Academy of Management Journal, 39(1): 179-196. 
Tangpong, C., Abebe, M., & Li, Z. 2015. A temporal approach to retrenchment and 
successful turnaround in declining firms. Journal of Management Studies, 52(5): 647-677. 
Teece, D. J., Pisano, G., & Shuen, A. 1997. Dynamic capabilities and strategic management. 
Strategic Management Journal, 18(7): 509-533. 
Teece, D. J. 2007. Explicating dynamic capabilities: The nature and microfoundations of 
(sustainable) enterprise performance. Strategic Management Journal, 28(13): 1319-1350. 
132 
 
 
Teece, D. J. 2014. The foundations of enterprise performance: Dynamic and ordinary 
capabilities in an (economic) theory of firms. Academy of Management Perspectives, 28(4): 
328-352. 
Thompson, J. D. 1967. Organizations in action: Social science bases of administrative 
theory: Transaction publishers. 
Tilman, D. & Downing, J. A. 1994. Biodiversity and stability in grasslands. Nature, 367: 
363-365. 
Trahms, C. A., Ndofor, H. A., & Sirmon, D. G. 2013. Organizational decline and 
turnaround: A review and agenda for future research. Journal of Management, 39(5): 1277-
1307. 
Trevor, C. O. & Nyberg, A. J. 2008. Keeping your headcount when all about you are losing 
theirs: Downsizing, voluntary turnover rates, and the moderating role of HR practices. 
Academy of Management Journal, 51(2): 259-276. 
van der Vegt, G. S., Essens, P., Wahlström, M., & George, G. 2015. Managing risk and 
resilience. Academy of Management Journal, 58(4): 971-980. 
Verbrugge, L. M. 1977. The structure of adult friendship choices. Social Forces, 56(2): 576-
597. 
Vermeulen, F. & Barkema, H. 2002. Pace, rhythm, and scope: Process dependence in 
building a profitable multinational corporation. Strategic Management Journal, 23(7): 637-
653. 
Vidal, E. & Mitchell, W. 2015. Adding by subtracting: The relationship between 
performance feedback and resource reconfiguration through divestitures. Organization 
Science, 26(4): 1101-1118. 
Vijh, A. M. 2002. The positive announcement‐period returns of equity carveouts: 
Asymmetric information or divestiture gains? Journal of Business, 75(1): 153-190. 
133 
 
 
Vogus, T. J. & Welbourne, T. M. 2003. Structuring for high reliability: HR practices and 
mindful processes in reliability‐seeking organizations. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 
24(7): 877-903. 
Vogus, T. J. & Sutcliffe, K. M. 2007. Organizational resilience: Towards a theory and 
research agenda. Paper presented at the IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man 
and Cybernetics, Montreal. 
Wan, W. P. & Yiu, D. W. 2009. From crisis to opportunity: Environmental jolt, corporate 
acquisitions, and firm performance. Strategic Management Journal, 30(7): 791-801. 
Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe, K. M., & Obstfeld, D. 1999. Organizing for high reliability: Process 
of collective mindfulness. Research in Organizational Behavior, 21: 81-123. 
Weick, K. E. & Sutcliffe, K. M. 2006. Mindfulness and the quality of organizational 
attention. Organization Science, 17(4): 514-524. 
Werner, E. E., Bierman, J. M., & French, F. E. 1971. The children of Kauai: A longitudinal 
study from the prenatal period to age ten. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
Werner, E. E. 1997. Vulnerable but invincible: High-risk children from birth to adulthood. 
Acta Paediatrica, 86(S422): 103-105. 
Werner, E. E. & Smith, R. S. 2001. Journeys from childhood to midlife: Risk, resilience, 
and recovery. London: Cornell University Press. 
Westphal, J. D. & Fredrickson, J. W. 2001. Who directs strategic change? Director 
experience, the selection of new CEOs, and change in corporate strategy. Strategic 
Management Journal, 22(12): 1113-1137. 
Whetten, D. A. 1980. Organizational decline: A neglected topic in organizational science. 
Academy of Management Review, 5(4): 577-588. 
Wickelgren, W. A. 1977. Speed-accuracy tradeoff and information processing dynamics. 
Acta Psychologica, 41(1): 67-85. 
134 
 
 
Williams, E. A., Pillai, R., Deptula, B., & Lowe, K. B. 2012. The effects of crisis, cynicism 
about change, and value congruence on perceptions of authentic leadership and attributed 
charisma in the 2008 presidential election. Leadership Quarterly, 23(3): 324-341. 
Williams, T., Gruber, D., Sutcliffe, K., Shepherd, D., & Zhao, E. Y. 2017. Organizational 
response to adversity: Fusing crisis management and resilience research streams. Academy 
of Management Annals: annals. 2015.0134. 
Williams, T. A. & Shepherd, D. A. 2016. Building resilience or providing sustance: 
Different paths of emergent ventures in the aftermath of the haiti earthquake. Academy of 
Management Journal, 59(6): 2069-2102. 
Winn, J. 1997. Asset productivity turnaround: The growth/efficiency challenge. Journal of 
Management Studies, 34(4): 585-600. 
Wooldridge, B. & Floyd, S. W. 1990. The strategy process, middle management 
involvement, and organizational performance. Strategic Management Journal, 11(3): 231-
241. 
Wooldridge, B., Schmid, T., & Floyd, S. W. 2008. The middle management perspective on 
strategy process: Contributions, synthesis, and future research. Journal of Management, 
34(6): 1190-1221. 
Wulf, J. 2012. The flattened firm: Not as advertised. California Management Review, 55(1): 
5-23. 
Zollo, M. & Winter, S. G. 2002. Deliberate learning and the evolution of dynamic 
capabilities. Organization Science, 13(3): 339-351. 
 
  
135 
 
 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
2014 – 2018 Universität Mannheim 
  Doktorand und wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter 
2011 – 2014 Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)  
  Studium des Wirtschaftsingenieurwesens (M.Sc.) (Note: 1,5) 
2013  Peking Institut für Technologie (BIT), China 
  Auslandsstudium 
2012  Polytechnische Universität Barcelona (ETSEIB), Spanien 
  Auslandsstudium 
2008 – 2011 Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)  
  Studium des Wirtschaftsingenieurwesens (B.Sc.) (Note: 1,8) 
2008  Altes Kurfürstliches Gymnasium Bensheim 
  Allgemeine Hochschulreife (Note: 1,5) 
 
136 
 
 
